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MIND, BODY, MOTION, MATTER

The essays gathered here represent recent approaches to eighteenth-
century literature and philosophy. Beginning in the 1980s, Foucauldian 
criticism, among other theoretical currents, transformed the study of 
philosophical ideas into analyses of “knowledge.”2 Early modern and 
Enlightenment philosophies, in particular, were subsequently inter-
preted as cultural constructions and assessed in terms of their historical 
effects. The literary works of the long eighteenth century were taken, in 
large part, as representations of the same social and political domains 
in which knowledge operated, even as they performed distinctive cul-
tural work.3 The twenty-first century has brought about a critical shift 
from the study of knowledge-making in our period to natural phi-
losophy. Natural philosophy is a capacious field of inquiry that tradi-
tionally encompassed both the natural world and human nature, and 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed major revi-
sions of its three core concepts: matter, or what the world is made up of; 
motion – not simply as a spatial phenomenon, but as an account of why 
things come to be and how things change; and the nature of humans as 
“thinking things.”4
This volume builds on current scholarship in eighteenth-century nat-
ural philosophy and literature, cognitive humanities, and the history of 
science, which take up these fundamental concepts. Because scholars’ 
interests branch out in many directions, we have not solicited contribu-
tions focused on just one theme.5 Our essays discuss such diverse top-
ics as artisanal aesthetics, religious toleration, pneumatology, thinking 
matter, and theories of judgment. The contributors consistently attend 
to aesthetics in their arguments and rely on literary-critical methods, 
yet some of us bring philosophical ideas to interpretations of literary 
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works or literary tropes and others direct their studies more broadly 
to theory and the history of ideas. Despite these dissimilarities, we all 
engage with the re-grounding of human experience that resulted from 
early modern materialist and mechanistic tenets. This is not to say that 
there is only one philosophical school that informs eighteenth-century 
writing. The premises of materiality and motion are not stable, nor do 
they unilaterally commandeer the period’s intellectual developments. 
On the contrary, they are significant for us because they posed difficult 
questions: Can matter and motion account for all being, be it the gen-
eration of a new biological life or human will and desire? Is matter inert 
and motion external to matter in living things, or is activity inherent 
in animate matter? If the human being is both material body and con-
sciousness, what is the nature of their interaction? How do the motions 
of sensation and feeling mediate bodies, minds, and their environ-
ments? Concepts elicit debate, of course, but it is the curiously conjunc-
tive natures of matter and motion, body and thinking that exercised the 
era’s theoretical imagination.
The topics we address would appear to invite interdisciplinary anal-
ysis, yet our essays are premised instead on the eighteenth century’s 
pre-disciplinarity. As we show, silos of learning were rare despite the 
growth of expertise in the period, and transnational conversations as 
well as transhistorical ones were commonplace.6 This pre-disciplinarity 
is also highlighted by the pansophism of several authors featured in the 
volume: the third Earl of Shaftesbury, who is treated by David Alvarez 
and Vivasvan Soni, aggregates politics, ethics, religion, and aesthetics; 
Denis Diderot, who appears in the essays by Sarah Ellenzweig, Kate 
Tunstall, and Joanna Stalnaker, not only directed the Encyclopédie, but 
expounds on epistemology, biology, and aesthetics, while writing novels 
and plays. Laurence Sterne, who appears in Jonathan Kramnick’s and 
Tunstall’s essays, and William Hogarth, who is discussed by Ruth Mack 
and Kramnick, are as important for their theories of mental operations 
as for their literary and visual works. The cross-fertilization of ideas 
enabled by the eighteenth-century’s pre-disciplinarity is also evinced, 
as Sara Landreth shows, in Daniel Defoe’s overlap with  Cambridge 
 Platonism, and, as Ellenzweig demonstrates, in Samuel Richardson’s 
alliance with philosophical materialism.
Rather than attempt to outline the complex ideas pertaining to mate-
riality and motion, and how they cross various fields of inquiry in the 
eighteenth century, let us begin with one of our recurring motifs – the 
concept of form. Although form is a term that largely dropped out of 
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philosophy in the eighteenth century, its absence helps explain the 
abundance of speculative energy around matter and motion, body and 
mind, as well as the imbrication of these concepts with aesthetics. It is 
often remarked that modern philosophy was inaugurated by rejecting 
such metaphysical superstitions as form inherited from Aristotelian-
ism, and that the new philosophy relied instead on clear perception and 
reasoning. The standard view of form’s elimination has obscured the 
fact that closely related notions of organization or structure are central 
to understanding everything from living beings to sensory perception 
to visual diagrams and narrative plots in the eighteenth century.
In Aristotle’s system, which was later translated into Scholastic phi-
losophy, form is one of the four causes; the others are material, efficient, 
and final (telos). For Aristotle, substance, which is to say anything that 
exists, is composed with both matter and form. Matter is undifferenti-
ated, though it has the potential to be a specific thing. Form is actuality, 
by which matter becomes individuated. At the same time, form provides 
for the thing’s belonging to a kind or species.7 Martha Bolton explains: 
“The form of horse, for example, is shared in that one form is individu-
ated by union with the (quantified) matter of many individual horses.”8 
Similarly, the soul in Aristotle’s philosophy is the form or actualizing 
principle of all living things (plants, animals, and humans) that endows 
living things with both individual essence and species essence. Thus, 
form provides a systematic explanation of the otherwise inert material 
world. Although formal cause is distinct from final cause, it is nonethe-
less closely allied with telos, that is, the idea that everything must aim 
towards some end already embedded within it. In the early modern 
era, the notion that all substances are a composite of matter and form 
is subjected to radical revision. Philosophers like John Locke deny that 
matter and form come together to individuate things and to identify 
species. Instead, matter is its own substance, and its changes in state 
can be attributed to mechanical motion, not different forms.9 Locke also 
helps dismiss the concept by arguing that the “substantial forms” were 
not knowable: “Those therefore who have been taught, that the several 
Species of Substances had their distinct internal substantial forms; and 
that it was those Forms, which made the distinction of Substances into 
their true species and genera, were … set upon a fruitless inquiry.”10
If form, as a causal principle, becomes a mere figment in eighteenth-
century thought, this ought to be reckoned with the many circumlocu-
tions for form on offer. Locke, to take one influential example of the 
trend, explains that what sustains a (living) thing as itself, that is, what 
makes an oak still an oak though it changes and grows over time, is its 
“fitness of organization.” In his chapter on identity in the Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding, Locke writes that the oak is “fit to receive and 
distribute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the wood, bark, 
and leaves, etc. … in which consists the vegetable life.” The identity of 
an animal also consists in its “fitness of organization and the motion 
wherein life consists,” though unlike the plant, fitness and motion 
“begin together, the motion coming from within.”11 These statements 
explicitly negate the Aristotelian principle of form, and yet, connecting 
the “organization” with “fitness,” which is a necessary condition of life, 
retains some idea of form as a blueprint for things. Locke simply does 
not require further explanation of what makes “fitness of organization,” 
or how it relates to the motion in which life consists. Although Locke’s 
minimization of form is influential, many seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century writers resisted the mechanistic thesis that organization alone 
could support life, and further, that it could support immaterial think-
ing. Questions regarding the nature of organized structures and what 
they could bear continued to vex.12
Form has a second, but no less important, conceptual role in Aristo-
telian philosophy, which is also reworked in the early modern period. 
In addition to being the principle of change, form is also the principle 
that governs how the external world is mediated by the mind. By defi-
nition one cannot have a materialized object as such in an immaterial 
thought, and thus the object must be in the mind in some other way. 
For Aristotle, the object is in one’s mind as form without its matter or 
material attributes. We come to know forms by a process of abstracting 
the object from these particulars. In this way, the mental form relates 
essentially to the object, and the act of cognition is no less than an iden-
tity with or becoming of the forms of things in the mind.13 Considered 
as something in the intellect, rather than in things, form predicates 
the mind’s acceptance of the material world.14 Certain aspects of this 
Aristotelian-Scholastic view were already undergoing a shift as early 
as the fourteenth century when philosophers like William of Ockham 
began to argue that objects caused intuitive and abstractive notions in 
us. Later, the empiricists developed the causal thesis by claiming that 
objects make impressions on a tabula rasa and that the subsequent ideas 
are not forms in the mind, but resemblances of objects’ qualities. This 
empiricist view negates the principle of form, but replaces it with the 
mental imprint. Like organization, this form-like alternative of mental 
image is not a transcendent idea. Nonetheless it connotes a whole with 
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a particular composition and shape, which predicates cognitive activ-
ity, just as organization predicates life-force. I am not arguing that form 
endures, but rather that the early modern philosophers who wish to 
evacuate its scholastic meaning substitute other terms that we now rec-
ognize as synonymous with form.
Form was not so assiduously avoided in eighteenth-century non-
philosophical writing, and, as our essays reveal, the meanings and 
uses of form may even have gained ground. Hogarth, for instance, 
devises a theory of mental form in his aesthetic treatise, The Analysis of 
Beauty: he posits that a visual object in our mind is like the thin shell 
of a material object that remains after scooping out its contents.15 Ruth 
Mack argues that Hogarth’s shell is not merely a virtual representation 
of a real thing. Since the inner and outer surfaces of this empty shell 
coincide in the mental object, the form rematerializes. Jonathan Kram-
nick also emphasizes the materialization of form in Hogarth’s idea of 
the scooped-out shell, noting that the observer and artist now inhabit 
the entire object, and view the whole form as if from within. If Hog-
arth signals the emergence of form’s materialization, this demystified 
idea of form is not characterized by rigid constraint, static structure, 
or singular purpose. Several of the concepts featured in our essays, 
including the serpentine line, the aesthetics of presence, and Diony-
sian ritual, among others, register this new notion of form, which con-
notes both shape and flux. And many of us discuss the formalizing 
endeavour of literary writing as a similar kind of structured vibrancy. 
Sara Landreth demonstrates that form both solidifies and evaporates 
in Daniel Defoe’s The Consolidator and Vision of the Angelick World. In 
her reading of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, Sarah Ellenzweig notes 
that motion is crucial to the novel form’s open-endedness. Kate Tun-
stall’s interpretation of entomological metaphors in Laurence Sterne’s 
Tristram Shandy and Diderot’s Le Rêve de d’Alembert, and Joanna Stal-
naker’s interpretation of Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie reveal a pro-
ductive tension between the generative workings of the mind and the 
form of writing. Other literary forms discussed here – metaphor, com-
parison, and personification, as well as structured patterns of action 
(artisanal work or religious ritual), and habitual structures of feeling 
and thought (enthusiasm and judgment) – are complicated by tensions 
between dynamism and regulation. Form has a special pertinence for 
the eighteenth century, which a return to the era’s philosophical ques-
tions promises to illuminate, and which, in turn, will enable new gene-
alogies of literary formalism.
The full story of form in premodern philosophy, early modern 
thought, and its subsequent reappearance as literary formalism in 
the twentieth century, is too lengthy to examine here, but the need for 
such a history was noted long ago by the philosopher and intellectual 
historian of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, Ernst Cassirer. In his 
essay, “The Problem of Form and the Problem of Causality,” Cassirer 
argues that the early modern denial of form created a gulf between the 
humanities, which cannot do without forms, and the sciences, which 
pursued the denunciation of form. This lasted until the early twenti-
eth century when form returned as a concept of vital wholeness, or 
“organic becoming,” in natural science. Cassirer explains that this con-
cept of wholeness, which alluded to form, but without form’s purpo-
siveness, gave “unexpected aid” to the humanities to reconsider “its 
own forms and its own structures.”16 The essays in Mind, Body, Motion, 
Matter reveal that vital wholeness was already permeating philosophy, 
science, and aesthetics in the eighteenth century. Despite the decline of 
metaphysical form’s causal role, it was not reduced to powerless shape, 
but became as we know it now – difficult to disentangle from things 
and mysteriously endowed upon them.17
Form is emblematic of many other conceptual re-significations facili-
tated by scrapping old philosophical principles. For our present pur-
poses, the tenuous relation of form to life and mind is important because 
it pulls into focus philosophical dilemmas regarding matter and motion, 
and body and mind. A brief orientation to the general course of these 
unsettled questions from Descartes and Hobbes to Diderot will fill out 
the background of our diverse studies. Hobbes, as is commonly known, 
claims that all human and non-human being is only matter, and that 
motion is the sole cause by which matter is moved or changed. Mat-
ter, being inert, requires external actions of contact or collision. On the 
assumption that human bodies are subject to the natural laws of motion 
that govern other bodies, Hobbes asserts that thought begins with the 
motions of objects on the sense organs, which produce like motions in 
the mind corresponding to the object; the passions are motions internal 
to the body; actions are the motions of willing. Motion is not simply 
an observable phenomenon for Hobbes; it belongs to first philosophy, 
or an account of causes.18 Descartes also espouses mechanism as it 
relates to material objects and bodies, but where Hobbes is a substance 
monist, Descartes is a substance dualist, that is, he claims that material-
ity and immateriality, and body and mind, are distinct by definition.19 
Dilemmas are endemic to both systems. If matter is inert and motion 
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a passive principle, the cause of originating motion and the cause of 
the conservation of motion become difficult to explain, even if God’s 
will is taken for granted. Monists must also explain how the motions of 
corporeal bodies on the sense organs become dephysicalized ideas in 
the mind. Dualists, for their part, need an account of how the immate-
rial and material coincide and interact. If collapsing the material and 
immaterial into monism seems inadequate to some explanatory tasks, 
the mediations required by dualism seem equally difficult.
Despite Locke’s call to recognize the limits of human knowledge on 
such questions, accounts of matter, motion, and mind flourished in the 
long eighteenth century. An initial reaction against Hobbesian material-
ism took up the problem of “senseless” matter and the counterintuitive 
claim that a living sensitivity could emerge from inert matter. Ralph 
Cudworth defends the idea of an immaterial principle behind inert 
matter, and proposes “plastick nature” as the formative and originary 
force, which also functions as an intermediary between God and mat-
ter.20 His contemporary, Henry More, defends the existence of immate-
rial substance, which he defines in opposition to inert matter: active, 
penetrable, but indivisible. Matter is defined as res extensa from Des-
cartes onward, but for More and Cudworth both material and immate-
rial substances are extended, that is, they occupy space. The positions 
of these two seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonists – somewhat 
misnamed because their interests range more widely than Plato or Neo-
platonism – reiterate that God and mind are ontologically prior, but by 
positing spirit as itself extended, they attempt to solve the problems 
of adhering to either substance monism or to dualism.21 In his discus-
sion of embodied soul, Henry More writes: “It is plain therefore, that 
this Union of the Soul with Matter does not arise from any such gross 
Mechanical way … but from a congruity of another nature, which I 
know not better how to term then Vital,” which, he goes on to claim, is 
“in the Matter” (emphasis added).22 Samuel Clarke, John Toland, and 
Isaac Newton all acknowledge the problem of denying or separating 
immateriality from materiality, and respond by generating translative 
forces, or by increasing pressure on the concept of immanence. As Rich-
ard Baxter put it: “In the flux of forms emanating from God … who can 
say where immateriality ends and materiality begins?”23
Over the course of the eighteenth century, philosophers continue to 
search for ways to incorporate impulses and life into matter. As evinced 
in theories of vitalistic monism and of preformation (in which the ovum 
contains the whole adult in miniature), they hold to materialist tenets 
while trying to modernize Aristotelian hylomorphism in the wake of 
the dilemmas found in Hobbes’s and Descartes’s philosophies. At the 
same time, the materialist standpoint inflects the body-mind issue: 
some eighteenth-century theories of mind emphasize sensation, and 
theories of the body’s sensitivity as its vital, comprehensive sense are 
put forth. Diderot, for example, returns on several occasions to the dif-
ficult relations of matter to life and mind. At one point, he responds 
to the dualist-mechanistic view that the soul is the cause of the body’s 
action: “What a difference there is, between a sensitive and living watch 
and a watch made of gold, iron, silver or copper!”24 In the Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding, Locke uses this same metaphor of the 
watch with its machine-like and replaceable parts to explain in what 
precisely the identity of the animal consists. In that passage, he confuses 
the metaphor’s meaning by supplementing the bodily mechanism with 
“fitness of organization” for life, as noted above, and consequently, 
commits neither to pure mechanistic materialism, nor to immaterial 
forces. Diderot recycles the metaphor, and in the simple gesture of fig-
uring a “sensitive, living watch,” exposes the conundrum of deriving 
vitality from a mechanistic framework.
Vitalism, which was on the ascent in the eighteenth century as mech-
anistic accounts proved dissatisfactory, is often seen as a proto-scientific 
movement due to its association with medical, biological, and chemical 
experiments in the period.25 Diderot, among others, reminds us that 
such inquiries should not be cordoned off as purely scientific. Stud-
ies of vitality ought to include its close association with earlier com-
promises of mechanistic claims, as in Henry More’s hypothesis. And, 
just as mechanist materialism is applied to mental as well as physical 
operations, it should be acknowledged that vital materialisms are as 
relevant to embodied thinking as to biological reproduction. Vitalisms 
are spurred by a search for wholeness that exceeds strictly scientistic 
application; their conceptualization is often poised at the threshold of 
description, formal logic, and the craftwork of imagination. Our inter-
ests, which coalesce around the materiality of experience during this 
segue in the history of thought, privilege expansive concepts of vital-
ity and activity, not least by attending to sites of contiguity between 
the body and mental or spiritual states, as well as those between bod-
ies and objects. In pursuing these lines of investigation, we contribute 
to a re-evaluation of the standard accounts of thinking and feeling in 
the empiricist eighteenth century. The constitution of a self-conscious, 
individualistic subject may be an important and lasting contribution 
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of early modern and Enlightenment philosophy, but turning towards 
materialist, mechanist, and vitalist theories not only unveils generative 
dilemmas, it challenges the over-emphasis on the disjunction of the self 
from materiality. To reflect again on the contestations over materialist 
premises reveals a being-of-the-world rather than a subject receding 
from it.
The first four essays focus on embodied experience as differently 
situated in visual aesthetics and religion. It is usually assumed that 
the empiricist understanding of visual perception, in which objects 
produce mental images, puts us at a distance from the object realm in 
ways that are reinforced in eighteenth-century visual art and visual 
description. In Ruth Mack’s and Jonathan Kramnick’s essays, visu-
ality is reconceived as contact. In “Hogarth’s Practical Aesthetics,” 
Mack investigates the object-centred experience of visual design in The 
Analysis of Beauty. Drawing on Hogarth’s own artisanal modus ope-
randi and his investment in the everyday object, which run counter 
to neoclassical high art, she not only repositions our understanding of 
Hogarth’s themes of corporality, but also demonstrates the materiality 
rather than the representationality of Hogarth’s visual aesthetic. Key 
to this aesthetic is the “serpentine line,” which is of a piece with the 
tactile motions of the engraver’s body as well as the customary lines 
and motions of the social body in casual gestures, dancing, etc. Hogarth 
articulates an experience of shape that is quotidian rather than extraor-
dinary and belongs not only to the individual subject, but also to the 
collective body’s habits.
Kramnick’s “Presence of Mind: An Ecology of Perception in Eighteenth- 
Century England,” also discusses eighteenth-century visual aesthetics. 
Kramnick counters, first of all, the representational model of visual per-
ception found in Hobbes (that objects reach the mind through our sense 
organs as mental images of the qualities of those objects) with a theory 
of direct perception patterned on touch. Citing contemporary work on 
active, embodied, or haptic perception that is now putting pressure 
on the representational model, Kramnick argues that these alterna-
tives have their roots in the eighteenth century. Our ability to see with 
our whole bodies as if to touch the environment is a skill of shaping 
“presence.” Readings of several passages of poetry and prose demon-
strate how this model was worked out in eighteenth-century literary 
description. Kramnick also retraces the shift from Hobbes’s mechanis-
tic account to Thomas Reid’s theory of direct sensation, but shows that 
philosophy lagged behind literature’s capacity to bring things to life 
and train readers in the skill of perceiving presence. The bridge between 
seeing and touch is completed with a reading of Sterne’s kinetic unfold-
ing of sensation in Sentimental Journey, which forces us to reconsider 
feeling as perceptual.
The next two essays continue the themes of feeling and motion, but 
shift from visuality to eighteenth-century religion. They complicate the 
accepted view that during the Enlightenment, religiosity was consid-
ered antithetical to thinking and to the liberation of individual subjects 
from the bonds of custom. In “Reading Locke After Shaftesbury: Feel-
ing Our Way Towards a Postsecular Genealogy of Religious Tolerance,” 
David Alvarez undertakes a careful reading of the affective politics of 
Shaftesbury’s Letter Concerning Enthusiasm and Locke’s Letter Concerning 
Toleration to demonstrate that religious differences were not quelled by 
the exercise of rationality. Shaftesbury does not seek to control religious 
enthusiasm, but invites an alternative system of “mood management.” 
Recognizing that tolerance itself can threaten, Shaftesbury’s ideal mag-
istrate recasts Christianity as a “good humoured and witty religion” 
that will in turn establish the grounds of sociability among his subjects. 
Because of its apparent emphasis on “dispassionate judgment” and 
“mutual recognition,” Locke’s Letter has been a hallmark of modern lib-
eralism’s theories of religious toleration. In Locke, however, sentiment, 
not the skeptical-epistemological critique that privatizes belief, allows 
us to endure the acts of tolerating and being tolerated required by reli-
gious pluralism. Alvarez thus revises the origins story of secularism, 
not least by attending to late seventeenth-century embodied religiosity.
“Rethinking Superstition: Pagan Ritual in Lafitau’s Moeurs des sau-
vages” provides another exploration of pre-conscious religiosity, but 
focuses instead on the externalized motions of rites. I demonstrate 
that early eighteenth-century ethnographies of religious customs did 
not simply derogate them as habitual motion-machines of bodies and 
sentiment. Rather than condemn pagan ritual practices (ancient or 
native) as idol worship rooted in fear or awe, many writers admitted 
that all humans are naturally capable of knowing the divinity, and thus 
that divine presence can attend the performance of rites. Focusing on 
Joseph-François Lafitau’s comparative ethnography of pagan ritual, I 
argue that his method is not, in fact, comparison but analogy. Lafitau is 
not a precursor to modern thought, not least because he resists empiri-
cist observation and description. His most significant analogy, which is 
that all pagan religion is nothing other than the obscure and formless 
Dionysiac mystery rites, provides a conjectural unification of diverse 
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forms of religion and functions as a denial of the separation of bodily or 
material aspects of religious experience from immateriality. For Lafitau, 
the bacchanal’s frenzied motions synch human consciousness with 
imperceptible being as nature’s religion.
The next group of four essays is similarly concerned with pre- 
conscious states, but here explicit engagements with philosophical 
materialisms frame focused readings of literary texts. Sara Landreth’s 
“Defoe on Spiritual Communication, Action at a Distance, and the 
Mind in Motion” refers us back to seventeenth-century contestations 
of Hobbesian materialism. Landreth homes in on pneumatology, “the 
science, doctrine, or theory of spirits or spiritual beings” that was tra-
ditionally part of metaphysics, but later became a psychological term, 
as well as a theological, and a scientific term.26 The eighteenth-century 
pre-disciplinary polysemy of pneumatology serves Landreth’s investi-
gation of Defoe’s Consolidator and his Vision of the Angelick World well. 
For Defoe, the mind/soul is a thing that moves and feels, an idea that 
reveals his link to Henry More and the hypotheses of air as a quasi-
material substance. Landreth is also concerned with the repercussions 
of materializing immaterialist principles for the act of reading and the 
printed text: she shows how reading and textuality become less con-
crete and discrete in Defoe’s writing, sustaining what Jay David Bolter 
and Richard Grusin call the “double logic” of immediacy and hyper-
mediacy. This double logic, Landreth observes, allows us to become 
aware of the “medium as a medium”– the experience of reading as “an 
intermingling of multiple representations, both mental and physical.”
Materialist-mechanist concepts of motion engender another innova-
tive close reading in Sarah Ellenzweig’s “The Persistence of Clarissa.” 
Ellenzweig begins with Hobbes’s view that motions of physical bodies 
persist, and that human conatus, or appetitive motion, like the motion 
of all matter, persists unless interrupted. She then argues that the per-
sistence and perseverance of the eponymous heroine of Richardson’s 
novel does not present us with the disembodiment of Clarissa’s person 
in opposition to Lovelace’s materialist pleasure-seeking. Rather, the 
argument draws together the characters’ pursuits of desires – ones they 
both know and yet which escape their grasp – as the same persistent 
motions in all life forms. Lovelace and Clarissa can be understood as 
similarly underestimating the power of materialism’s vitality: Lovelace 
because he can only imagine one script for it, and Clarissa because she 
believes in the power of her will over her motions even when she can-
not move. Clarissa, rather than willing her own destruction, merely 
“swerves” as all of nature necessarily swerves – a prospect more ter-
rifying for Richardson’s heroine, perhaps, than the idea of her own 
culpability. Her death drive shows her, paradoxically, “to be a desir-
ing, aspiring participant in the natural world, embedded in its order of 
things.”
Kate Tunstall’s and Joanna Stalnaker’s essays complement these 
discussions of the motility of matter by introducing a Continental 
perspective. In “The Early Modern Embodied Mind and the Entomo-
logical Imaginary,” Tunstall analyzes the insect metaphors for mind in 
Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy and Diderot’s Le Rêve de d’Alembert. 
She offers a fresh look at Tristram Shandy’s appreciation of the body’s 
“cognitive and creative capacities,” and, focusing on the figure of the 
Momus glass, shows how its image of “frisky maggots, gamboling 
about inside a dioptrical beehive” enables the author’s self-satirization 
of his own mental misconceptions. Tunstall then contrasts Sterne’s fig-
ure with the bee swarm in Diderot’s Le Rêve de d’Alembert. This dia-
logue, which begins as a debate between Diderot and d’Alembert about 
materialism and dualism, continues in a dream-conversation with mul-
tiple characters. As Tunstall shows, Diderot’s argument that a mate-
rial body is by its own constitution capable of thought depends on the 
idea of the whole body’s sensitivity to the world and to others; the bee 
swarm is a metaphor for this unified body and mind (without recourse 
to an immaterial soul). At the same time, the bee swarm unsettles the 
idea of subjective consciousness, not least by emphasizing collectivity. 
Diderot’s and Sterne’s speculations on thinking matter and creative 
generation, expressed in witty transgressions and affirmational sen-
sualism, fully implicate aesthetics in the mid eighteenth-century shift 
from mechanistic to vital materialism.27
In “Diderot’s Brain,” Joanna Stalnaker discusses the philosophe’s vital 
materialism and its aesthetic expression in his sprawling last work, Élé-
ments de physiologie. She explicates each of the three sections of Dider-
ot’s opus: death, biological generation, and memory. In the first section, 
Diderot considers theories of animal organization, in which the living 
creature’s parts are both vital in themselves and act in concert with a 
single sensitivity, to muse on the possibility that the end of life is a grad-
ual process of losing vitality rather than a sudden event. In the second 
part of the work, Diderot returns to the generation of living beings, and, 
as Stalnaker argues, this section, usually seen as borrowed from other 
authors, realizes the very vitality of elements on an aesthetic level that 
he attributes to living things. In the final section, Diderot, in a departure 
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from the empiricist idea that memory is the locus of a continuous self, 
claims that the soul is “amid its sensations,” and wonders how the 
memory of a lifetime of both conscious and unnoticed sensations might 
extend beyond the self in a continued vitality. Stalnaker reveals that 
Diderot’s materialist sensibility finds its proper form in the energies of 
dialogic and fragmented discourses.
The volume ends with Vivasvan Soni’s “Can Aesthetics Overcome 
Instrumental Reason? The Need for Judgment in Mandeville’s Fable of 
the Bees.” The invention of the aesthetic in the eighteenth century, Soni 
reminds us, brought forth a form of judgment that resists the instru-
mentalization of ends. Yet, he argues, “the distinction between defen-
sible ends and a mere instrumentality becomes elusive.” Turning to 
Mandeville, who appears to embrace instrumentality, Soni argues that 
the Fable of the Bees actually abolishes ends orientation, and replaces 
it with something that looks very much like the aesthetic in that its 
purposiveness lacks purpose. The way out of the impasse of ends- 
orientation is through the labour of judgment, which is not grounded 
“in Reason,” as Soni suggests, but in “the giving of reasons.”
Soni’s interrogation of the Enlightenment dilemma regarding ends 
might seem to diverge from others’ readings of pre-reflective and mate-
rialized experience since it puts thinking, and particularly the active 
labour of judgment, in the forefront. Yet Soni’s point that we must 
acknowledge that purposes are a kind of fiction coheres with our proj-
ect of recasting rationalism in eighteenth-century thought. The idea of 
“fictioning purposes” likewise provides us with another angle on the 
history of form with which we began: “true” purpose or end, which 
was assigned to form in the Aristotelian-Scholastic system, is revealed 
once again to be disrupted by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
philosophers. Yet ends are not altogether nullified, and, like form, 
they undergo a conceptual deregulation that nurtures aesthetics. On 
the whole, our volume’s detailed inspections of the new philosophies 
demonstrate the volatility of the core ideas opened up by materialism, 
and the possibilities of an aesthetic vitalism of form.
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In London and Westminster Improved (1766), John Gwynn observes that in 
current times the work of the history painter is “less attended to”; “his 
part,” rather, “is usually supplied by a paper hanging maker and two 
or three workers in stucco.”1 The wallpaper and ornamental plaster-
work to which Gwynn refers here is a sign of what Charles Saumarez 
Smith calls a “change in … perception” of the “material environment,” 
a new focus on the decoration of the interiors of houses and on those 
interiors as complete wholes.2 Near the beginning of the eighteenth cen-
tury, architectural illustrations of buildings began to include cutaway 
sections, revealing individual rooms.3 As such images would suggest, 
design began to matter for all parts of a dwelling: from the arrangement 
of columns and the layout of rooms, it moved to wallpaper, to elaborate 
chimney pieces, and to patterned silks on chairs and curtains. While 
there had for some time been a robust set of manufacturing industries for 
such luxury goods in France, England lagged behind – at the beginning 
of the century, severely so. Anne Puetz observes that “in Britain, very 
little original engraved ornament had been produced prior to the fourth 
decade of the eighteenth century, and craftsmen had to rely on imports, 
or copies of designs, from France, Italy and The Netherlands.”4 But, 
over the course of the century, this state of affairs began to improve. The 
Nine Years War, with its restrictions on imports, created an incentive for 
the English to create at home. And the luxury goods that still filled the 
marketplace, especially those from China and France, put pressure on 
domestic manufacturers to compete with increasingly high standards 
of production.5 When, in the first half of the century, native manufactur-
ing rose to the occasion, silk design flourished as the industry began 
to separate out designers from weavers; ornamental plasterwork and 
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wallpaper surged in popularity, especially in the 1740s and 50s, losing 
their status as cheap replacements for textile hangings and becoming 
fashionable in themselves; and styles of furniture proliferated. As inte-
riors of houses, generally, acquired new importance, architects like the 
Adam brothers created and popularized what we would now call inte-
rior design.6 By the 1730s, Saumarez Smith observes, “design conscious-
ness emerge[d] in the public vocabulary.”7 By the 1750s, according to 
Jules Lubbock, “public interest in design rose to fever-pitch.”8
This public interest in design – that newly visible, interesting, and 
commercially important aspect of objects that could not be reduced 
to their materials – involved both artist and artisan, both the “history 
painter” and the “worker in stucco.” For the pressure to create new 
design quickly opened into an old set of proprietary questions: to begin 
with, was this the domain of craft or of high art? On the side of the for-
mer, numerous private drawing schools were founded across London 
to educate artisans in the practice that would lead to inventive new 
design, and the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, 
and Commerce was founded in 1754, explicitly tying this new Eng-
lish design to economic interests. On the side of high art, The Royal 
Academy was founded in 1768, formally establishing the polite arts as 
the source for design, with Joshua Reynolds’s idea that such invention 
would filter down to the world of the artisan.9
William Hogarth was intimately connected to several aspects of the 
new eighteenth-century development and “consciousness” of design. 
His mentor (and, ultimately, his father-in-law) James Thornhill became 
famous as a history painter but then began to work outside those strict 
bounds and is now credited with some of the earliest conceptual think-
ing on interior design.10 Hogarth himself furthered the new cultural 
focus on the interior environment in his conversation pieces, portrait 
paintings focusing on small groups of people engaged in everyday 
activities.11 And, finally, and most important for what I will discuss 
here, Hogarth straddled the roles of artist and artisan for his entire 
career. Hogarth was apprenticed to Ellis Gamble, a silver engraver, at 
16. To some extent, Hogarth would spend the rest of his career dis-
tancing himself from this early work, disparaging the “drudgery of 
mechanical reproduction” and separating his identity as an “artist” 
from the early instruction of “a master who was fundamentally an arti-
san.”12 This is what Hogarth has in mind, for example, when in one 
of the manuscripts for the Analysis of Beauty, he remarks that he “lost 
a great part of [his] time, in engraving coats of armes on Silver Plate” 
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(AB, 121). But despite such reflections, Hogarth never entirely left arti-
sanal practice behind. The St Martin’s Lane Academy, with Hogarth at 
its head, was full of artists – medallists, engravers, enamellers – whose 
arts were “useful” or “applied” (as we would now say), rather than 
“high.” And Hogarth’s own artistic practice fit well with this world; as 
Ronald Paulson observes, Hogarth’s mature process of engraving his 
own paintings would have been called “necessary” or “mechanical” 
by the proponents of “high art” of the likes of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 
and Richardson.13 And so it was: in the debates over the foundation of 
an English academy on the model of the French one (in full steam, as 
the Analysis was published in 1753), Hogarth’s opponents depicted him 
as a mere artisan and merchant, committed to the useful arts and to the 
world of the market.
The history of design generally moves through questions raised by 
architecture and decorative art, but I would like to take up Saumarez 
Smith’s suggestion that we should consider design history as part of a 
larger intellectual history.14 At this moment of an emerging “design con-
sciousness,” how was Hogarth thinking about design’s relation to the 
everyday object? And how was he thinking about the relation between 
design and historical or cultural context? Answering these questions, 
I contend, leads us to understand Hogarth’s aesthetic project as also 
undertaking a kind of early social theory, one explicitly concerned with 
discovering how representation might come close to the practices it 
attempts to depict.
I’d like to turn now to Hogarth’s aesthetic treatise, the Analysis of 
Beauty, which has never been taken as seriously as his painting and 
engraving. Indeed defences of Hogarth’s Analysis of Beauty frequently 
falter when they come to the serpentine line – a real problem since 
the line is Hogarth’s definition of beauty (Figure 1.1). While Ronald 
Paulson and Jenny Uglow, the artist’s twentieth-century biographers, 
defend his turn to the written word and even stress the positive recep-
tion of the treatise, they both appear at a loss when it comes to account-
ing for the basic grounding of the aesthetic theory in a universal “line of 
beauty.” Hogarth’s “real mistake,” Uglow writes, “was to defy the tyr-
anny of rules by inventing a new rule himself, and insisting that it was 
an absolute truth.” How indeed does one reconcile the Hogarth who, as 
Uglow puts it, could claim that “the essence of beauty lay in one form, 
the ‘serpentine line’” with the Hogarth who in his visual work “him-
self acknowledged that ideals of beauty could be local and cultural”?15 
Paulson, in his introduction to the Analysis, makes clear, moreover, that 
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Figure 1.1. Analysis of Beauty (1753), Plate 1. Courtesy of the William Ready 
Division of Archives and Research Collections, McMaster University Library, 
Hamilton, Ontario. Hogarth’s line of beauty is line four (No. 49), near the 
centre of the top of the plate.
the text of the treatise itself seems conflicted in this way: “Hogarth had 
introduced ‘the Power of habit and custom’ in his Preface to beat con-
noisseurs and their dupes … He seemed unaware that the argument 
could be turned against his own Line of Beauty, which might be as 
locally and perhaps as ethnically conditioned.”16
I would like to approach this problem by reconsidering Hogarth’s 
“practical” aesthetics. Paulson uses this term to describe Hogarth’s 
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opposition to the Third Earl of Shaftesbury’s “theoretically pure” neo-
classical aesthetics, in which “the human body can only be beautiful if 
divorced from function, fitness, and utility.”17 Indeed, Hogarth makes 
the term “experience” central to his aesthetic argument, and when he 
does so he turns away both from Shaftesbury and from classical art 
treatises, arguing that the artist-viewers, indeed all his readers, should 
“see with our own eyes” (AB, 18). Here, in the first part of the trea-
tise, Hogarth echoes Bacon and Locke, rejecting custom for clear sight. 
In this domain, the artist, writing from experience, can bring forward 
a familiar visual metaphor, even as he embraces its literal meaning: 
Hogarth observes that the majority of artists see through their experi-
ences with art – “the manners in which pictures are painted” – rather 
than looking directly at the world in front of them. He begins, then, by 
acknowledging that artists and connoisseurs will have the hardest time 
reading the Analysis, because they will have to unlearn “the surprising 
alterations objects seemingly undergo through the prepossessions and 
prejudices contracted by the mind” (AB, 20).
In the first pages of the text, Hogarth repeatedly reminds us that this 
treatise is one written by an artist, rather than a philosopher.18 Indeed, 
he says, he is “one who never took up the pen before” (AB, 1). Hog-
arth’s written treatise is a straightforward response to the requirements 
for the mastery of liberal arts on the model of the Renaissance artist;19 
his claim for greater experience with brush than pen is no doubt a jab at 
the connoisseurs, as well as at Shaftesbury’s armchair theorizing. Such 
claims for the artist also connect the general category of experience to 
Hogarth’s long-standing conduct as an artist and as a teacher of art. 
In his academy at St Martin’s Lane, this meant a style of instruction 
that opposed the hierarchical French academy style and use of drawing 
books and casts and instead “urged students to learn expression, move-
ment, and the appearance of things from the model or from general 
observation.”20 But this is not all Hogarth has in mind in calling atten-
tion to himself as a practitioner.21 He hints at the complexity of his defi-
nition of experience when he says that having conceived the idea for 
a treatise, “I applied myself to several of my friends, whom I thought 
capable of taking up the pen for me, offering to furnish them with mate-
rials by word of mouth” (AB, 13, my emphasis). We might neglect, or 
suppose incidental, this reference to ideas as “materials,” “the matter 
or substance from which a thing is or may be made,”22 were it not for 
Hogarth’s subsequent lines. He describes himself as having instead 
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“thrown it in to the form of a book” before submitting it to the judg-
ment of his friends (AB, 13). Here, “thrown” almost certainly means “to 
put deftly into some other form or shape” (a sense of the word that, in 
eighteenth-century discourse, can refer to everything from translating 
language to tilling a field). Given the subject of the treatise, the wind-
ing line, it is also hard not to hear “throw” in another contemporary 
sense: as “to form or fashion by means of a rotary or twisting motion” – 
descriptive, in the eighteenth century, of the manufacture of both pot-
tery and silk.23 Hogarth as writer, he seems to remind us, is still Hogarth 
as artisan, making a treatise as he might a pot or a piece of cloth. But 
what does it mean, exactly, to make a theory of beauty artisanally?
At the very least, it means to write counter to Renaissance art trea-
tises. As Ann Bermingham observes, such treatises attempted to sepa-
rate art from craft, establishing “liberal arts” by opposing intellectual 
to manual labour. Pointing back to Florentine theory and its focus on 
“disegno” – which Alberti defines as “the ability to abstract ideal beauty 
from the most beautiful examples of nature and to reproduce them in 
or as art” – Bermingham shows how writers from Castiglione to Vasari 
attempt to reduce even the manual act of drawing to a form of intellec-
tual endeavour.24 Hogarth was acquainted with such formal treatises, 
of course, and these would have been central to his conception of his 
own endeavour. But it is important that his terms come, as well, from 
a much more general thinking about “experience.” The terms of the 
debate over the practical knowledge in craft have a long history that 
extends beyond this formal writing on art. In her account of the Renais-
sance division between theoretical and practical knowledge, Pamela 
H. Smith turns back to Aristotle’s separation of praxis or experiential 
knowledge from scientia or episteme. There, theory was the domain of 
logic and geometry, certain truth, and practice (techne-, the kind of prac-
tice that concerns us here) the domain of things made by bodily labour: 
the latter was the realm of custom and habit, and a knowledge “of how 
to make things produce effects.”25 In tracing the history of this divi-
sion through the seventeenth century, Smith shows how early modern 
artisans produce theory through practice and she also demonstrates, 
near the end of her account, that the separation between the practical 
and the theoretical lingers even in the seventeenth-century empiricism 
that, in its focus on experiment and experience, would seem to undo 
the division. As she puts it, “the new natural philosophers expressed an 
ambivalence toward the role of the body and the senses … they sought 
to control the bodily dimensions of empiricism at the same time that 
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they began to distance themselves from artisans and practitioners.”26 
For Bacon and his contemporaries, experience is privileged, but the 
artisan is exiled, and the habitual, sensual quality of artisanal experi-
ence is distanced from the experience of the scientist.27 It is in these 
terms that we should read Hogarth’s intervention: if the Analysis of 
Beauty most obviously claims that “experience” should be the grounds 
for knowing beauty, it also shows how the line of beauty can offer us 
a way to know something more about the vexed category of “experi-
ence” Smith describes.28
Hogarth’s turn towards individual experience (“our own eyes”) 
makes clear his debt to the English tradition of empiricism. Such a 
focus on experience would have come to him directly through Bacon 
and Locke as well as through seventeenth-century Dutch painting, 
itself strongly influenced by this English empiricist tradition.29 If we see 
both of these influences alongside Smith’s account of the earlier period, 
we can make better sense of the philosophical stakes of Hogarth’s 
insistence on the importance of practical experience. Writers on Hog-
arth have expressed, in a variety of ways, his embrace of an unusually 
bodily empiricism: his aesthetics is one committed to beauty as plea-
sure, going Addison one better and turning aesthetics fully towards the 
“gross” senses; Hogarth is committed to a “corporeal, sensorial experi-
ence.”30 As David Bindman has pointed out (in useful philosophical 
terms), Hogarth went beyond Locke’s model of vision and brought 
touch into his primary understanding of experience. Bindman notes 
that Hogarth’s take on Molyneux’s problem was different from Locke’s, 
and that Hogarth imagined a closer connection between touch and the 
visual sense.31 Usually critics stressing the artist’s heightened bodily 
empiricism take as their examples for it the eroticism of Hogarth’s 
visual art, but I will suggest in what follows that this is only one of 
its manifestations. Rather, we should understand the erotic “corporeal-
ism” in Hogarth as one dimension of a larger investment in practical 
knowledge. When the debate over an art academy again made cen-
tral the relation between artist and artisan as a way of thinking about 
the nature of artistic creation, it is perhaps no surprise that Hogarth 
returned to terms that are close to his Renaissance precursors’, attempt-
ing to think theory in terms of practice.
The Analysis is very much associated with the everyday object: it is 
often understood as remarkable precisely because it offers as examples 
of beauty not only the Apollo Belvedere but also stays and smoke-
jacks. Presumably it is the presence of such everyday objects that has 
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led historians of design to see the text as important. Puetz claims, for 
instance, that “Hogarth’s Analysis of Beauty (1753) first provided a 
detailed aesthetic discussion of ‘design’ in its fullest sense,” by which 
she means including its figurative one: as “conceptual control over the 
production of objects.”32 There is no doubt that Hogarth possesses such 
a conceptual understanding of design, but his relation to it is more com-
plicated than such a summary lets on. Take, for example, Hogarth’s 
explanation in the introduction to the Analysis of how we are to con-
ceive objects in our minds, something he ultimately claims as a strategy 
for seeing “the inside of those surfaces, if I may be allowed the expres-
sion” (AB, 21):
In order to my being well understood, let every object under our consi-
deration, be imagined to have its inward contents scoop’d out so nicely, 
as to have nothing of it left but a thin shell, exactly corresponding both 
in its inner and outer surface, to the shape of the object itself: and let us 
likewise suppose this thin shell to be made up of very fine threads, closely 
connected together, and equally perceptible, whether the eye is supposed 
to observe them from without, or within; and we shall find the ideas of the 
two surfaces of this shell will naturally coincide. (AB, 21)
Uglow gestures towards the strangeness of this thought experiment 
when she remarks, “Perhaps late twentieth-century readers find this 
easier, since it is very like computer graphic modeling, in which an 
image can be revolved and viewed from within or without and from 
different angles.”33 And Abigail Zitin has recently focused on this 
passage in a reading that stresses how “the virtual inhabitation of an 
object reconceived as an empty shell deprives the object of its quid-
dity. It becomes a form and nothing but a form, a set of coordinates 
on a grid.”34 But both descriptions miss something important about – 
or, rather, abstract something from – Hogarth’s description. Hogarth 
insists that we are to think of this object not only as composed of lines 
but as having its entire materiality emptied from it; what is left is not 
mere form at all, but a material shell. Moreover, Hogarth’s desire that 
we imagine the process of emptying the shell (not just its final incarna-
tion) emphasizes a multiplicity of surfaces without relinquishing the 
material qualities of the object. In this, Hogarth resembles the empiri-
cist Dutch artists of Svetlana Alpers’s description, who, to “maximize 
surface” for the “probing” and “attentive eye,” show us lemons as 
objects by splitting and peeling them.35 Unlike such artists, however, 
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Hogarth’s ultimate aim lies not so much with the object in all of its 
particularity as with what the object, in its objectness, can tell us about 
the idea of abstraction. We are to see lines as made and as materials for 
making: they are not lines only but “very fine threads.” As  Hogarth 
makes this shell, he abstracts only to pull the abstraction into an image 
and, then, into a hollow thing of thread. Here, he seems to reply to 
the likes of Joshua Reynolds that even the abstract or conceptual, in 
Reynolds’s terms the domain of high art, must partake not just of 
the material but of the artisanal domain of habitual action: thinking 
comes close to weaving, carving, casting – and, hardly incidentally, 
engraving.
This example is more than just a witty formal rejoinder to Reynolds 
in the form of a new metaphor for conceptual thought. It is also related 
to the positive idea of the image that Hogarth works out in his plates 
for the Analysis, themselves the products of his own made, engraved 
lines. Indeed, at the outset of the treatise, Hogarth makes a point of 
specifying his aim for the plates:
And in this light I hope my prints will be consider’d, and that the figure 
referr’d to in them will never be imagined to be placed there by me as 
examples themselves, of beauty or grace, but only to point out to the rea-
der what sorts of objects he is to look for and examine in nature, or in the 
works of the greatest masters. My figures, therefore, are to be consider’d 
in the same light, with those a mathematician makes with his pen, which 
may convey the idea of his demonstration, tho’ not a line in them is either 
perfectly straight, or of that peculiar curvature he is treating of. Nay, so 
far was I from aiming at grace, that I purposely chose to be least accurate, 
where most beauty might be expected, that no stress might be laid on the 
figures to the prejudice of the work itself. (AB, 17)
Scholars of Hogarth, Paulson included, have tended to concentrate on 
the first and last parts of this quotation, which suggest that the print 
points beyond itself, to the real world.36 We certainly see Hogarth wres-
tling with the problem of including plates at all in a treatise that dis-
courages copying and argues against the origin of art in representation, 
instead directing the reader/artist to the direct observation of Nature. 
But also contained in this remark is the idea of the mathematical fig-
ure, important because it is neither illustration nor direct contact with 
nature. Mathematics should make us think about how exactly it is that 
Hogarth’s image points to nature.
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Hogarth’s term “figures” brings together geometrical shape with the 
range of “artificial representation[s] of the human form” (and represen-
tations of such representations, in the case of the statues) that populate 
his plates.37 In stressing the way in which his engravings might work to 
“convey the idea of his demonstration,” Hogarth uses mathematics to 
push his own representations towards what Reviel Netz describes for 
ancient “diagrams.” Netz, in his work on Greek mathematics, explains 
that diagrams are not like pictures. They are, rather, in his terms, “psy-
chological objects.”38 They contain, as Hogarth suggests, a “subset of 
the real properties of the object.”39 But what Hogarth does not spell 
out here in the Analysis is that diagrams are partial representations that 
do not emphasize their partiality. If they throw us on the world, they 
do so not by making us look away from image and towards the world 
but by teaching us how to think. They accomplish this in a way that (if 
our minds are focused on artistic representation) will seem strange. In 
the impossible “perfectly straight” lines (Hogarth) and in the “so-called 
equilateral triangle” (Netz), diagrams have about them the status of 
“make-believe.”40 They function with an interesting kind of partial cor-
respondence: they are “functionally identical” to the intended object.41 
Diagrams work on what Netz calls an “ontological borderline” – gifted 
with a kind of reality that works within a “cognitive process” as the 
thing it represents.42 Netz writes, “The diagram is not a representation 
of something else; it is the thing itself. It is not like a representation of a 
building, it is like a building, acted upon and constructed.”43
How does this notion of the diagram work in terms of Hogarth’s 
two plates “illustrating” the Analysis? John Bender and Michael Mar-
rinan give us an excellent starting point for answering this question 
in their book The Culture of Diagram, where they offer the diagram as 
a paradigmatic Enlightenment way of thinking. Following Netz in 
opposing a diagram to a picture (though this time with the plates of the 
Encyclopédie, rather than Euclidean geometry, in mind) they offer this 
definition: a diagram is “a proliferation of manifestly selective pack-
ets of dissimilar data correlated in an explicitly process-oriented array 
that has some of the attributes of a representation but is situated in the 
world like an object.”44 Bender and Marrinan focus, for instance, on the 
plate from the Encyclopédie depicting the pastry-maker’s shop: its upper 
tableau, roughly the top third of the plate, shows a scene from the shop, 
with objects arranged on tables and shelves and “work stations where 
each figure performs a specialized task”; the remainder of the plate 
depicts a set of objects, tools from the shop now pulled out, placed on 
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a white background and shown in views that clarify their “features of 
use.”45 We do not have to work hard to see a relation between the dia-
grammatic French plate and Hogarth’s first plate from the Analysis.
In both cases, the plates offer us “packets of data” without telling us 
explicitly how to interpret that data. Indeed, the complexity of work-
ing between text and plate, and between images in the plate, is part of 
what Bender and Marrinan argue is characteristic of the diagram’s new 
cognitive model: here (unlike a history painting) the plates offer view-
ers multiple points of access, just as we might walk around an object 
and look at it from all sides. In the Encyclopédie, this fulfills Diderot’s 
aim to establish “interconnections” and a great “frequency of the 
cross-references,” leading the viewer between tableau and tools, and 
between the explanatory text and the numbers on the plate.46 At work 
here is the “user’s active exercise of relational judgment.”47 Certainly 
Hogarth’s plate does this in the way it makes us search for relations 
between the examples in the frame and the scene in the sculpture yard: 
a frame here does not contain so much as it offers up additional vec-
tors of inquiry, of experience. Even the seemingly random numbering 
of Hogarth’s images (as the frustrated reader of the treatise can testify 
within a few pages) moves the eye back and forth, along the way forc-
ing it to encounter relations and resemblances.48
Hogarth could not have known the Encyclopédie plates (the first vol-
ume of which was published in 1762), but Diderot could have known 
Hogarth’s images.49 My argument here, though, is not about influence; 
rather, I’m interested in thinking about what Bender and Marrinan’s 
account of the Encyclopédie can help us to see about Hogarth’s prints 
and thus about some of the diverse aims and effects of diagrammatic 
images. In this regard, I am especially curious about the omission of 
Hogarth’s Analysis plates from their account of diagram (though they 
include a more obscure Hogarth engraving on perspective). I’d like to 
think, then, about why Hogarth’s plates in the Analysis might offer both 
a great example of diagrammatic thinking and a bad example of the 
kind of scientific work that Bender and Marrinan claim diagrams ulti-
mately do.
Considering the obvious similarities between the two diagrams, one 
striking difference between Hogarth’s plates and those of the Encyclo-
pédie concerns the tableau. On the Encyclopédie plate, we are to imagine 
the tableau as the home of the objects that lie below it, even as the jux-
taposition multiplies possible relations. Bender and Marrinan describe 
this as the relation between two unlike systems, the visual catalogue 
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and the tableau: “Diagrams align, juxtapose, and contrast two kinds 
of information: on the one hand, the autonomous bursts of data that 
characterize visual catalogues; on the other, the uniform flux of homog-
enous information provided by tableaux.”50 Language, they make clear, 
cannot specify all the relations between these parts, and “this unspeci-
fied interaction of varied components generates kinds of knowledge 
impossible to infer from any one element.”51
Hogarth creates two distinct systems, forcing us to ask questions 
about the connections between frame examples and the scene in the 
yard, but he also raises additional questions, within the tableau, about 
where – and how – “autonomous” objects belong. We can see this by 
considering closely an element in his discussion of “Fitness,” the first 
chapter of the Analysis. Here Hogarth’s account of beauty’s relation to 
“fitness,” to the “use” of an object, is an idea he takes from Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia, in which Socrates defines beauty in terms of fitness for use. 
Hogarth’s examples range from “twisted columns,” which are “orna-
mental” but “convey an idea of weakness” to the positive example of 
the race horse (AB, 25). Fitness is a relation of “parts” to “design,” as in 
the proportions of chairs and the “dimensions” in ship-building (AB, 
26). But at the end of this first section, Hogarth becomes more partic-
ular in his presentation of two examples: “The Hercules, by Glicon” 
and “the leaden imitations near Hyde-park” (AB, 27). One example, 
Hogarth seems to say, is good: what we now know as the Farnese 
Hercules “hath all its parts finely fitted for the purposes of the utmost 
strength,” requiring irregular proportions. And the other example 
is bad: the leaden and stone imitations of classical statues, bound for 
country house gardens, which attempt to “correct such apparent dis-
proportions,” resulting in a clumsy regularity (AB, 27). But Hogarth’s 
own reference to the figure on plate 1 complicates this opposition. The 
text reads this way, “The Hercules, by Glicon, hath all its parts finely 
fitted …” (AB, 26). The reference follows this first mention of the Her-
cules, suggesting that the figure depicts “The Hercules, by Glicon.” But 
what does this mean in terms of the image the viewer then confronts in 
the plate, with the statues in the sculpture yard? Is this a representation 
of a good copy (or, even, of the original), as the placement of the textual 
note would suggest; or is it a bad eighteenth-century copy, as the con-
text of the sculpture yard would seem to demand? In forcing this ques-
tion, Hogarth uses one of what Bindman describes as “the ideal marble 
figures, which were, from at least the sixteenth century, treated primar-
ily as aesthetic objects, detached from specific physical or historical 
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settings” to make us wonder about the nature of form and setting.52 
That is, the example of the Hercules makes us wonder whether we are 
seeing a form embedded in and determined by its context or a pure 
form that would not be contingent in this way.
Part of what generates this uncertainty is that Hogarth does not use 
the plate to offer a visual contrast between good and bad form. Hog-
arth’s larger point about the Hercules concerns proportions, the rela-
tions between parts and whole. Ships, chairs, and race horses bring 
together beauty and function in the abstract – presumably, the reason 
for referring to a race horse, rather than a named, particular, repre-
sented race horse, is to maintain this level of abstraction, letting us see 
relationships more clearly. But in the case of the Hercules this breaks 
down as Hogarth’s example takes on greater particularity. When he 
mentions the Hercules in the text, Hogarth moves to a particular statue 
and, at the same time, to visual representation (pointing us to the plate). 
Then, however, instead of giving us a visual comparison of good and 
bad form, he juxtaposes the form of the Hercules to the details of the 
sculpture yard. In this case, the juxtaposition he offers through text and 
image calls on an additional kind of identification from the reader, as 
she is asked to recall a place that is part of her everyday, real-world 
experience. For Hogarth refers here to a very particular sculpture yard 
(Henry Cheere’s) on a very particular corner (Hyde Park). There is 
something intriguingly excessive in this particularity and something 
consequently strange about the analogy Hogarth posits: the form of the 
classical statue; the leaden imitations in Cheere’s yard on Hyde Park 
corner. These descriptions are different in kind. Indeed, it is as though 
Hogarth moves too quickly through his argument, collapsing teaching 
us about form with instructing us on where to find it in the outside 
world. The formulation may be clumsy but the suggestion it raises is an 
interesting one: that everyday context, the one the reader knows first-
hand, could be experienced as she experiences a shape.53
Hogarth continues this line of thinking near the end of the treatise 
in his discussion of “action.” In this last section, too, he is concerned 
with how shape could serve as a special sort of representation of the 
everyday. Hogarth begins by separating the beautiful from the every-
day by thinking of them in terms of two kinds of lines. There are two 
kinds of movements, he says: “useful” and “graceful,” and only the lat-
ter express the line of beauty. All “useful and habitual motions, such as 
are readiest to serve the necessary purposes of life, are those made up 
of plain lines” (AB, 106). As for graceful movements (and their waving 
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lines): “The whole business of life may be carried on without them” 
(AB, 106). But this is a distinction that does not hold. In his account of 
the graceful movement of the arm in the “habit of moving in the line 
of grace and beauty,” he seems invested (much like Locke is in his trea-
tise on education) in thinking through how such movements become 
customary: “they by frequent repetitions will become so familiar to the 
parts so exercised, that on the proper occasion they make them as it 
were of their own accord” (AB, 107). The customary seemed to separate 
straight and beautiful, but now all is customary. This repetition (not 
unlike the working on silver or making objects into threads) gets the 
habitual, the customary, into action – indeed, into the line of beauty 
itself. What seemed a bit awkward in the example of the Hercules – the 
equation of details with form in the written text – here acquires a more 
precise resolution. The everyday becomes a shape.
It is not, however, a static shape. Hogarth works hard throughout 
the treatise to enable us to see lines as themselves moving. Thus, he 
describes the line of beauty as “varying” and conveys this through 
the image of its making: “the hand takes a lively movement in mak-
ing it with pen or pencil” (AB, 42). The serpentine line, yet more var-
ied, is described as “waving and winding at the same time different 
ways”; it is the line, not the eye, that “leads … in a pleasing manner 
along the continuity of its variety” (AB, 42). When Hogarth arrives 
at the topic of “action,” then, he is contemplating a way that moving 
lines can encode – or somehow otherwise contain – motion. As in the 
example of polite gestures, though, tracing shape means tracing some-
thing else: the body’s situation in the culture that surrounds it. Hog-
arth begins straightforwardly: “bodies in motion always describe some 
line or other in the air, as the whirling round of a fire-brand apparently 
makes a circle, and the water-fall part of a curve, the arrow and bullet, 
by the swiftness of their motions, nearly a straight line” (AB, 105). But 
this is not the only way action can make its way into form, as Hogarth 
makes clear in turning to “habit and custom” (AB, 105). The lines that 
“describe” an individual’s “gait in walking,” for example, stand not 
just for those actions (of lifting the foot or swinging the arms) but for 
“the habits [each person has] contracted” (AB, 105). Lest we imagine 
this just as an imaginary line, a line marked in the air, Hogarth fills 
out the picture by turning us to material lines on a page: for as it is 
with walking so it is, too, with the “visibly different” handwriting that 
marks each individual’s habitual movements (AB, 105). That motion 
that the line contained when made “with pen or pencil” was never just 
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abstract shape; it was always attached to the body and to habit. It is 
hard not to think here of Hogarth’s taking up the pen and throwing his 
materials into a book, for writing, handwriting, is also a kind of making 
associated with the body and indeed the habitual movements that are 
the domain of the artisan.
Again, though, the individual artisan seems attached here to a kind 
of cultural making. Angela Rosenthal’s account of the fan in Hog-
arth’s treatise shows how Hogarth’s minimal descriptions can take for 
granted, as though part of the body, what we might now call cultural 
objects: “In early Georgian England, these invisible lines ‘formed in the 
air’ by the movement of the hands and arms that Hogarth encourages 
his reader to image were rarely drawn by the fingertips alone. Those 
belonging to fashionable society would also sport something in their 
hands – the gentleman a cane or a snuffbox, the ladies a handkerchief 
or, more commonly, a fan.”54 What seems like individual gesture is the 
gesture of “fashionable society,” both conventional and completed by 
that society’s favourite commodities. Hogarth makes this connection 
between the individual and the social explicit when he treats dance. The 
minuet, he writes, is really an intensification of the “ordinary undulat-
ing motion of the body” in walking; moreover, “the figure of the minuet 
path on the floor is always composed of serpentine lines” – something 
that can be said, as well, of the very different country dance. Habit, 
then, is broadened to this shared experience: walking becomes dancing, 
the shape of which “var[ies] a little with the fashion” (AB, 109). And it 
becomes clear that Hogarth is thinking not just of individual habits but 
of what we would now call “customs” – and what the eighteenth cen-
tury sometimes called “manners” – those other-than-conscious prac-
tices that tie a community together. Hogarth’s moves from the setting 
of his first plate, the sculpture yard, to that of the second, the coun-
try dance, bears this out: as if the social questions raised by individual 
forms in the sculpture yard should now be thought in terms of a more 
dynamic, more obvious set of social relations.
To characterize social movement as he does, Hogarth must position 
a viewer outside the action: a viewer who can see the lines made on the 
floor by the dancers’ movements. To reinforce this aspect of distance, 
Hogarth relates that “the dances of barbarians are always represented 
without these [that is, graceful] movements, being only composed of 
wild skiping, jumping, and turning round, or running backward and 
forward, with convulsive shrugs and distorted gestures” (AB, 111). For 
Hogarth, it is as though, when you look at society from the outside, 
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you can see that each society, or each kind of society, is understand-
able as a pattern of shapes and lines. We should not allow this rough 
caricature of barbarians to distract us from the larger implications of 
Hogarth’s argument. In its treatment of contingent and ideal forms, 
and in its accounts of action, his demonstration of a universal form of 
beauty, far from neglecting the social and the contingent (as Paulson 
and Uglow worry), lays bare a rather sophisticated thinking about the 
relation between form and habit or custom. This thinking places the 
Analysis of Beauty in dialogue with social theorists of the French and 
Scottish Enlightenments: Montesquieu on “spirit” or William Robert-
son on “stages.” Yet Hogarth’s aesthetic treatise leads him to entertain 
questions that are less about using structures as a way to compare dif-
ferent societies and more about how shape or structure might be under-
stood to represent society. In this (though he approaches the problem 
from the opposite direction) he may be closer to twentieth-century cul-
tural anthropology and sociology after the linguistic turn – as in Clif-
ford Geertz’s use of literary form or music in order to understand an 
ethnographic event.55
An even better corollary, though, is the vein of twentieth-century 
thinking about society deeply concerned with the stakes of repre-
senting “practice.” Take, for instance, Michel de Certeau’s Practice of 
Everyday Life, which begins by describing “the signifying practices of 
consumers,” who act with “artisan-like inventiveness.”56 De Certeau 
encourages us to imagine this inventiveness in terms of Fernand Delig-
ny’s “wandering lines” depicting the everyday movements in space of 
autistic children, what de Certeau calls “indirect or errant lines obeying 
their own logic.”57 The strange “tracings” that children and caretakers 
alike mapped onto everyday spaces serve for de Certeau as a way of 
thinking about how “everyday practices” can be “tactical in character,” 
potentially directed against structures of power.58
The connection between Hogarth and de Certeau is not as strange as 
it might at first appear, and it can help us to see aspects of Hogarth’s 
project that are otherwise difficult to discern. De Certeau’s example 
reminds us, for instance, of the origin of Hogarth’s line: both in the 
rococo style, originating in France but popularized by practitioners 
at St Martin’s Lane (like Hubert-François Gravelot the engraver, who 
was famous for his book designs), and in graffiti and children’s art.59 
Furthermore, these eighteenth-century visual forms were not as cul-
turally distant from each other as we might predict. The rococo line 
was seen as “errant” – empty, counter to reason – at least partly due 
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to its “perceived origins in the craft workshop”; indeed, even its pro-
ponents in Britain were middle-class practitioners, not architects and 
their patrons.60 The rococo line, then, stood for design that had emerged 
through craft, a good example for Hogarth’s side of the Academy 
debate. And it is because of this origin in artisanal practice that the line 
offers Hogarth an obvious way to think about another kind of practice: 
customary, everyday experience. Moreover, if we are tempted to read 
the last part of Hogarth’s treatise as an “etiquette manual,” this com-
plicated origin for the line should suggest otherwise.61 Certainly Hog-
arth describes “grace” not as something innate and inimitable but as 
something that may be learned by bodily practice. But the strangeness, 
the movement within the line, suggests an interest in change that goes 
beyond that familiar middle-class story. For de Certeau the everyday is 
tactical. The vitality of Hogarth’s lines reaches towards this wandering, 
anti-systematic potential.62
For Hogarth the line stands to represent social experience even as 
it is also a form of social experience. In the course of his treatise – and 
likely long before its writing – Hogarth encounters something that also 
interests de Certeau: the problems and possibilities offered by lines as 
representations. Lines are not perfect representations of practices; once 
they advocate for the line, both Hogarth and de Certeau spend some 
time explaining to the reader how lines should be read. Hogarth, as we 
have seen, first uses geometry to encourage us to think about lines as 
representations that tip over ontologically, standing for but also work-
ing as the things they represent. For both Hogarth and de Certeau, 
lines are able to do an unusual sort of work: they show habits and cus-
toms – practices – not as static things but as movements, forces,63 and, at 
the same time, they pull making back into representation. Lines, in both 
accounts, stand for everyday practices, but they also are practice. Hence 
Hogarth’s attention to line as not just a visual language of motion but as 
itself moving. In this sense, the line is the domain of artisan and of the 
ethnographer, as a kind of practical analyst.
For Hogarth, and certainly for de Certeau, the point is not just being 
able to represent – on the page, or through language – the right kind 
of line. In this regard, it is significant that de Certeau comes to his 
thinking about the lines not only through perusing Deligny’s book 
on autism but also as a direct response to earlier ideas of representa-
tion within anthropology and sociology. Bourdieu had already called 
attention both to “practice” and to representation as a problem: the 
trouble, in his words, of “constitut[ing] practical activity as an object of 
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observation and analysis” is also the trouble of the analyst introducing 
“into the object the principles of his relation to the object.”64 Bourdieu’s 
terms are familiar. In the first pages of Outline of a Theory of Practice, 
with structuralism very much in mind, he observes that the “social 
world” is the object of “three modes of theoretical knowledge which 
have only one thing in common: the fact that they are opposed to prac-
tical knowledge.”65 In his project to define further what exactly such 
practical knowledge would entail, Bourdieu casts the relation between 
the theoretical and the practical in terms of lines: the “logical” relation-
ships are those shown by lines on a “map” and the practical relations, 
movements, a “network of beaten tracks made ever more practicable by 
constant use.”66 Like Hogarth, both Bourdieu and de Certeau fight the 
limitations of representation not by turning away from it entirely but 
by attempting to find new ground within representation itself. Bour-
dieu does not want to turn away from structuralism altogether, but he 
does want to show that structuralism’s maps of relations contain addi-
tional relations that they do not declare.
Despite his obvious attempt to view social action from the outside, 
as a shape or line, Hogarth writes against the false distance of outside, 
theoretical knowledge – and, importantly, without any obligation to 
tackle the problems of objectivity foisted upon later studies of society 
by scientific method. We can see one example of this if we return to the 
first plate. Take the narrative, erotic vectors here as Paulson explicates 
them. On one side we have the dancing master propositioning Anti-
nous (the lover of the Emperor Hadrian). On the other, Venus (though 
depicted here as the modest type) exchanges amorous glances with the 
Apollo Belvedere.67 The Antinous example is especially interesting. On 
face, Hogarth presents this as a formal comparison of the two figures: 
stiff, straight lines as opposed to serpentine form, activating in different 
terms his argument through stays (no. 53) and table legs (no. 50). But 
he overlays this formal comparison with an erotic relation,68 one that 
does not occur merely on the level of content. Rather, this erotics is an 
account of relation.
This is also a direct response to the neutral gaze Bender and Mar-
rinan assume, indeed make primary, in their scientific “diagrammatic” 
thinking, and which they attach to a later discourse of scientific objec-
tivity. Consider first that in explaining the scientific purchase of their 
“culture of diagram,” the authors turn to Lorraine Daston’s account 
of “aperspectival objectivity” – an objectivity that negates the idiosyn-
crasies of the viewer, a concept Daston historicizes (in an article prior 
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to the book-length Objectivity) by turning to eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy. Daston thus grounds an understanding of perspective that 
we associate with nineteenth-century science in an eighteenth-century 
discourse of morality and aesthetics: “Eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century discussions of perspectivity agree in both their means (de- 
individualization, emotional distance) and ends (universal knowledge 
of one sort or another), but they treat very different objects: moral and 
aesthetic claims on the one hand, and scientific claims on the other.” Her 
earliest example of such “perspectival suppleness” is in Shaftesbury.69
When they attach “aperspectival objectivity” to the plates of the 
Encyclopédie, then, Bender and Marrinan pull in the scientific valence 
of the phenomenon but ironically leave aside the eighteenth-century 
origins that Daston gives for this later scientific concept. Put another 
way, to ground “diagram” in a history of science, they project a concept 
from nineteenth-century science (i.e., the result of a pointedly teleologi-
cal historical account) back onto an eighteenth-century phenomenon. 
In so doing, they incorrectly generalize – and disembody – Enlighten-
ment “experience.” After all, one of the central critiques Hogarth (and 
Addison before him) offers of Shaftesbury’s disinterestedness has to do 
with its ridiculous neglect of desire. For Hogarth seeing is desiring; we 
understand beauty not by our remove from it, but through our inter-
est in possessing it. Indeed, we might understand desire and artisanal 
experience to be bound together in their location of the body as the 
source of experience. Beauty and desire go hand in hand – form and 
desire go hand in hand – as is evident in the Miltonic quotation on that 
first title page and the line with its serpent head.
As we have just seen, Hogarth dips into the reservoir of the unseemly, 
bodily nature of experience to make even relationality seem desiring, 
as though some of those abstract vectors of diagrammatic thinking 
could be made into affective ones. But the implications of this sight 
that entangles itself with its object are not limited to desire per se. Early 
in the treatise, Hogarth describes the pleasure of motion he has felt as 
seeing a country-dance: “particularly,” he says, “when my eye eagerly 
pursued a favourite dancer, through all the windings of the figure, who 
then was bewitching to the sight, as the imaginary ray, we were speak-
ing of, was dancing with her all the time” (AB, 34). In the Analysis of 
Beauty, desire lets us think about the way that the eye-beams of vision 
move as the dance moves, reflecting and becoming part of, its motions.
Let us return to Hogarth’s first plate as depicting the objects of every-
day life. Bender and Marrinan’s analysis allows us to see just how far 
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Hogarth’s commitment goes, and how it sutures the diagrammatic to 
the everyday by way of design. Bender and Marrinan assume that the 
diagram’s creativity must be new and thus opposed to what they call 
“habit” and “normal use,” which they illustrate by opposing ency-
clopedic diagram to Chardin’s The Copper Fountain, which shows the 
objects’ “patina of wear,” the evidence of “repeated enactments of … 
ritual gestures” of everyday life.70 But Hogarth’s diagrammatic think-
ing allows for no such opposition. Even if his candlesticks look new, 
Hogarth works to show us the presence of the everyday within objects 
by teaching us how to re-envision those objects (to recompose them as 
threads, or place them in known settings). We should view his attention 
to the vision that moves with the dance as part of this same commit-
ment to thinking about how the object reaches out to its viewer and its 
environment.71 Everyday objects, then, are the perfect way to illustrate 
design’s own role in this reaching out. For Hogarth teaches us, through 
his theorization of the line, to think of the way an object (a candlestick, 
or a piece of wallpaper) could be tied to the cultural world – that world 
of people, of practices – that surrounds it.
Hogarth’s response to Reynolds’s idea of merely conceptual design, 
then, is not only that thinking can be understood as a kind of making. 
It is that if we understand practice in this way, we necessarily take as 
a given a mind that cannot be separable from its objects. Bourdieu and 
de Certeau greatly trouble objectivity, showing how the separation of 
self from object cannot be as complete as Lévi-Strauss (and, of course, 
many others before him) hoped that it might be. Hogarth, for his part, 
begins to indicate just how complicated the intellectual history of these 
problems is. Before nineteenth-century science made its mark, Hogarth 
understood that Shaftesbury’s proto-objectivity was not only a poor fit 
for the social world but that it would need to be rethought on the very 
basis of the kind of practical object that world could be.
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This essay explores some connections between theories of perception 
and varieties of literary form in the long eighteenth century. My goal 
will be to trace the development of what I call an anti-representational 
model of perceptual experience during the period, a model that consid-
ers perceiving to be an active process – more on the pattern of touch 
than vision – and that proposes that what the senses do is make the 
world available rather than hold it at a skeptical remove. The anti- 
representational view, I’m going to suggest, is a dissident line or counter-
current within the eighteenth century’s dominant theory of perception. 
On the dominant account, ideas or impressions provide an internal pic-
ture of an external object or event or state of affairs. “The thing we see 
is in one place,” writes Hobbes, “the appearance in another.”1 I’m going 
to begin with this theory of perceptual representation (the dominant 
theory) and then turn to works of poetry, philosophy, and fiction that 
propose that what minds or works of art do is not so much represent 
things as make them present to us, or that concentrate on the process 
rather than the product of perception. My examples of the dissident line 
will be from the loco-descriptive poetry of John Dyer, James Thomson, 
and William Cowper, the aesthetic theory of William Hogarth, Thomas 
Reid’s commonsense philosophy, and a few moments from Laurence 
Sterne. My interest in these examples will be to explore how percep-
tion could be understood as direct contact with external objects: as an 
aesthetics of presence, in other words.2 With its emphasis on skilled 
action and its embrace of naiveté, I’ll intermittently suggest that the 
eighteenth-century aesthetics of presence has some bearing on our cur-
rent critical mood, both with respect to surface reading and speculative 
realisms close to home in the humanities and ecological or embodied 
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theories of perception further afield in the cognitive sciences.3 So I con-
ceive of this project as one of historical recovery as well as one of bring-
ing the past to bear on some features of our present.
The Representational Stance
Empiricism is famous for saying that knowledge derives from the 
senses, but what do the senses actually show us, and how should their 
relation to the world be conceived? The question emerges across the 
period, in the manner, eventually, of a debate: is our sensory apprehen-
sion of the world direct, reaching out to objects and entities themselves, 
or roundabout, mediated by internal images of external things? This 
is Thomas Hobbes choosing the second option at something like the 
dawn of empiricism and materialism alike. “Concerning the thoughts 
of man,” he writes in the first sentence of Leviathan’s first chapter, “they 
are every one a representation or appearance of a quality or accident of 
a body without us; which is commonly called an object” (14). The point 
for Hobbes is that in coming up with our best theories of mental life we 
ought not to confuse the pictures in our head for the objects they repre-
sent. When external bodies “presseth the organ proper to each sense,” 
they create an internal motion whose “appearance to us is fancy” (14). 
Perceptual experience thus moves through a kind of filter, with motion 
on the one side producing an image on the other. “Sense in all cases, is 
nothing else, but original fancy,” Hobbes writes, “caused by the pres-
sure, that is, by the motion, of external things upon our Eyes, Ears, and 
other organs thereunto ordained” (14). Fancy is original on this account 
because it occurs at the moment of perception, not in a later instance of 
reverie. To fancy is simply to experience by way of the internal picture 
Hobbes calls a “phantasm” what is already in one’s midst.
So although Hobbes insists that perception should be understood in 
physical terms, as a motion that joins internal fancy to an external world, 
he also maintains that one’s engagement with this world is always at a 
distance, always tarrying after its images. “The object is one thing,” he 
writes, “the image or fancy another” (14). Many that followed shared 
this oscillation between worldly engagement and perceptual seclusion. 
Consider Locke’s celebrated likening of vision to a camera obscura: 
“Methinks the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut 
from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible 
resemblances, or ideas of things without; Would the pictures in such a 
room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it 
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would very much resemble the mind of man, in reference to all Objects 
of sight and our ideas of them” (2.12.17). Would the pictures in a cam-
era obscura remain in place they would resemble the settled ideas in 
a person’s head. And they would do so because the understanding in 
Locke’s account stands in view of ideas that both represent things and 
acquire a kind of stability. Or to put matters in reverse, vision furnishes 
the mind with ideas that shape what we see. Experience tells me that 
one red voluminous object is an apple, another a tomato; and, after each 
idea is hung in place, I don’t have to guess which is which every time 
I step into a garden. Viewed either way, however, our senses do not 
so much reach to objects themselves as bring ideas of objects to mind. 
Summing up the conventional wisdom some forty years later, Hume 
writes in the Treatise that “’tis universally allow’d by philosophers, and 
besides is pretty obvious of itself that nothing is really ever present 
with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, and that 
external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they 
occasion.”4 Or, as he clarifies in the Enquiry, “the slightest philosophy 
teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or 
perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these 
images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate 
intercourse between the mind and the object.”5 Our experience is of the 
solid world but this world shows up on a screen, as “fleeting copies or 
representations of other existences, which remain uniform and inde-
pendent” (2.12.9).
The representational stance seems at first glance to be a kind of soft 
dualism and so to keep the mind out of the physical picture of the uni-
verse preferred by modern science.6 And yet for Hobbes or Hume (as 
for Boyle and Newton), the stance followed directly from the discover-
ies that science had made. Our senses reveal to us an apple or a fly or 
a rock. At the same time, instruments like a microscope show us that 
such middle-sized objects are made from smaller bits of matter. So we 
may conclude on this basis that our perceptual acquaintance is never 
quite with the ultimate nature of things. And we may further main-
tain that a science of perception should tell some sort of causal story 
about events out there and experience in here. In this respect, much 
of today’s mainstream cognitive science of perception follows directly 
from assumptions put in place during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.7 David Marr’s groundbreaking study Vision (1982), for 
example, begins with the observation that “if we are capable of know-
ing what is where in the world, our brains must somehow be capable 
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of representing this information,” and so concludes that “the study of 
vision therefore must include not only the study of how to extract from 
images the various aspects of the world that are useful to us, but also an 
inquiry into the nature of the internal representations by which we cap-
ture this information and thus make it available as a basis for decisions 
about our thoughts and actions.”8 The question for Marr as for Hume 
is how does an organism build a rich three-dimensional set of images 
that correspond in some fashion to invariant features of the physical 
surround. Representation in either case is understood to be a structural 
relation between acts or entities of the mind and properties or features 
of the world.
Towards a Theory of Direct Perception
Much of today’s cognitive science of perception follows in the repre-
sentational line of Locke and Hume, but not all. In recent years, the 
representational stance has come under pressure from active, embod-
ied, or haptic theories of perception, themselves a lineal descendant, I 
want to argue, of some eighteenth-century views of the mind and the 
senses. On the ecological theory of J.J. Gibson, for example, perception 
is not an event in the brain but an achievement of the whole animal. 
Vision should be understood, wrote Gibson, as an “exploration in time, 
not a photographic process of image registration and image transmis-
sion,” as a style of tactile engagement rather than optical remove.9  
This account has been important for subsequent criticism of neural 
reductionism – the dominant approach to the mind today – because 
it puts the perceiver in touch with an environment instead of focusing 
on the internal, enabling conditions for perceiving something. The idea 
is to conceive of perceiving with respect to a creature in motion rather 
than a single point and to think of what is perceived with respect to 
potentials for action or dwelling rather than objects in space.10 “Instead 
of thinking of perception as a passage from inside to outside, from in 
here to out there,” writes Alva Noë, a contemporary philosopher and 
cognitive scientist in the tradition of Gibson, we need to account for 
how “we ourselves (whole persons) undertake our perceptual con-
sciousness of the world in, with, and in relation to the places where we 
find ourselves.”11 The argument for direct perception and the insistence 
on ecological analysis go together. “The world shows up for us in expe-
rience,” Noë says, “because we know how to make contact with it” 
(2). And we know how to make contact with it because we know how 
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to use our bodies. Perception is a kind of skilled attunement to what the 
world affords, done by creatures whose eyes move as so or whose paws 
curve like this.12
I’m going to argue now that this idea of making contact with objects 
and environments in our midst – and in particular the notion that 
perceptual acquaintance employs a kind of everyday skill or homely 
style – emerges over the course of the eighteenth century in contrast to 
the idea that we ought to worry about whether our perceptions accu-
rately capture the precise features of things. I’m also going to argue that 
literary writing plays an important role in getting this account off the 
ground. What I’m calling the eighteenth-century aesthetics of presence 
emerged in part as a way to address an urgent problem faced by the 
representational view. The problem went something like this: If visual 
perception moves on a line from the eye to the object, then how does 
one perceive the distance between here and there? All one should see 
is the point at the end of the line, and yet we experience visual space 
in three dimensions. How is this so? George Berkeley begins his 1709 
Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision with just this conundrum. “It is,” 
he writes, “agreed by all that Distance of itself and immediately can-
not be seen,” and that is because “Distance being a Line directed end-
wise to the eye, it projects only one point in the Fund of the Eye, which 
point remains invariably the same whether the Distance be longer or 
shorter.”13 These sentences would prove to be very important. Our sup-
posed inability actually to see distance – its existence only on a line 
directed endwise – formed the problem of depth perception for much 
of the eighteenth century. On Berkeley’s influential account, the space 
between one point and another is not so much seen as inferred, calcu-
lated by means of “an act of Judgment grounded on experience than of 
Sense” (2). When we handle or bump into something we form “ideas of 
touch,” whereas when we view something we form “ideas of sight.” And 
when we perceive the distance between one thing and another – and so 
experience the world in three dimensions – we calculate unawares the 
distance of each from our hands (15). The house across the way looks 
to be smaller than the tree in between, but since I have touched both a 
house and a tree at some point I know things appear that way because 
the one is behind the other. So while “Tis plain that Distance is in its own 
nature imperceptible,” we are able to experience depth and curvature 
and full surround by abstracting from tactile experience an idea of where 
something must reside if it appears to be of a certain size (4). Berkeley’s 
new theory conceives of visual perception as indirect and inferential, 
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a product of internal calculations. At the same time, it relies upon the 
immediate grasping of things by the fingers. After all, he says, we would 
never understand where anything is located, here or far away, without 
coming into contact with “the Objects that environ us, in proportion as 
they are adapted to benefit or injure our own Bodies” (64). The legacy of 
Berkeley’s argument, we might say, is double, as he understands vision 
alone to move on a line through empty geometrical space and seeing at 
large to be wound up in ecologies of action and dwelling.
For literary scholars, this legacy is probably most familiar in Addi-
son’s notion of sight as “a delicate and diffusive kind of touch,” one 
that “spreads it self over an infinite Multitude of Bodies, comprehends 
the largest Figures, and brings into our reach some of the most remote 
Parts of the Universe.”14 This sentence is from the first of the Spectator 
papers on the pleasures of the imagination, a series ostensibly designed 
to popularize Locke’s representational view that sense “furnishes the 
imagination with its ideas” (411: 536). Addison’s notion of tactile vision 
is and is not a metaphor, however, and to that degree does and does not 
live up to this view. Sight brings into our reach things we could never 
actually touch and yet also turns and responds to what it encounters. 
In keeping with each, the papers that follow toggle between an account 
of vision that operates at a length beyond the fingers and one that lik-
ens seeing to drawing everything close. The papers on beauty tend to 
set tableaux at a linear distance whereas those on the “new or uncom-
mon” emphasize mobile gradation. Often associated with later ideas 
of the picturesque, Addison’s category of the “novel” might be consid-
ered instead as an aesthetic of measured distance.15 We delight in scenes 
that are “perpetually shifting, and entertaining the sight every moment 
with something that is new,” he writes, with “such Objects as are ever 
in Motion, and sliding away from beneath the Eye of the Beholder” 
(412: 544). We delight in these acts because they turn or adjust as we get 
closer to the grain, as the line from one object to another bends, rises, or 
descends according to the motion or sliding of things along the surface 
of the earth. Addison’s tactile vision is in this way distinct from Berke-
ley’s. Whereas Berkeley says that depth perception combines ideas of 
sight with those of touch, Addison says that seeing is a form of touch-
ing. For Berkeley, sight and touch pick out different features of an object 
then combine them in the internal representation box. For Addison, 
at least in some of his moods, sight is touch-like because it picks out 
the same features we might access with our fingers: one thing beneath 
another, the rise and fall of the ground, the backward curve of a figure.16
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Touching Ground
For writers after Berkeley and Addison the question of whether visual 
perception moved on a line through the air or along the uneven grade 
of the earth’s surface remained open. Most followed the geometrical 
and representational line of thinking proposed and worried over in 
Berkeley’s New Theory. For some, however, the project was to make vis-
ible the distance between one place and another by filling in and pre-
senting space rather than drawing it on an intangible set of coordinates, 
by seeing along a receding surface or curved gradient for example, or 
through a translucent covering or along an occluding edge. Among 
writers concerned with this filling-in, none are more relevant for my 
current purposes than authors of loco-descriptive poetry, preoccupied 
as they were with varied matters of the earth’s surface, with the sliding 
from vale to tree to hill to sheep to fruit and so on. It is this preoccupa-
tion, I’ll now argue, that leads some poets to work out an aesthetics of 
perceptual presence in advance of its formalization in philosophy or 
science: specifically, again, to consider and account for seeing distance 
along a gradient or through a top layer or behind an occluding surface 
or edge rather than on a line directed endwise. The “curious eye” of 
Dyer’s Grongar Hill (1726), for example, strays “over mead, and over 
wood, From house to house, from hill to hill,” seeing on its way (among 
other things) “the gloomy pine, poplar blue/ The yellow beech, the 
sable yew” until “wandering” beyond the “purple grove,” it pauses for 
a moment on the walls of Dinefwr castle:
Deep are his feet in Towy’s flood,
His sides are cloth’d with waving wood,
And ancient towers crown his brow
That cast an aweful look below,
Whose ragged walls the ivy creeps
And with her arms from falling keeps.17
Responding to these lines almost fifty years later, William Gilpin would 
complain in Observations on the River Wye that Dyer had botched the 
perspective: “his distances are all in a confusion,” Gilpin writes, “and 
indeed it is not so easy to separate them from his foregrounds … 
His castle, instead of being marked with still fainter colours than the 
purple-grove is touched with all the strength of a foreground: you 
see the very ivy creeping upon its walls.”18 Gilpin’s complaint notes a 
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dramatic foreshortening: the ivy-covered walls in Dyer’s poem have 
the clarity of something etched and immediate, not a hazy prospect. 
This perspective is botched, however, only on the assumption that the 
poem intends to reproduce one vista from a place that does not move, 
rather than wind its way along the ground to walls whose presence 
is sketched by the partial occlusion of ivy. On this reading, Dyer does 
not so much fail to render one-point perspective in the manner of a 
landscape painting as compose a kind of anti-ekphrasis, a moving per-
spective that cannot be rendered on a picture plane. Understood in this 
latter sense, the peculiar touching that Gilpin observes marks a tran-
sient end point turned on a rough tetrameter line: a winding and drop-
ping that arrives at a misplaced presence, with trunks of ivy and the 
walls beneath them shifting into the foreground.19
Gilpin understands the recession along a surface and the covering 
of one surface by another as separate ways of seeing distance, whereas 
Dyer seems to think of recession and occlusion together, as a motion 
across and then coming close to an engaged world. The attempt in 
either case is to use the descriptive mode to see along a gradient, both 
over the ground and behind what is in front of you. James Thomson 
makes perhaps an even more interesting case because his poetry was 
once understood to be committed to abstract geometrical space, lines 
projected endwise, and distanced incurious viewing. This is the read-
ing one associates most readily with John Barrell, who, writing in the 
heyday of the hermeneutics of suspicion (the 1970s), seemed unwilling 
to conceive of Thomson’s landscape aesthetics as anything other than a 
ruse: “Thomson is able to see the landscape, not as something in which 
he is involved, and which is all round him, but as something detached 
from him, over there: his eye may wander over the view, but his own 
position is fixed, and from his viewpoint he can organize the landscape 
into the system of parallel bands and flat perspectives by which only 
he can comprehend what he sees.”20 Much of recent Seasons criticism 
has endeavoured to unsettle Barrell’s powerful reading and to locate 
in the poem models of perception and action that bring the viewer and 
the viewed into closer proximity. Kevis Goodman, for example, has 
focused on moments in the poem in which Thomson’s “microscopic 
eye” brings to the surface a teeming world of vegetable life otherwise 
unseen, while Heather Keenleyside has looked at Thomson’s “use of 
personification to associate the instability of persons and things” with 
an ethics and ethos of patience that leaves “moving and being moved 
[as] impossible to parse.”21 Whereas Barrell understands Thomson to 
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“create a space between the landscape and the viewer,” Goodman and 
Keenleyside understand him to bring the two together.22 In the language 
of so-called surface reading, we might say that this is the way we read 
Thomson now. We are more inclined to see Thomson involved in his 
world than to look for moments of detachment or ownership.23 For my 
part, this inclination will be noticeable as a focus on Thomson’s naiveté. 
This is Thomson’s speaker lingering over items strewn between one 
place and another. This is distance perceived directly, Berkeley’s empty 
space filled in.
And how does this happen? Thomson’s eye moves along the sur-
face of crowded space, so even air teams with bugs, dust, and droplets, 
each reflecting colour or shade along its wing or edge. Summer insects 
“people the blaze” on a kind of up and down, for example, swarming 
from winter’s repose to land on moving streams or passing “through 
green-wood glade” to feed on fresh leaves.24 The episode ends when 
the insects come up against a striking background, passing over and 
landing on a pail set at close distance:
   … Some to the house,
The fold, and dairy, hungry, bend their flight;
Sip round the pail, or taste the curdling cheese:
Oft, inadvertent, from the milky stream
They meet their fate; or, weltering in the bowl,
With powerless wings around them wrapt, expire. (Su. 260–5)
With minimal visual cues, the lines etch the flying, landing, and dying 
of insects on liquid. The insects glide on a crooked thread to the bowl 
(and its lip) as milk streams nearby and cheese curdles at bottom. Like 
the flight they describe, the lines bend on a kind of metrical warp, lifting 
from the trochaic “oft” across the subordinated “weltering” and wrap-
ping before getting to the delayed “expire.” Thomson’s writing out of 
perceptual presence so takes an overall shape. The bowl, speck, and 
milk come into view as one surface passes on top of another, as gauzy 
wings move over an opaque pail or a milky stream pours beneath a 
whirling speck.25
This simple example shows one method by which the poem attends 
to objects at a middle distance, not (again) as points on a grid but as 
features of an ecology that change with the position from which they 
are held. In this way, the perception of something solid – the filling in of 
distance – depends both on the layout of what is seen and the motion 
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of who is seeing: the array in which a bowl placed just so will shear 
off when a glance from just here moves to just there. This is so, I think, 
even in the poem’s more static-seeming still lifes, the “fruit empurpled 
deep” of autumn, for example, that
Presents the downy peach, the shining plum
With a fine bluish mist of animals
Clouded, the ruddy nectarine, and dark
Beneath his ample leaf the luscious fig. (A. 675–9)
Writing about the seventeenth-century Dutch still lifes that animate 
and lie behind these lines, Svetlana Alpers has described how they 
“encourage the mind to dwell on perceiving as a process [by featuring 
the] experience of an object as coming into its own, distinguishing itself 
from other things, taking shape.”26 Understood in this fashion, Thom-
son’s still life makes the perceptual object less familiar, by describing 
how fruit takes shape from behind something one sees through or 
around. Apart from the merely “ruddy nectarine,” each piece seems to 
stretch distance along an occluding surface or partial cover: a passing 
membrane of down or mist or leaf that brings the skin so close to ours. 
The fine blue of the animal shapes that cloud the skin of the plum, for 
example, brings the shine to a presence crowding out the quiet nectar-
ine. The skin of the peach and the plum and the rind of the fig pop out 
because they form a curved background to a filmy covering, and the 
eye, like a finger, must pass from the one to land on the other.27
Seeing and Skill
In lines like these, Thomson seems to move from one middling sized 
object to another, dropping a line of sight along the gradient and so 
responding after a fashion to Berkeley’s question about distance while 
providing an example of Addison’s diffusive kind of touch. By the 
middle decades of the eighteenth century such ideas of perception as 
direct contact became more explicitly formulated in works of theory, 
often in stated contrast to ideas of perception as a relation between an 
internal image and an external entity. William Hogarth, for example, 
begins his aesthetics treatise, The Analysis of Beauty (1753), by declar-
ing that he hopes to bring the “practical knowledge of the whole art 
of painting” to our understanding of the perception of beauty.28 Hog-
arth distinguishes this practical knowledge – the skilled know-how of 
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a working artist – from the abstract principles of such “connoisseurs” 
and theorists as the Third Earl of Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson. 
Apprenticed at age sixteen to the silver engraver Ellis Gamble, and for 
his life one who etched out lines on the surfaces of metal or canvas, 
Hogarth here draws on ideas of the artist’s skill – techné in the Aris-
totelian language of craftwork – at creating what is at the end of one’s 
fingers.29 The practical knowledge of painting turns out to be the ability 
to decompose any object – a tree, a face, a table, what have you – into 
its constituent lines, including especially the “serpentine line” whose 
undulating wave marks the actual presence of beauty in the object itself 
(viii, passim). Beauty is in the world, not in our heads, Hogarth says, 
in contradistinction to Hutcheson and Hume and virtually every other 
aesthetics theorist of the period. To “learn to see objects truly” is to 
learn to identify the “nature of those lines … by which we are directed 
to call the forms of some bodies beautiful, others ugly” (1). In other 
words, it is to learn to put oneself in the position of the artist as she both 
makes and observes items in the world.
As Abigail Zitin has recently put it, this adjustment to the practi-
tioner’s stance “registers an incipient resistance to illusion, to being 
consumed by the representational content of an image.”30 That is, for 
Hogarth, aesthetic experience occurs in moments when the beholder 
identifies the lines that compose beautiful objects. The subjective 
impact of a finished artwork – the emotion or pleasure it raises in the 
viewer – is only of secondary importance. Of primary importance is 
the process of decomposing objects to their lines so they may be recom-
posed as beautiful works. Hogarth refers to this activity as a “manner 
of attending to forms” and for this reason Zitin has described his theory 
as a kind of “practitioner’s formalism” (Hogarth, 26; Zitin, 555). Hog-
arth’s theory is a formalism because it understands beauty to reside in 
objective shape; it is a practitioner’s formalism because it understands 
that to view such a shape is to recreate, not to represent it. The, by then, 
standard commitment to the internal image in talk about beauty makes 
a full turn. According to Hogarth, the artist’s skill is to see from within 
an object – by identifying its lines – and the artwork’s end is to put the 
beholder in place to do the same. “Let every object under our consid-
eration,” he says, “be imagined to have its inward contents scooped 
out so nicely, as to have nothing of it left but a thin shell, exactly cor-
responding both in its inner and outer surface, to the shape of the 
object itself: and let us likewise suppose this thin shell to be made up of 
very fine threads, closely connected together, and equally perceptible, 
58 Jonathan Kramnick
whether the eye is supposed to observe them from without, or within” 
(7). Once we do this, Hogarth continues, “we shall find that the ideas of 
the two surfaces of the shell will naturally coincide” and that to attend 
to individual threads is at once to observe and inhabit the entire object, 
to “enter into the vacant space within this shell, and there at once, as 
from a center, view the whole form within” (8). Hogarth’s language in 
this passage seems to balance between a description of the techniques 
of visual perception used by practising artists and a lesson on how ordi-
nary viewers can, like artists, turn objects to shells and shells to lines. 
(“I would desire the reader,” he says, “to assist his imagination as much 
as possible, in considering every object, as if his eye were placed within 
it” [10].) In either case, the end towards which the practitioner’s tech-
nique drives is to make contact with the object, in fact, to hollow out its 
insides and stand within its centre. At the same time, the contact pre-
sumed by Hogarth’s theory is not only with a premade world, since, in 
keeping with the practitioner’s stance, to pursue such objects is also to 
compose them. “We shall presume [a] principal ray moving along with 
the eye,” he writes, “and tracing out the parts of every form we mean to 
examine in the most perfect manner: and when we would follow with 
exactness the course any body takes, that is in motion, this ray is always 
to be supposed to move with the body” (26). Hogarth intends to bring 
the practical knowledge of the painter to ordinary acts of perception, 
and for him that means bringing an ability to trace out the shape and 
motion of the world at hand. To experience the beauty of some object or 
body is both to draw its lines and to be led by them on a kind of chase.
Hogarth spells out his aesthetics of technique and know-how in 
argued contrast to moral sense theories of response, taste, and connois-
seurship. An even more polemically engaged theory of direct percep-
tion, however, may be found in the roughly contemporary commonsense 
philosophy of Thomas Reid. For the duration of his long career, Reid’s 
central preoccupation was to overturn the notion – common to empiri-
cists from Locke to Hume – that “external things must be perceived by 
means of images of them in the mind.”31 These are his words from An 
Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764) 
where he elaborates on them in lively and unabashed terms: “that we 
can have no conception of any thing, unless there is some impression 
or sense or idea in our minds which resembles it, is indeed an opin-
ion in general very well received among philosophers but it is neither 
self-evident nor hath it been clearly proved: and therefore it [is] more 
reasonable to call in question this doctrine than to discard the material 
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world, and by that means expose philosophy to the ridicule of all men, 
who will not offer up common sense as a sacrifice to metaphysics” (75). 
As Reid understands the representational theory of Locke and Hume, 
the notion that one perceives objects through a filter of ideas leads inev-
itably to a skepticism about whether these objects really exist. The goal 
then is to use the ordinary assumption that we access the world directly 
as a standard for thinking about perception and to assert that any chal-
lenge to this notion of access violates common sense. The means of 
achieving this goal is, in turn, in rejecting the language of mental imag-
ery as a needlessly recondite picture of the everyday habits of view-
ing and acting. Whereas Locke and Hume found the need to come up 
with a separate panoply of mental states – impressions, ideas, senses, 
images, and the like – Reid admits only of our having “natural signs” 
that automatically and with no interference fasten experience to their 
objects. Unlike mental representations, natural signs bear no similarity 
to the world; they are simply part of it: “They pass through the mind 
instantaneously and serve only to introduce the notion and belief of 
external things, which by our constitution are connected with them” 
(63). So on Reid’s view we are caught up in the world in the sense that 
there is only a slim distance between the sign we possess and the sig-
nified we inhabit. “Natural signs” go unnoticed in our experience as 
“the mind passes immediately to the thing signified without making 
the least reflection on the sign, or observing that there ever was such a 
thing” (63). In this respect, the theory of natural signs is not so far from 
Hogarth’s hollowed out shells. Both draw perception out of the head 
so it may limn the surface of the world. According to Reid’s dense and 
difficult account of what he calls “the geometry of the visibles,” in fact, 
depth perception happens because vision projects on the surface of a 
sphere, not on a flat plain.32 Sight tilts on a curve, Reid says, because 
it fastens to objects receding on a bent gradient. The formal theory of 
perceptual presence lagged behind its literary antecedents because it 
conceived of vision as a kind of touch and presented depth as curvature 
or occlusion among middle-sized objects.
What is common to Hogarth and Reid is the notion that if one 
is averse to a posture of detachment – in ordinary or aesthetic acts of 
perception – then one must also be averse to a theory of internal rep-
resentations. The act of standing in relation to an image for both writ-
ers means that one is somehow not participating in what that image 
represents. Hogarth raises this objection in order to put the beholder of 
beautiful works of art or beautiful pieces of nature in a place to recreate 
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them in time: it is not the image of the finished whole that concerns him 
but the various strands by which it is made. Reid asks his reader simply 
to trust her naive judgments about the encountered and lived world. 
The worry here (again) is that a representational theory leads to skepti-
cism, and so, on his view, to disaster. We abide with the “sun, moon, 
stars and earth, [with] vegetable and animal bodies” themselves, not 
with their ideas or images (67). The world goes on without our having 
any account of it, Reid says, so we might just do our best to trust what 
we see and feel.
Where Hogarth directs his reader to attend to form, Reid directs his 
to attend to whole objects. The charge is perhaps most curious when it 
is made with respect to the prototypically mental property of colour, 
which Reid says is a property of bodies themselves: “By color, all men, 
who have not been tutored by modern philosophy, understand not a 
sensation of the mind, which can have no existence when it is not per-
ceived, but a quality or modification of bodies, which continues to be 
the same, whether it is seen or not. The scarlet-rose, which is before me, 
is still a scarlet-rose when I shut my eyes, and was so at midnight when 
no eye saw it” (85). Reid was nearly alone among eighteenth-century 
theorists in holding that colour was a mind-independent and enduring 
feature of the bodies it colours.33 As elsewhere, he would have us accept 
our relation to the sun, the moon, and stars, to vegetable and animal 
bodies, to red and to blue, rather than throw that relation into doubt. 
In this respect, Reid’s direct realism is an important if unacknowledged 
antecedent to the speculative realism on offer by, for example, Gra-
ham Harman’s headline-grabbing “object-oriented ontology,” which 
also argues, contra “the widespread empiricist view that the supposed 
objects of experience are nothing but bundles of qualities,” that colours 
“are bonded to the thing to which they belong,” while advocating for a naive 
approach to the encountered world.34 Reid might stand as a background 
to the current mood, in this manner, but he also might draw attention to 
the strange way that speculative realism understands objects to retreat 
from us and from each other.35 In contrast to such retreat, Reid’s valu-
ation of the naive and the ordinary would shrink the distance between 
our perceptual acts and the “earth, which we inhabit,” the “country, 
friends and relations, which we enjoy,” and the “land, houses, and 
moveables, which we possess” (18). And it would do so by conceiving 
of perception as a kind of motor skill, secured by the well-designed 
“fabric of the human body” (113). Vision, for example, is “skillfully and 
regularly performed” by “a system of unconnected muscles conspiring 
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[as] wonderfully in their various actions” as “excellent musicians in a 
concert” or “a company of expert players in a theatrical performance” 
or “good dancers in a country dance” (113).36
Apostrophe and Dwelling
Perception is direct on this view because we are adept at using our bod-
ies to bring the world – the earth, our friends, and dwelling – within 
reach. One word for this skill is the ability to achieve what Henry Home, 
Lord Kames, called “presence,” both “ideal” and “real,” in his 1762 Ele-
ments of Criticism – the “laying open [of] things existing and passing 
around us” – and much of the dissident line that I’ve been attempt-
ing to reconstruct aims to consider and realize something like presence 
in aesthetic and perceptual acts.37 Consider one more loco-descriptive 
poet, William Cowper, whose task it is to sing of the sofa, “who long 
in thickets and in brakes/ Entangled, winds now this way and now 
that/ his devious course uncertain, seeking home.”38 Entanglement is 
a nice word for the tactile account of vision. The idea would be that to 
see the world is to reach out to something that is already there. Here 
again the perceptual theory matches up with the literary form. For 
while critics have long separated the apostrophe with which The Task 
begins from the meandering entanglements to which it proceeds – as if 
sofas were one thing and thickets another – there is an important sense 
in which Cowper writes of both within a common notion of a world 
up close. Apostrophe, writes Kames, aims “to bestow a momentary 
presence upon a sensible being who is absent” (2:554–5). When this 
figure joins with personification, he adds, it aims to bestow presence 
and sentience at once, so “things inanimate” may qualify “for listening 
to a passionate expostulation” (2:555). For my purposes, momentary 
presence describes the formal and figural way of bringing something 
to hand, the reaching out to things just past one’s fingers so they may 
be brought into view. Momentary presence is by its nature fleeting and, 
as it is set out in the poem, requires one’s skill and handiwork. If the 
apostrophic speaker is at home in the world, that is because he knows 
how to bring it in reach, and if he knows how to bring it in reach, that 
is because he is good at paying it attention, like his skilled gardener of 
cucumbers pinching the bud of each second stalk so to yield “summer 
fruits brought forth from wintry suns” (3:553). If he is good at pay-
ing attention, finally, that is because Cowper is good at the apostrophe 
and personification that “raise the prickly and green-coated gourd/So 
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grateful to the palate,” as if the form of the trope could trace the edge of 
each sofa and the skin of each cucumber (3:446–7).
What Is It Like to Be a Starling?
Like the pail of milk or the bunch of fruit, the cucumber is not over there, 
but right here, and it is right here because it is the subject of apostrophe’s 
momentary presence, one that shows up for a creature with a certain 
kind of body and a certain kind of motility. The loco-descriptive poets 
understood this because they were working through the ecology of per-
ception, on the ground, naively, as it were. I have argued that this naiveté 
extends to the idea that the world shows up as present, not as a mental 
representation, and that presence is something achieved through a kind 
of skill. Seeing is like touching is like gardening. I’ll turn now in the 
final pages of this essay to some versions of presence in a few moments 
from Sterne. The first is from an early letter that Sterne wrote to Eliza-
beth Lumley before they were married, the rest from Sentimental Journey. 
Lumley was apparently about to leave her family’s country house:
Thou sayest thou wilt quit the place with regret – I think so too – Does 
not something uneasy mingle with the very reflection of leaving it? It is 
like parting with an old friend, whose temper and company one has long 
been acquainted with. – I think I see you looking twenty times a day at the 
house – almost counting every brick and pane of glass, and telling them 
at the same time with a sigh, you are going to leave them – Oh happy 
modification of matter! They will remain insensible of thy loss. – But how 
wilt thou be able to part with thy garden? – The recollection of so many 
pleasing walks must have endeared it to you. The trees, the shrubs, the 
flowers, which thou reared with thy own hands – will they not droop and 
fade away sooner upon thy departure – Who will be the successor to nurse 
them in thy absence. – Thou wilt leave thy name upon the myrtle-tree. – If 
trees, and shrubs, and flowers could compose an elegy, I should expect a 
very plaintive one upon this subject.39
The letter is one of only a few that Sterne kept from the period (the 
1740s), and it is clear that he continued to think through its contents 
over the course of his career. For my current purposes, the letter is 
remarkable for its use of apostrophe and personification to entwine its 
recipient in the fold of a built and natural environment. Lumley is at 
home in the world, or rather the home – its walls and windows, walks 
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and gardens – is her world made present to mind. Seen this way, the 
apostrophe and personification provide a kind of linguistic shape and 
poignancy to the familiar acquaintance she has with the house and 
the gardens. “The apostrophizing poet,” writes Jonathan Culler (a 
twentieth-century Lord Kames of sorts), “identifies his universe as a 
world of sentient forces.”40 In this case, the brick and the glass and the 
flower, the shrubs and trees are present as available to Lumley, just as 
she is present as available to them (or at least to the shrubs and flow-
ers; the brick and glass are insensible, after all). Each mourns the other. 
Each mourns the other in anticipation of the other’s no longer being 
available. Each is present to the other as a living thing.
The kind of presence sketched by the trope, as Sterne writes about it, 
stems from the tactile know-how Lumley brings to gardening, as if to 
see the world beyond the end of one’s fingers one must actually reach 
out to touch it. As with Hogarth and Reid, the acquaintance Lumley has 
with created and living things takes some work and some skill, even as 
it seems to extend, on Sterne’s vision, to more naive and ordinary acts of 
perceiving. The latter point will become clearer years later when Sterne 
returns to and embellishes this understanding of presence in that most 
tactile of all eighteenth-century novels, Sentimental Journey – that novel 
of handholding and pulse taking. He returns in fact to the very myrtle 
tree upon which Lumley wrote her name and does the same. Arriving 
at Calais, Yorick contrasts his sense of worldly entanglement with the 
jaundiced and inward view of those unresponsive to travel. The world 
is all barren “only to him who will not cultivate the fruits that it offers,” 
he says, and then declares while clapping his hands, “was I in a desart, 
I would find out wherewith in it to call forth my affections … I would 
fasten them upon some sweet myrtle, or seek some melancholy cypress 
to connect myself to – I would court their shade, and greet them kindly 
for their protection – I would cut my name upon them, and swear they 
were the loveliest trees throughout the desert: if their leaves wither’d, I 
would teach myself to mourn, and when they rejoiced, I would rejoice 
along with them.”41 Once again personification traces a line of contact 
between the ends of one’s fingers and the places one inhabits, and in so 
inhabiting, perceives. The novel simply removes the letter’s earlier and 
more explicit references to Lumley’s skilled handiwork while retaining 
the feel of acquaintance and the work of the trope to bring the world 
within reach.
The episodes in which objects and persons and animals are found to 
be in reach in Sentimental Journey are of course many, and I’m not going 
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to detail them here. No eighteenth-century novel (again) is more con-
cerned with touch. I would turn instead to a passage that clarifies that 
this putting of touch into the foreground makes a point about vision in 
particular and perception at large. This is Yorick soon after he arrives 
in Paris:
I own my first sensations, as soon as I was left solitary and alone in my 
own chamber in the hotel, were far from being so flattering as I had pre-
figured them. I walked up gravely to the window in my dusty black coat, 
and looking through the glass saw all the world in yellow, blue and green, 
running at the ring of pleasure … Alas poor Yorick! cried I, what art thou 
doing here? On the very first onset of all this glittering clatter, thou art 
reduced to an atom – seek – seek some winding alley with a tourniquet at 
the end of it … there thou mayest solace thy soul in concourse sweet with 
some kind grisset of a barber’s wife, and get into such coteries! (47)
In her preface to the 1927 signet edition of Sentimental Journey, Virginia 
Woolf cited this passage (and this passage alone) as the quintessence 
of what she calls Sterne’s “pure poetry.”42 It is easy to see why. We are 
asked to consider Yorick gazing out his window onto the busy street 
below and to follow or adopt the rushing scene of colour that satu-
rates his visual field: a dusty black coaxes yellow and blue to combine 
into green. But we are asked also to consider the structural layout of 
the scene. Once the line of sight passes over the coat, it remains fixed 
at the window looking out at the street, while Yorick remains “soli-
tary and alone” in the room. The hotel fills out Locke’s metaphor of 
the camera obscura, in other words, as light from the street projects an 
image in a closed chamber, but it does so to some critical effect. In this 
respect, Sterne echoes no one more than Reid, who also took aim at just 
this metaphor. “Locke’s doctrine of ideas,” Reid writes, “alleges, with-
out any manifest proof, that every man shut in, as it were, in a camera 
obscura perceives nothing outside but only the images or ideas of things 
depicted in his own camera.”43 For Sterne as for Reid, the account of 
vision as a screening of images in a dark room puts too much emphasis 
on detachment and pictorial representation. The world does not project 
to a point.
In drawing attention to the Reidian and realist elements of Sterne, I 
aim to provide a context different from the long-standing association 
of the novelist with the project of Adam Smith and David Hume and, 
indeed, even from the project of sympathy, as that has been modelled, 
Presence of Mind 65
for example, as an inter-subjective encounter in James Chandler’s very 
recent and magisterial Archaeology of Sympathy.44 Sterne’s is a realism 
not limited to the emotions or to forming images of what is on some-
one else’s mind. Rather, I want to say it is a realism of the surrounded 
world conceived as something drawn close. On this view, perception is 
a kind of ability and a kind of technique, not the sitting in a darkened 
room so much as a walking about a crowded city or a reaching out to 
plants and stones. Sterne shows this technique in scenes of making the 
world present by bringing it to hand or seeing it with one’s fingers. 
He also elicits this technique in skill of his own, using his own craft 
to show how objects are made present to whoever beholds them. So, 
for example, when Yorick encounters his famous starling, the sentences 
bend to elicit the visual zigzag of a moving human body. “I had some 
occasion,” Yorick writes, “to step in the court yard,” and so “walk’d 
down the stairs,” whereupon hearing a cry, “I look’d up and down,” 
returned back, and “looking up again I saw it was a starling hung in 
a cage” (68–9). The visual zigzag mimics a kinetic unfolding: this is 
what Yorick sees as he walks this way with his head turned that way, 
as he brings the visual field within reach. With the attention to physi-
cal movement and shifting lines of sight, in other words, the sentences 
create the sense of an available world: a bird unseen from one vantage 
will come into view with a head moved liked this; a court yard will 
back onto a street when entered from a room. They create points that 
are both “movement dependent,” in Noë’s words, with the slightest 
motion of the body modulating the sensory relation to the object of per-
ception, and “object dependent,” with the slightest motion at the edges 
of the visual field grabbing our attention.45 They turn finally to a kind 
of seeing that is not simply pictorial, as Yorick “takes both hands” to the 
cage and wrestles with the “twisted and double twisted wires” while 
the bird flies to the spot of his fingers and, “thrusting his head through 
the trellis” and pressing “his breast against it, as if impatient,” repeats 
“I can’t get out” (69). Personification – Sterne’s know-how and handi-
work – traces two bodies in close, moving proximity and shows Yorick 
caught up with what he touches and, in so touching, makes present.
The encounter begins with some doubt on Yorick’s part about whether 
the starling is really asking to be set free or is merely a mechanical thing 
insensibly repeating words taught by a previous owner. It ends by dis-
carding skepticism and accepting a common place in a shared world, 
one that unfolds in time and at the end of one’s fingers. This turn from 
the skeptical to the naive might stand as the common thread among 
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my disparate writers. As I’ve intimated from time to time, I also think 
it sheds some light on our current naiveté – our more accepting interest 
in objects and surfaces and forms. We really do see things directly, Reid 
said. The world outstrips what is in our head. Just look. But know too, 
and this might be the lesson from the eighteenth-century techniques of 
presence, how much skill there is in seeing what lies between here and 
there, as Berkeley said, or turning a beautiful object to its lines, as Hog-
arth said, or finally, for everyone reading, simply engaging works in the 
way that we do. There is a lot to see, and there is a lot to lose.
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Since the 1960s, John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) has 
been given a prominent position in histories of the development of lib-
eral religious tolerance.1 Liberal political theorists find in the empiricist 
Locke a forebear to Immanuel Kant, a rather violent yoking justified 
by understanding Lockean tolerance in terms of dispassionate judg-
ment and the mutual recognition of religious freedom.2 A Neo-Kantian 
framework, however, both distorts Locke and forecloses a fuller under-
standing of the formation of religious tolerance in the English Enlight-
enment. Focusing on Locke’s definition of religion as private belief, his 
skepticism about theological truth, and the epistemological grounds for 
his separation of church and state, such accounts neglect how Locke 
reinterprets religious passions and sensations to establish the precon-
ditions of his conceptual framework for tolerance.3 As a result, these 
approaches also overlook the role his rhetoric plays in putting this 
implicit background in place. Accounts that enshrine Locke at the ori-
gin of liberal religious tolerance tend to reproduce his rhetorical fram-
ing of it as a dispassionate stance, in which religious zeal is opposed to 
reasonable tolerance. This not only disavows the pains and passions 
related to tolerance but also naturalizes the politics of the regimes of 
sensation and affect that support it.
If Locke’s now-canonical Letter has been used to support an “intel-
lectualist orientation” to religious tolerance, rereading it through 
the early affective turn of his pupil’s Characteristics of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, Times (1711) opens up for analysis the implicit background 
of sensation and feeling that Locke’s Letter transforms. The reverse 
has usually been the case: Locke distorts our reading of Shaftesbury 
and tolerance through an emphasis on epistemology and autonomy. 
3  Reading Locke after Shaftesbury: 
Feeling Our Way Towards a Postsecular 
Genealogy of Religious Tolerance
david alvarez
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Shaftesbury’s writings, however, are a powerfully illuminating 
example of how the transformations of religion that contribute to the 
Enlightenment formation of tolerance are not only conceptual but 
sensorial. Theorizing religious tolerance through what he argues is 
an alternative, empowering system of religious passions, Shaftesbury 
puts in place new “historical conditions of possibility for both the 
affective and evaluative response” to religious difference.4 Moreover, 
his explicit, self-conscious practice of cultural politics foregrounds 
how his rhetoric appeals to and transforms the felt meanings of reli-
gious passions, pains, and concepts.5 The rhetorical actions of Enlight-
enment texts – philosophical, literary, or otherwise – are key to seeing 
how discourses of nascent liberal tolerance manage anxieties caused 
by threats to religious identity. Such rhetorical moves also motivate 
the practice of tolerance by identifying and promoting the resources of 
resilience needed for endurance and self-restraint. To shift our under-
standing of the formation of religious tolerance from Locke to Shaftes-
bury, however, is neither to treat Shaftesbury as its origin nor to hold 
up his defence of tolerance as correct. Rather, Shaftesbury’s attention to 
sensation and the passions offers a corrective to dominant approaches 
of understanding the formation of religious tolerance through concep-
tual analysis and historical contextualizations that elide the history of 
the emotions.
A Shaftesburian approach to tolerance shares some similarities to 
Lars Tønder’s recent critique of the prevailing Neo-Kantian “intellectu-
alist orientation” in contemporary political philosophy, which, Tønder 
argues, disavows “the affective intensities and perceptual shifts that 
underpin the endurance and resilience embedded in the practice of tol-
erance.”6 Because it ignores what tolerance always involves – pain – 
such an approach distorts our understanding of the meaning and 
political potential of practicing tolerance. The word “tolerance” itself is 
derived from the Latin tolera-ntia, “endurance of pain,” and, as Tønder 
observes, pain “resonates with the phenomenology of tolerance as well 
as with everyday uses of tolerance as a response to something or some-
one of which or whom one disapproves.”7 Arguing for a “sensorial ori-
entation” to tolerance, Tønder suggests that analysing how “regimes of 
discourse and sensation” define and politicize the pains of tolerance can 
further democratic goals by expanding “the conditions of contestations 
and deliberation.”8 Moreover, a sensorial orientation is able to illumi-
nate how the “pleasurable pains” of discourses of tolerance (e.g., satire 
and the sublime) enable a “resilient endurance” through a “feeling of 
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pleasure” that augments one’s power and moves one towards others.9 
Tønder also affirms the pains of tolerance for their liberating potential, 
their ability in some contexts to be “world-making rather than world-
shattering” and to empower the creation of “new constellations of 
thought and action.”10 Although Shaftesbury’s consideration of pain is 
less affirmative, he understands his own effort to promote tolerance as 
the resignification of a regime of sensation and passion, and he treats 
tolerance as a “pleasurable pain” by identifying sources of resilience 
and endurance. He offers an immanent Enlightenment critique of lib-
eral theories of tolerance such as Locke’s that disavow and relegate the 
passions to a tacit, unexamined background.
Attending to Shaftesbury’s transformation of religious regimes of 
passion and sensation also enables the pursuit of a postsecular geneal-
ogy of tolerance. Shaftesbury’s conceptualization of a tolerant public 
rationality not only requires repressing an earlier set of religious pas-
sions but redefining and promoting new felt meanings for religion. Tol-
erance is not separated from religious understandings and feelings but 
is formulated in relationship to them. This is not to reduce “the secular” 
to “the religious” or to claim that religion contaminates secular toler-
ance; instead, Shaftesbury’s work provides ample evidence in support 
of revisionist scholarship in the wake of Talal Asad that understands 
these categories as “interdependent and necessarily linked in their 
mutual transformation and historical emergence.”11 And while much 
has been written about Locke’s reliance on Christian theology in his 
arguments for religious tolerance, reading Locke with a Shaftesburian 
lens highlights how his text enables the endurance of religious differ-
ence by transforming and appealing to religious passions.12 Focusing 
on the background of sensation and passion that these texts put into 
play suggests their continuing power to inform and animate political 
liberalism not only conceptually but in terms of the felt meanings they 
put in place.13 Turning to Shaftesbury to open up a postsecular geneal-
ogy of tolerance can enable “the modern articulation of the secular … 
to loosen and lighten up” by offering an in-depth opportunity for “the 
secular to historicize and contextualize itself.”14 Such an approach also 
foregrounds the politics of tolerance. Shaftesbury’s efforts to promote 
tolerance are deeply political in ways that “compromise the possibility 
of a deep, genuinely pluralistic democratic politics.”15 Overall, Shaft-
esbury’s work invites an analysis of religious tolerance that focuses on 
the space between the secular and the religious, alert to its ambiguous 
political effects.
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Shaftesbury and Religious Tolerance: Passions,  
Cognition, and Politics
Shaftesbury’s argument for religious tolerance is usually considered 
in relation to his promotion of polite conversation in a rational public 
sphere self-regulated by the “test of ridicule.”16 Characterizing Shaftes-
bury’s conception of sociability and conversation along Habermasian 
lines, Lawrence Klein influentially describes him as arguing “for broad 
religious and intellectual toleration in the context of a public sphere, a 
worldly domain of free and open discussion in which exchange and 
criticism advanced both truth and refinement.”17 As “epistemological 
practices,” wit, raillery, and polite conversation liberate the mind from 
prejudice and self-deception, allowing religious tolerance to develop 
within a public sphere of open discussion.18 Viewing Shaftesbury 
through a Habermasian lens, however, obscures the constitutive role 
played by the passions in his reformulation of public reason. “Good 
humour” is not a tool for freeing the mind from the influence of the 
passions but rather a political sensibility and practice that enables a 
particular kind of rationality. For example, as part of his critique of 
Hobbes’s reduction of human motivation to “only one Master-Passion, 
Fear, which has, in effect devour’d all the rest,” Shaftesbury not only 
contends against the regime of passion and sensation that supports 
Hobbesian and Anglican High Church politics and forms of reasoning 
but also seeks to put in place a new one with a different set of political 
and cognitive possibilities and limitations.19 Analysing “good humour” 
as primarily an epistemological tool tends to emphasize its possibilities 
(e.g., the ability of wit to “put the mind at liberty”), while downplaying 
the disciplinary force of politeness and the rhetorical power of ridicule 
(159).20 For Shaftesbury, however, good humour as an “epistemological 
practice” cannot be separated from its rhetorical ability to transform 
the passions: it is a political practice before it is an epistemological one.
Viewing Shaftesbury within the framework of Habermas’s casually 
secular account of public reason in The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere also shifts attention away from the theological elements 
that inform Shaftesbury’s construction of public reason and religious 
tolerance.21 Specifically, he does not oppose religious passion to reason 
but instead reinterprets and reforms a religious sensibility, which then 
conditions the practice and contours of public reason. Accounts like 
Sammy Basu’s that see Shaftesbury’s polite civility as “post-theological” 
risk rendering his defence of religious tolerance in terms of a 
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“subtraction story,” in which emancipation from the yoke of an oppres-
sive religious sensibility permits truth and tolerance to naturally mani-
fest themselves in a liberated modernity.22 Charles Taylor criticizes such 
narratives on the grounds that they misrepresent “newly constructed self- 
understandings and related practices” for “perennial features of human 
life” that “were there all along, but had been impeded” by “certain ear-
lier, confining horizons or illusions.”23 To the extent that Shaftesbury is 
construed along early Habermasian lines, we risk not only an “intellec-
tualist orientation” to tolerance but also an ahistorical, presumptively 
secular one.24
Shaftesbury, however, understands religious passion as a historical, 
politicized regime of discourse and sensation. It is both the object of 
Shaftesbury’s analysis of tolerance and the target of his transformative 
rhetoric. He contends that the felt meaning of a Hobbesian interpre-
tation of religious passion as fear provided implicit, powerful back-
ground support to the justification of persecution, political absolutism, 
and the power of High Church Anglicans. To promote tolerance, he 
aims to transform this meaning of religious passion and subvert its 
politics. He argues in A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (1709) that con-
trolling religious violence requires recognizing and calming “men’s 
natural fears”:
And thus is religion also panic when enthusiasm of any kind gets up as 
oft, on melancholy occasions, it will. For vapours naturally rise and, in bad 
times especially, when the spirits of men are low, as either in public cala-
mities or during the unwholesomeness of air or diet, or when convulsions 
happen in nature, storms, earthquakes or other amazing prodigies – at 
this season the panic must needs run high, and the magistrate of neces-
sity give way to it. For to apply a serious remedy and bring the sword 
or fasces as a cure must make the case more melancholy and increase the 
very cause of the distemper. To forbid men’s natural fears and to endeavor 
the overpowering them by other fears, must needs be a most unnatural 
method. The magistrate, if he be any artist, should have a gentler hand 
and, instead of caustics, incisions and amputations, should be using the 
softest balms, and, with a kind of sympathy, entering into the public and 
taking, as it were, their passion upon him, should, when he has soothed 
and satisfied it, endeavor, by cheerful ways, to divert and heal it … [In 
antiquity,] superstition and enthusiasm were mildly treated and, being let 
alone, they never raged to that degree as to occasion bloodshed, wars, 
persecutions, and devastations in the world.25
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For Shaftesbury, when nature threatens death through disease, natural 
catastrophe, and “other amazing prodigies,” humans feel fear and anxi-
ety. While he insists that such melancholic religious fears are natural, he 
denies that they inevitably lead to violence: “when the spirits of men 
are low … the panic must needs run high.” The task, therefore, is to 
raise men’s spirits. A magistrate should use “the softest balms,” “exer-
cise sympathy,” and share the passion of the people so that he might 
by “cheerful ways divert it.” Instead of urging a dispassionate, rational 
stance that relegates the passions to an unacknowledged background, 
Shaftesbury presents religious tolerance as fundamentally about man-
aging religious passions. They must be acknowledged and assuaged, 
vented and transformed, since “to forbid men’s natural fears” is as dan-
gerous as “to endeavor the overpowering them by other fears.” Though 
they are irresistibly “natural,” such passions require a controlled and 
transformed expression because of their political volatility: to respond 
to religious fears with “caustics, incisions, and amputations” – to use 
state violence (“the sword” or “fasces”) – only amplifies the debilitat-
ing panic that Shaftesbury links to political oppression, irrationality, 
and sectarian violence. In contending against Hobbes’s philosophical 
anthropology, which justified political order and religious uniformity 
by appealing to the fear of death, Shaftesbury offers a new economy 
of the passions to support a new politics.26 This passage acknowledges 
religious pain and anxiety but also seeks to transform the political dis-
course through which the subject interprets its emotions and under-
stands its experience. Instead of a politics based on religious fear, 
Shaftesbury offers and practises, in Albert Hirschman’s terms, a theory 
of religious tolerance conceived in terms of countervailing passions.27 
The magistrate manages fear with cheer, panic with sympathy. For 
Shaftesbury, religious tolerance begins with mood management.
The rhetoric of the passage also supports this claim, since it positions 
religious anxiety in a larger, more reassuring frame. If religious fear 
is “natural,” it is also an unnatural “distemper” that requires “heal-
ing.” Structuring his argument around medical tropes, Shaftesbury fig-
ures the magistrate’s intervention as the encouragement of a natural 
process, framing it less as a manipulative political intervention than a 
physician’s healing hand. These figures also distinguish Shaftesbury 
from Hobbesian and High Church political absolutists and persecutors, 
who not only propose “incisions and amputations” but do so with the 
comically horrific and clumsy medical instruments of the sword and, 
especially, the fasces. Even in his diagnosis of religious melancholy, 
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Shaftesbury practises the rhetorical cure of good humour: the passage 
both advocates and practises the magistrate’s role. As part of this effort, 
it also links religious fear to a limited time frame, to “seasons” of calam-
ities and convulsions that will naturally pass. And it depicts the mag-
istrate as sharing and sympathizing with the melancholy passions that 
can afflict the public. Indeed, in the face of such panic, “the magistrate 
of necessity [must] give way to it.” Before he can “divert and heal,” 
he must “soothe and satisfy.” Shaftesbury insists on the force of the 
“natural passion of enthusiasm” with which religious tolerance must 
reckon.28 He counters that force, however, not with rational-critical 
public debate but by acknowledging and transforming religious pas-
sion: this passage is an example of how Shaftesbury theorizes, urges, 
and practises that transformation.
The key term in this transformation is, of course, “enthusiasm,” 
which, Shaftesbury claims, “is a matter of nice judgment and the hard-
est thing in the world to know fully and distinctly” (27). Its conceptual 
ambiguity, however, is less important for him than its affective indeter-
minacy. The equivocal nature of this feeling enables him to reinterpret 
and reframe its meaning in support of a new political regime of the 
passions. Shaftesbury makes a primitive existential predicament equiv-
alent to a Hobbesian or Lockean state of nature. Instead of fearing a vio-
lent death at the hands of others or, worse still, the loss of our property, 
the original condition of humans is marked by ambiguous religious 
feelings of enthusiastic anxiety and wonder.29 In his speculative history 
of the origin of religious violence, it is the difficulty of interpreting our 
confused religious emotions that opens the door to political oppression, 
economic exploitation, and violent sectarianism:
We can admire nothing profoundly without a certain religious veneration. 
And because this borders so much on fear and raises a certain tremor or 
horror of like appearance, it is easy to give that turn to the affection and 
represent all enthusiasm and religious ecstasy as the product or mere 
effect of fear: Fear first created gods in the world. But the original passion, as 
appears plainly, is of another kind. (354)
Our experience of wonder, “to admire … profoundly,” includes feeling 
“religious veneration,” and yet the passion is confusing: it “borders … 
on fear” and the “tremor or horror” it produces has a “like appear-
ance” to fear. For Shaftesbury, humanity’s struggles to interpret this 
equivocal passion inaugurate religious history. From ancient Egypt to 
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the Anglican Church, this hermeneutical problem, our “human weak-
ness,” has been exploited by priests to extort believers and to establish 
and maintain political power (360).30 The manipulative practices and 
rhetoric of priestcraft interpret our confused religious feelings as fear, 
empowering religious authorities to gain “whatever extent of riches 
or possession could be acquired by practice and influence over the 
superstitious part of mankind” (358).31 This political interpretation of 
religious passion continues in the rhetorical practices of the Anglican 
Church, “the writing Church Militant,” whose “imposture” and “for-
malism” create an oppressive, exploitative “melancholy” that foments 
religious violence.32 Against priestcraft, Shaftesbury seeks to return us 
to the “original passion,” to interpret an ambiguous religious emotion 
not as an experience of the “astonishing and frightful” but of the “ami-
able and delightful.” This latter passion – and not fear – “first created 
gods in the world.”
The foundations of any religion, according to Shaftesbury, find their 
“first beginnings … in that natural complacency and good humour 
which inclines to trust and confidence in mankind … The first scene 
of doctrine … fails not to present us with agreeable views of joy, love, 
meekness, gentleness and moderation” (386–7). Good humour is less 
a feeling of happiness than a religious disposition to trust and engage 
with others and the world.33 It is a sensibility of delight and wonder 
marked by an openness, an affirmation of life, and an enhancement 
of our natural social affections. More than a feeling, good humour is 
an expansive mode of cognition and experience.34 Because Shaftes-
bury insists on the power of the passions to determine our perceptions, 
his interpretation of religious passion as good humour instead of fear 
becomes the basis for an alternate discourse of sensation, politics, and 
public reason.35 His text poses a choice not between religious passion 
and secular reason, nor between religious and secular passions, but 
between religious sensibilities. Because he connects the emancipation 
of reason to a reinterpretation of religious passion, critique for Shaftes-
bury is something other than secular. So is religious tolerance.36
Priming the Passion for Religious Tolerance
In the last volume of Characteristics, the “Miscellaneous Reflections,” 
Shaftesbury impersonates a commentator on his earlier essays, offering 
several illustrations of the magistrate’s “moderating art” for overcom-
ing religious violence.37 These examples prioritize the political benefits 
80 David Alvarez
of managing religious passions over any epistemological promise. 
They also highlight the mutual construction of religion and polite good 
humour. God, for instance, handles the “melancholy and forward tem-
per” of the “pettish” Jonah by exhorting him to “good humour” with 
a “lusory [and] most tender manner” (388–90). Similarly, Shaftesbury 
suggests “a certain festivity, alacrity, and good humour” in the “sharp, 
humorous, and witty … repartees, reflections, fabulous narrations or 
parables, similes, comparisons and other methods of milder censure 
and reproof” of Jesus (390). Good humour is a Christian passion and 
practice in the strictest sense. God models it. Shaftesbury’s claim that 
he borrows his style from the rhetorical practices of Jesus and his use 
of these divine examples to cast Christianity as “in the main a good 
humored and witty religion” reveal how religion and polite public rea-
son are mutually transformative Enlightenment constructions (390).
Shaftesbury most fully illustrates “that magisterial science or policy 
which our author recommends” by recounting a passage from the book 
of Acts about a town clerk of Ephesus who calmed “a religious panic” 
upon the arrival of Paul (375, 374). When Paul began preaching Chris-
tianity, the Ephesians responded to “their established church [being] 
called into question” by crying out, “All with one voice, about the space 
of two hours … ‘Great is Diana of the Ephesians’” (374). Urged on by 
the town’s artisans, who profited from crafting idols of Diana, a “rage 
or epidemical frenzy” passed through the crowd, and “the new reli-
gionists [Christians]” were threatened with persecution. This catastro-
phe was avoided, however, because the clerk assured the people that 
“everyone acquiesced in their ancient worship of that goddess and in 
their tradition of the image which fell down from Jupiter,” that “these 
facts were undeniable,” and that “the new sect neither meant the pull-
ing down of their church nor so much as offered to blaspheme or speak 
amiss of the goddess” (375). As Shaftesbury points out, the clerk “went 
pretty far,” since “this, no doubt, was stretching the point sufficiently, 
as may be understood by the event in after time” (375). In after time, of 
course, the worship of Diana ceased. The town clerk’s claims were a lie.
The “moderating art,” therefore, seems relatively unconcerned 
with epistemological issues. Promoting the tolerant politics of “good 
humour” has no necessary connection to promoting truth. Equally sig-
nificant is the passage’s identification of anxieties about religious iden-
tity (not the fear of death) as the potential source of violence. The town 
clerk’s particular lie matters, since he claims that the existing religious 
order is not threatened but will endure. The lie is a political response 
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to the manipulation of the public’s religious fears: it calms the Ephe-
sians and robs the artisan “priests” of their power, enabling a peaceful 
religious transition (in this case from paganism to Christianity) that 
Shaftesbury considers natural were it not for the politics of fear. Since 
his examples often describe his own rhetorical practices, the town 
clerk’s actions show Shaftesbury’s concern not to refute religion with 
truth but rather to make it possible to hold onto religious identity more 
loosely by liberating believers from fear. Thus the direct implication of 
the town clerk’s example for contemporary British politics would seem 
to be for the state/magistrate to sympathize with the public’s anxiety 
over “the Church in danger” and then simply proclaim its safety. This 
might be “stretching the point sufficiently,” but Shaftesbury thinks that 
it would undermine the political power of High Church Anglicans and 
defuse religious turmoil. Failing such a declaration, the cultural poli-
tics he pursues in Characteristics aims to transform religious feeling and 
render the public less vulnerable to the political exploitation of reli-
gious fear.
The subordination of truth to tolerance also appears in Shaftesbury’s 
historical examples of political failures to manage religious passion 
with good humour. If, when Roman Catholic priests had faced the Ref-
ormation, they had not “as is usual, preferred the love of blood to all 
other passions, they might in a merrier way, perhaps, have evaded the 
greatest force of our reforming spirit” (16). Similarly, if the Jews had 
rejected the “sovereign argument” of “Crucify! Crucify!” and instead 
“taken the fancy to act … puppet shows in [Jesus’s] contempt” then 
they “might possibly have done our religion more harm than by all 
their other ways of severity” (16). Both of these provocative examples 
emphasize that sectarianism must be countered with good humour – 
not with violence, which produces more fear and therefore replicates 
absolutist politics, and not with reason, which ignores the meaning and 
politics of religious feeling. Basu also notes that these examples entail 
“either that ridicule could in fact defeat the truth, or that Christianity 
and Protestantism contained many untruths.”38 Or both.
Read in the light of his commentary on the magistrate, Shaftesbury’s 
somewhat famous celebration of satirical puppetry in A Letter Concern-
ing Enthusiasm further undercuts the claim that good humour is pri-
marily an epistemological tool. Such puppet shows are a version of the 
magistrate’s practice of soothing fears caused by “amazing prodigies” 
and threats to religious identity. The Letter thus objects to the persecu-
tion of some zealous French Huguenots who had recently arrived from 
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France on the grounds that it would only inflame religious zeal and 
violence.
Their own mob [i.e., the Huguenot ministers] are willing to bestow kind 
blows upon them and fairly stone them now and then in the open street. …  
But how barbarous still and more than heathenishly cruel are we tole-
rating Englishmen! For, not contented to deny these prophesying enthu-
siasts the honour of a persecution, we have delivered them over to the 
cruelest contempt in the world. I am told, for certain, that they are at this 
very time the subject of a choice droll or puppet-show at Bartholomew 
Fair. There doubtless their strange voices and involuntary agitations are 
admirably well acted, by the motion of wires and inspiration of pipes. 
For the bodies of the prophets in their state of prophecy, being not in their 
own power but (as they say themselves), mere passive organs, actuated 
by an exterior force, have nothing natural or resembling real life in any of 
their sounds or motions, so that how awkwardly soever a puppet show 
may imitate other actions, it must needs represent this passion to the life. 
And while Bartholomew Fair is in possession of this privilege, I dare stand 
security to our national Church that no sect of enthusiasts, no new venders 
of prophecy or miracles, shall ever get the start or put her to the trouble of 
trying her strength with them, in any case.39
Shaftesbury’s willingness to “stand security” to the established church 
might be as truthful as the town clerk’s guarantees to the Ephesians, 
but the passage is usually read in earnest. While their fellow French 
Huguenots – shaped by an absolutist political regime – want to “stone 
[the enthusiasts] now and then,” and while the Anglican Church is 
also interested in “trying her strength,” the puppet show, Shaftesbury 
claims, enables the public to regulate itself. Self-regulation via pup-
petry is often linked to the ability of humour, wit, and satire to “correct 
abuses and excess” since “the exercise of raillery recalled adversar-
ies to a more reasonable view.”40 Thus, raillery’s power to puncture 
enthusiastic “imposture” enables autonomy and judgment. The pas-
sage, however, does not straightforwardly support either claim about a 
self-regulating public or the establishment of a “more reasonable 
view.” Rather, Shaftesbury’s appeal to and description of these enter-
tainments demonstrates his trust in the coercive power of wit and 
raillery to affectively reposition readers and spectators in ways that – 
while manipulative – resist strengthening the absolutist politics of fear. 
Puppet satire regulates the public by producing a difference between 
fanatic Huguenots and tolerant British readers/spectators.41
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The need to draw a boundary is motivated by the threat of contami-
nation posed by a religious panic “raised in a multitude and conveyed 
by aspect, or, as it were by contact or sympathy … The fury flies from 
face to face, and the disease is no sooner seen than caught.”42 To coun-
ter the force of this “social and communicative” passion, Shaftesbury 
links the prophets to mechanism, figuring their bodies as “mere pas-
sive organs … hav[ing] nothing natural or resembling real life.” Pas-
sive, unnatural, lifeless: the puppets’ “involuntary” actions produced 
by “wires” and “pipes” imitate the enthusiasts’ “passion to the life” 
(10). In Shaftesbury’s representation of the puppet show, spectators 
dis-identify and distance themselves from the lifeless, mechanical 
behaviour of religious enthusiasts. Yet if satire is to prove more reliable 
than state authorized violence, these spectators – and Shaftesbury’s 
readers – must also be mechanically moved. Insofar as satire urges us to 
reject a painful identification with the satiric object and to indulge the 
pleasure of identifying with the satirist, it works upon us prior to self-
reflection. There is thus a tension between Shaftesbury’s claims about 
humour’s emancipatory power and the rhetorical action of satirical 
form, a tension between autonomy and Shaftesbury’s paternal con-
fidence in the power of satirical puppet shows to moderate religious 
passion. This suggests that such puppet shows are less “a potential 
opportunity for insight … than simply an occasion for the mechanical 
application of values that we do not so much hold as are held by.”43 
His description of puppetry depicts spectators at Bartholomew Fair 
as mistaking the action of satire for agency and the pleasure of satiric 
identification for judgment. Shaftesbury’s satirical rhetoric in Character-
istics invites readers to do the same. Good humour as satire, therefore, 
does not necessarily distance the subject from the “ardent solemnities 
of identity”: wit and raillery can also plug us into the pleasurable, unre-
flective embrace of a new identity.44 Since anxiety caused by the threat 
to religious identity can be exploited by the politics of fear (as the exam-
ple of the Ephesians showed), Shaftesbury unsurprisingly turns to the 
rhetoric of satire to provide the consolations of a consolidated identity. 
Tolerance is made possible by alleviating this anxiety. The pleasure of 
derision also helps. This new identity, however, is not a secular separa-
tion from religion but rather a transformation of religious feeling: Shaft-
esbury’s example of satirical puppet shows differentiates not between 
the religious and the secular but between melancholy enthusiastic 
Huguenots and good-humoured tolerant Anglicans.
In this case, Shaftesbury uses satire to transform a religious sensibil-
ity, undercutting a politics based on religious fear and jumpstarting a 
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“natural” politics of tolerance based on religious good humour.45 While 
his claims about the epistemological value of wit and raillery are prom-
inently stated, he gives priority to good humour’s political benefits.46 
First, he considers its political results as more certain and thus more 
valuable. He confidently predicts that good humour can promote reli-
gious tolerance, while acknowledging that it does not necessarily lead 
to truth. The examples he gives of polite conversations are marked both 
by “confusion” and “total uncertainty” as well as by an “improvement 
to the good humor of the company” that “set the appetite the keener 
to such conversations.”47 Shaftesbury clearly argues that good humour 
makes cognition more trustworthy, but the successes seem modest. 
While the transformation of religious fear into religious good humour 
has both epistemological and political benefits, epistemological prog-
ress cannot be the source of political progress. Both are independent 
possibilities of good humour, which underwrites a stable religio- 
political order for all and enables intellectual freedom for an open 
elite.48 The management of religious passion is a political project prior 
to being an epistemological one, though part of Shaftesbury’s politics is 
to emphasize the cognitive benefits of good humour.49
Second, Shaftesbury understands good humour as both a passion 
and a practice, as an enabling mood and as the cultivation of that dispo-
sition. To achieve the political and epistemological benefits of the pas-
sion of good humour requires the practice of good humour. This is one 
reason why Shaftesbury rejects “formal” modes of writing marked by 
“method” (e.g., sermons and academic treatises): whatever their con-
tent, they lack the rhetorical power to shift the passions away from the 
cultural politics of fear. Their form reproduces the discursive regime 
of the passions institutionalized by the court and the church and thus 
reinforces their power. Shaftesbury’s Characteristics, therefore, works to 
rhetorically reconfigure the structure of religious passions in its audi-
ence, shifting moods away from the feeling and politics of “melan-
choly” and returning them to the “original passion” of religious good 
humour. It seeks to prime its readers to perceive and inhabit the world 
as more tolerant individuals. Because the passions politically condition 
perception and reasoning, they come first. Moreover, as a transforma-
tion of the background that orients virtuous practice, this priming act 
is itself also political.
Overall, Shaftesbury theorizes religious tolerance in terms of a 
dynamics of countervailing passions. He also explicitly links the polit-
ical rationality of his tolerant public sphere to good humour, itself a 
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transformation of religious passion. Religious tolerance for Shaftesbury, 
therefore, is not about separating religion from the state but about man-
aging and shifting the meaning of religious feeling. His theorization of 
religious tolerance thus lays out not only the conceptual but also the 
affective contours within which the nascent practice of liberal tolerance 
makes sense: his conceptions of the public sphere and of “religion” are 
mutually reinforcing. Shaftesbury’s analysis is especially useful, how-
ever, not for his particular model of religious tolerance – about which 
one might have many reservations – but for his general approach. His 
explicit attention to the passions distinguishes his defence of tolerance 
from dominant Neo-Kantian histories of its development and enables 
us to interrogate the taken-for-granted categorical schemes through 
which Enlightenment arguments about religious tolerance are usually 
disseminated.
Reading Locke after Shaftesbury makes it easier to apprehend the 
implicit background roles played by transformed regimes of sensation 
and passions in A Letter Concerning Toleration, both as preconditions for 
Locke’s arguments and as motivations for tolerance, despite a rhetori-
cal frame in the Letter that disavows them. Locke transforms Christian-
ity into a tolerant “religion,” not only by rendering it as “belief” – as is 
widely known – but also by rhetorically transforming the felt meaning 
of religion in support of religion as belief.50 And while Locke attempts 
to anchor religious tolerance in such binaries as belief/practice, mind/
body, and church/state, because Shaftesbury thinks between the terms 
of these binaries through the passion of good humour, his approach 
enables us to illuminate the discursive construction of the binaries 
themselves. As a passion, good humour both unsettles the distinction 
between belief and practice and belongs neither to mind nor body (nor 
strictly to the individual). Finally, Shaftesbury’s focus on religious fear 
as a cognitively and politically debilitating pain that must be acknowl-
edged, balanced, and transformed raises questions not only about how 
Locke handles anxiety in relation to religious identity but also how he 
promotes the resilience and endurance needed to counter the resent-
ments of tolerating and being tolerated. Since tolerance for Shaftes-
bury is the effect of a “natural” religious passion of good humour, he 
seeks to strengthen and enable that passion. His approach to tolerance 
in terms of countervailing passions opens up questions about the rela-
tionship between pain and tolerance in terms of compensatory plea-
sures: “What compensations do tolerators get for self-restraint? What 
pleasures check their resentment?” or “To what extent do discourses of 
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tolerance acknowledge and manage the humiliation of the tolerated?” 
One might also consider, as Tønder does, the vitalizing, world-making 
pleasures of pain itself. Locke’s Letter, however, obscures these kinds 
of questions. His disavowal of religious pain has become central to our 
self-understanding in relation to the formation and meaning of reli-
gious tolerance, which tends to downplay or ignore the pain endured 
by tolerators and tolerated alike.51 Yet if a tolerant society must some-
how address the desire for the security of religious certainty and iden-
tity, then, as Shaftesbury recognizes through his investment in good 
humour, part of the rhetorical work of discourses of religious tolerance 
must be to make tolerance appealing.
Locke and Religious Tolerance: Sensing  
Proper Pains and Fears
If intellectualist theories of religious tolerance as a detached, dispas-
sionate stance appeal to Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration, his text 
is nonetheless a passionate performance. The first aim of its frequently 
visceral language is to turn readers against clerical authority. Locke 
condemns hypocritical “Fiery zealots,” those with “a burning Zeal … 
burning, I say, literally with Fire and Faggot,” who “persecute, tor-
ment, destroy, and kill other Men upon pretence of Religion.”52 He often 
stokes fears of men “striving for Power and Empire over one another” 
in the name of religion (25, 23). By framing tolerance not as a prob-
lem of religious difference but of hypocritical clergy driven by “irregu-
lar passions,” the text directs readers’ resentments and fears towards 
the menace of those who seek “to deprive them of their estates, maim 
them with corporal punishments, starve and torment them in noisome 
Prisons, and in the end even take away their lives” (25, 24).53 The pre-
tenses of the zealous promise worldly pain. The clergy should be feared 
not for their religious authority, which Locke in any case denies, but 
because they threaten human bodies and property. This effort to sepa-
rate laity and clergy based on fears of worldly suffering is part of the 
Letter’s larger rhetorical strategy to support the binaries of state/church, 
mind/body, and reason/passion by managing readers’ fears, a project 
that depends both on defining what counts as pain and how those pains 
can be resolved. Its rhetoric aims to inculcate a sensibility for whom 
such binaries and religious tolerance would feel naturally reasonable.
This effort requires, however, appealing to and transforming both 
sides of these binaries. As Matthew Scherer notes, the Letter’s argument 
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for the separation of church and state “is buttressed at every turn by 
arguments that acknowledge and even intensify the interconnection of 
religion and politics.”54 For example, Locke’s Christian rebuke of cleri-
cal rapaciousness redefines how religion should manifest itself pub-
licly. Situating his text in the long history of Church reform, he builds 
upon late seventeenth-century reconceptualizations of Christianity that 
equate religion with morality: “The Business of True Religion … [is] the 
regulating of Mens Lives according to the Rules of Vertue and Piety.”55 
He includes tolerance as part of this ethical code – “Toleration is the 
chief Characteristical Mark of the True Church” – and decries how 
prone the clergy are to violate it (23). Intolerant because irreligious, 
they not only threaten civil interests but also betray true Christianity. A 
“burning zeal” should “make War upon [one’s] own Lusts and Vices,” 
and not “bend all its Nerves … to the introducing of Ceremonies, or 
to the establishment of Opinions” (24). Locke’s version of Christian-
ity reduces articles of faith to mere opinion, and its emphasis on ethi-
cal practice has no place for public religious experience or communal 
ritual. As Elizabeth Pritchard emphasizes, “At the time of Locke’s writ-
ing, religion’s ability to affiliate bodies across vast spaces or to seg-
regate them despite close quarters was unrivaled.”56 She argues that 
Locke responds to this power not by privatizing and excluding religion 
from the public sphere but by transforming its public forms. Religion is 
not the other of liberalism. Nor is liberalism a religion. Rather, religion 
and liberal politics are constructed in relation to one another. While 
scholarship has called for more attention to the affective dimensions 
of this transformation, the focus of analysis has remained mostly on 
concepts.57 Approaching the formation of religious tolerance through 
Shaftesbury, however, suggests the importance of analysing the regime 
of sensation – the Letter’s interpretation and invocation of pain and 
fear – that Locke rhetorically constructs as part of these conceptual 
transformations. This not only provides a fuller understanding of how 
Locke creates a new political rationality but also provides a sense of its 
limits, both in terms of its relevance to non-Western cultures and the 
extent to which Locke’s rhetorical construction and appeal to sensation 
and the passions is both pre-reflective and political.
My argument builds on and qualifies Kirstie McClure’s claim that 
Locke is enabled to “distinguish exactly the Business of Civil Gov-
ernment from that of Religion, and to settle the just Bounds that lie 
between the one and the other” by limiting suffering to our “Civil 
Interests,” namely “Life, Liberty, Health, and Indolency of Body; and 
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the possession of outward things such as Money, Lands, Houses, Fur-
niture, and the like.”58 For McClure, drawing this boundary depends 
on an empiricist conceptualization of pain: “the Letter consistently 
inscribes factual considerations of worldly harm or benefit as the defin-
ing feature and boundary of a civil discourse that at once articulates 
and circumscribes the proper exercise of political power.”59 Worldly 
pain is “factual” because it is “represented as empirically knowable 
in a manner specifically denied with respect to the ‘truth’ of religious 
claims” (380).60 An empiricist approach to pain thus provides the state 
with “a civil language of facticity” that is “neutral with regard to the 
‘truth,’ of particular religious practices and to the theological idioms 
through which they are articulated.”61 Contrasting Locke’s approach to 
pain with our current understandings of “the historically and culturally 
unstable signification of ‘harm,’” McClure argues that the political logic 
of Locke’s formulation of religious tolerance should not be extended to 
“incommensurable secular and social visions of the good life.”62 This 
is because “any exercise of civil power will necessarily privilege one 
or another politically invested interpretation of social harm.”63 Because 
she focuses on the inapplicability of Locke’s theory of religious toler-
ance to today’s struggles over difference, McClure does not pursue the 
possibility of reading Locke in terms of “the historically and culturally 
unstable signification of ‘harm’” that her argument opens up. His text, 
however, redistributes and rearranges suffering. It conceptualizes and 
seeks to inculcate a new regime of sensation that is the condition for 
the legal justification and practice of religious tolerance.64 He moves 
away from understanding religious difference in terms of conflicting 
truth claims not by appealing to the truth of a neutral space where real, 
empirical, secular pain exists but by shifting the ground from determin-
ing the truth content of religion to interpreting and transforming the 
felt meaning of pain. The text is structured by the fearful representation 
of bodily and religious pains and the promise of their relief.
In tandem with its attack on the clergy as a threat to bodies and prop-
erty, the Letter represents the experience of religious difference as pain-
less. Tolerant subjects fear for their “Civil Interests” but not for their 
religious identity: religious difference is met with emotional indiffer-
ence. As McClure argues, state empiricism interprets intersubjective 
religious pain as “literally immaterial in both civil and epistemological 
terms,” and this determination of what counts as pain is partly how the 
text draws the boundary between church and state.65 In terms of their 
religion, other people are not Hell but adiaphora:
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If Christians are to be admonished that they abstain from all manner of 
Revenge, even after repeated Provocations and multiplied Injuries, how 
much more ought they who suffer nothing, who have had no harm done 
to them, forbear Violence and abstain from all manner of ill usage towards 
those from whom they have received none.66
Although Locke links religious identity to painful provocation and vio-
lent conflict in the Two Tracts on Government, the Letter argues that reli-
gious difference causes no harm or suffering.67 Granted, in this passage 
Locke defines tolerance as abstaining from “Revenge,” implying that he 
expects readers to experience religious difference as a provocation. But 
the Letter’s explicit account of the experience of religious difference bur-
ies any acknowledgment that “to become tolerant is not only to endure 
the pain of something or someone of which or whom we disapprove; it 
is also to endure the anxieties and hardship that arise from resisting the 
desire to eliminate the tolerated’s presence in a situation of difference 
and disagreement.”68 Such endurance seems particularly significant in 
relation to religious difference, since one’s sense of the ultimate mean-
ing and value of life, communal ties, and perhaps even one’s salvation 
are called into question. Instead of considering tolerance as the endur-
ance of any kind of pain associated with others’ religion, Locke calls 
attention to the “pains and industry” required for “the comfortable 
support of our Lives.”69 Claims to suffering based on religious identity 
are reduced to hypocritical attempts to cover self-interest: while some 
may claim to be injured by “the Contagion of Idolatry, Superstition, 
and Heresie,” they “bear [it] most patiently” unless “strengthened by 
the Civil Power” (33). Religious intolerance masks worldly desire; its 
political dangers are linked not to religious anxieties but to fears about 
self-preservation and the violation of private property. Locke’s Letter 
explicitly argues against intersubjective religious pains.
The Letter renders religious difference innocuous partly by building 
upon Protestant definitions of Christianity as intellectual assent to creeds:
If a Roman Catholick believe that to be the body of Christ, which another 
man calls Bread, he does no injury thereby to his Neighbor. If a Jew do not 
believe the New Testament to be the Word of God, he does not thereby 
alter anything in men’s Civil Rights. (46)
As the repetition of “believe” in this passage emphasizes, pain-free reli-
gious difference is propositional. Beliefs cannot cause bodily pain or 
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property damage. Distinguishing between mind and body to support 
his demarcation of church and state, Locke argues that the beliefs of 
others can have no effect on the body and, more famously, the reverse: 
“such is the nature of the Understanding, that it cannot be compell’d to 
the belief of any thing by outward force” (27). Defining religion as belief 
justifies the claim that religious difference cannot cause bodily pain and 
that bodily pain cannot cause people to change their religion. Locke’s 
separation of church and state transforms and appeals to a regime of 
sensation. As Tønder argues in relation to Thomas M. Scanlon’s invo-
cation of the principle of autonomy as the foundation for tolerance, 
Locke’s binaries entail “a framing of the experience of pain that citizens 
must internalize” before they can be invoked.70 The body has nothing to 
do with religion as belief, and yet this conception of religion entails and 
is supported by claims about what bodies and minds feel.
A Relish for Tolerance: The Pleasurable  
Pain of Privatizing Religion
Enabling a dispassionate stance towards religious others, Locke’s dis-
avowal of intersubjective religious pain makes his text amenable to 
Neo-Kantian approaches to religious tolerance. But if the Letter down-
plays suffering related to religious identity, its rhetoric heightens indi-
viduals’ fears for salvation:
the principal Consideration, and which absolutely determines this Con-
troversie [the power of the magistrate to enforce religious belief], is this. 
Although the Magistrate’s Opinion in religion be sound … yet if I be not 
thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for 
me in following it.71
The curious word here is “safety.” The passage focuses on individu-
als’ feelings about their “opinion” – whether or not it makes them feel 
safe. Even if the magistrate’s religious opinions are true, this makes no 
difference to an individual’s religious anxiety. Locke appeals to the reli-
gious fears of his readers, not their capacity for judgment. Feeling safe 
is more important than possessing the truth.
Locke declares that “the highest obligation” and “our utmost Care, 
Application, and Diligence” should be to ensure our “Eternal Happi-
ness” (38, 47). But if the text emphasizes individuals’ private religious 
fears, it also places the resolution of those fears completely within the 
individual’s power:
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every man [has] the care of his own eternal happiness, the attainment 
whereof can neither be facilitated by another man’s industry, nor can the 
loss of it turn to another man’s prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from 
him by any external violence. (47)
One’s salvation cannot be assisted by others, the failure to obtain it does 
not harm others, and it can be achieved despite the violence of others. 
It is a private matter, indifferent to others’ religious concerns: “the care 
of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself” (47). Locke isolates 
religious pain as individual and incapable of spreading, but not hope-
less. If one cannot will what to believe, and if one cannot be forced to 
believe, one can nonetheless sense with certainty how one feels about 
one’s belief. For Locke, religious reasoning is a form of reflective judg-
ment. We cannot know the truth of our religious beliefs, but we can 
know with certainty the truth of our feelings about them. And this is 
the truth, Locke claims, that matters most to God. Locke appears to 
have great confidence that individuals will manage their religious feel-
ings in ways that will assuage their fears for salvation. After all, “every-
one is orthodox to himself” (23). Everyone will believe in ways that 
will lessen their private pains and fears. And if they do not, the fault 
and responsibility is entirely theirs. Both the fear and its resolution are 
private. Locke’s reform of religion draws upon and deepens Protestant 
subjectivism, both conceptually and affectively. As in Shaftesbury, the 
goal is to manage religious fear, although Locke does not oppose fear to 
good humour but instead heightens fear and harnesses its theological 
resolution for political ends. He offers no Shaftesburian raptures: the 
overwhelming urgency and ultimate uncertainty of religious truth will 
always goad the religious with uneasiness. For Locke, the right kind 
and amount of fear (subjective religious uneasiness combined with 
fears for the safety of one’s body and property) produces not violence 
but tolerance.
The emotional satisfaction provided by authentic belief permeates 
the Letter’s analysis of the relationship between salvation and truth:
Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward worship we conform, 
if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true and the 
other well pleasing unto God, such profession and such practice, far from 
being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation. (26)
Again, Locke’s theology is not concerned with the objective truth of 
one’s “profession” but with being “fully satisfied in our own mind.” 
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The phrase is suitably ambiguous, suggesting both satisfactory judg-
ment and emotional satisfaction. Overall, Locke’s secular separation 
of church and state is premised on a religiosity so passionate that it 
overrides cognitive concerns. The definition of religion as private belief 
does not mean emotional distance from one’s religious practice but 
rather emotional intensification, both in terms of the urgent need to 
attend closely to one’s feelings about one’s beliefs and in terms of the 
intense respect religion deserves from others. Christianity is privatized 
as religion in the Letter by tamping down intersubjective religious pas-
sion in the public sphere while intensifying it as private experience.
But how can religious indifference towards others ground a public 
respect for religion? Locke justifies “the supreme and absolute author-
ity of judging for oneself” in religious matters “because nobody else is 
concerned in it, nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein” 
(47). He argues for autonomy not by urging respect for the dignity of 
others based on their ability to reason autonomously about their salva-
tion but by making religious judgments intersubjectively irrelevant – 
and thus politically risk-free. The practice of tolerance as indifference 
towards the salvation of others is grounded in Locke’s disavowal of 
intersubjective religious pain: the text’s definition and invocation of 
pain justifies and motivates individual sovereignty over their religion. 
Likewise, autonomy matters for the individual not because it enables 
the apprehension of truth but because only autonomy can offer the 
promise of addressing religious fear. It is a politico-theological balm. 
The Letter offers religious freedom not in response to our dignity but in 
response to our fears: its definition of pain motivates both subjectivized 
religion as belief and intersubjective tolerance as indifference.
Locke’s text, therefore, cannot be invoked as a forerunner to a Neo-
Kantian paradigm of mutual perspective taking oriented towards 
understanding. The insularity of the passions in Locke’s conception of 
religion does not orient tolerant subjects towards intersubjective under-
standing or even reason-giving in the context of the acknowledgment 
of the “finitude of reason.”72 If Locke’s text cultivates respect for others, 
it is not based on a “basic right to justification” that persons “owe to 
each other” because others are “reasonable and worthy of being given 
adequate reasons.”73 Instead, tolerance is an intersubjectively indiffer-
ent, politically harmless practice of feeling one’s way towards eternal 
happiness, of privately working out one’s salvation in fear and trem-
bling. Locke grounds tolerance not on communicative rationality but 
on the individually shared religious fear that conditions that rationality. 
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Tolerant subjects are one not in their beliefs or values but in their pas-
sions: individually feeling together in fear and relief, they are distanced 
but not dispassionate.
Locke’s text not only teaches us what and whom to fear, it also 
invokes that fear and then resolves it in ways that support his conceptu-
alization of religious tolerance. James Tully has tracked in Locke’s work 
a shift from theorizing assent as governed by evidence to its determina-
tion by “custom, education, and fashion.”74 Neither “a natural disposi-
tion … to the true or the good” nor “the weight of the evidence” govern 
belief. Instead, it is “governed by acquired dispositions.”75 Background 
dispositions can be transformed because “the relish of the mind is mal-
leable like that of the body.”76 Tully defines “relish” as “the mechanism 
that brings absent goods within one’s view of happiness, renders them 
desirable, and thus disposes the agent to them.”77 Another name for 
such a mechanism is rhetoric. Locke’s repeated invocation of fears for 
salvation gains added significance in the light of Tully’s observation 
that “even the infinite pleasures and pain of heaven and hell can be 
contemplated without desire or aversion until a person has cultivated 
an uneasiness for heaven and made it part of his or her happiness.”78 
Locke’s text seeks to rhetorically provide a “relish” – “the acquired 
mental habit in virtue of which specific ways of thinking and acting are 
pleasant to the agent” – for religious tolerance.79 The Letter is an effort 
to rhetorically jumpstart those habits by positioning readers within its 
framework for self-understanding and the felt meaning of pain. Build-
ing on Tully’s analysis of Locke’s educational theory, Pritchard contends 
that Locke’s pedagogy “is designed to yield religious subjectivities who 
are not susceptible to injury or offense, who are not brittle and unyield-
ing but open-minded, who can tolerate and even enjoy exposure to the 
global circulation of religions as ideas, fashions, or commodities.”80 
This description of Locke’s interest in education also captures the Let-
ter’s rhetorical work.
Both Shaftesbury’s and Locke’s arguments for religious tolerance 
involve a shift from questions of truth to questions of feeling, a shift 
that makes practices of reason politically valuable for their affective 
and not their epistemological function. For Locke, what matters reli-
giously (i.e., the efficacy of belief) and thus politically (i.e., preventing 
violence and preserving property) is not the truth of what one believes 
but what one feels about what one believes. And just as the shifting 
of affects, of mood management, was a political act in Shaftesbury – 
but one that occurred outside of and prior to public reason – so in 
94 David Alvarez
Locke: the privatization of religious judgment and the propositional-
ization of religion as the rational site of agonistic dispute rely on and 
reproduce a prior political shift in affect. Thus the political separation of 
church and state is established on the pre-reflective but political rhetori-
cal definition and invocation of the passions. While the text places the 
agonistic frame of democracy at the level of autonomy, this hides the 
already politicized regime of sensation and passion that enables auton-
omy. In both Locke and Shaftesbury, politics appears to operate within 
a rational space of dialogue and criticism, but such forms of communi-
cative rationality are already politically determined. For both, the pre- 
reflective felt meaning of religious passion that these texts inculcate 
enables the formation of religious tolerance. Because these background 
conditions motivate and structure communication and judgment, they 
also limit the ability to take up the perspectives of others. In Locke’s 
Letter, insofar as fear directs attention and motivates reasoning, his text 
links being reasonable to inhabiting a disposition of fear that orients 
our assessment of ourselves and others. As Shaftesbury contends, such 
a fearful disposition might come with limitations. Indeed, Locke’s Let-
ter teaches us the difficulty of practising tolerance as mutual recogni-
tion, since the regime of sensation and the framework of the passions 
that his text promotes already put in place a particular understanding 
of religion and communicative rationality. To extend the democratic 
potential of religious tolerance, therefore, requires expanding “the 
conditions of contestations and deliberation” to include the politics of 
the pre-reflective regimes of sensation and passion within which dis-
courses of tolerance make sense.81
The shift to feeling also engineers the resilience necessary for tol-
erance by providing the individual with certainty. Tolerators endure 
others because their religious security does not depend on others. In 
Locke’s Letter, the religious identity of the tolerant self cannot be fun-
damentally threatened, but the text nonetheless addresses such threats 
by locating the resources of resilience needed to endure difference in 
the subjective certainty of sentiments about salvation. For both Locke 
and Shaftesbury, the risks related to tolerance are managed indepen-
dently of encounters with religious others. As Nancy Yousef has argued 
in relation to Shaftesbury’s theory of moral sentiment, the “feeling for 
others he names ‘natural affection’ appears troublingly dissociated 
from the perception of others.”82 Affective certainty substitutes for 
the risks of intersubjectivity. Likewise, the priority Shaftesbury gives 
to “good humour” renders tolerance less an intersubjective enterprise 
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than an “autonomy [that] seems to arise, or be wrested from, epistemo-
logical premises [the certainty of feeling] which surrender the aspira-
tion to intersubjective understanding.”83 Locke’s account of religious 
tolerance is similarly structured. Insofar as his text acknowledges that 
one might feel threatened by religious difference, it anchors the subject 
in a religious identity confirmed by the certainty of sentiment. What 
enables tolerance is not a respect for the other’s autonomy but one’s 
sense of security in how certain one feels about one’s beliefs. Locke’s 
text does not orient the tolerant self towards a dependency on others 
since this would involve politically dangerous intersubjective risks. 
And yet although Locke seeks to make intersubjectivity less volatile, 
his position cannot be characterized as intellectualist or dispassionate. 
Tolerance in Locke is a pleasurable pain oriented to a particular politics 
but not to other people.84 As in Shaftesbury, Locke trusts in the certainty 
of subjective religious sentiment to engineer a tolerant society.
Religious Reason in Public
Yet if religion cannot harm or be harmed by others – if it lacks any 
motive for intersubjectivity – why communicate about it? Locke sepa-
rates religious feeling from truth claims so thoroughly that it is unclear 
what would motivate an individual to engage with another’s religious 
difference. He makes it clear that civil society has no religious interest: 
“the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society … is the sole 
reason of men’s entering into society, and the only thing they seek and 
aim at in it.”85 Religious society is a contradiction in terms, and Locke 
denies that it offers any social benefits that might be lost:
every one joins himself voluntarily to that Society in which he believes he 
has found that Profession and Worship which is truly acceptable to God. 
The hopes of Salvation, as it is the only cause of his entrance into that 
Communion, so it can be the only reason of his stay there. (28)
These hopes are fundamentally private: church members are linked 
by a contingent agreement on creeds and practice, but there is no 
emotional connection between them. The flip side of no intersubjec-
tive religious pain is that there is no intersubjective religious pleasure. 
Even excommunication has no traumatic consequences, since it merely 
entails losing “the participation of some certain things which the soci-
ety communicated to its members” (31). The diction of “certain things” 
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discounts the significance of those things. Indeed, Locke even denies 
“Civil Injury” to an excommunicant’s loss of bread and wine, since it 
“was not bought with his, but other men’s Money” (31).
Pritchard explains Locke’s commitment to religion publicly “circu-
lating as argument, sign, and fashion” as part of an effort to achieve 
“just enough distance from vulnerable bodies to allow those bodies a 
wider range of social, economic, and political intercourse.”86 Treating 
religion as a set of concepts enables emotional distance, reducing “the 
occasion of injury, profanation, and pollution.”87 Pritchard’s insight 
paradoxically links the public manifestation of religion in Locke to lim-
iting pains and fears related to threatened religious identities: a prob-
lem that the text explicitly denies is a problem. Although the Letter does 
not explicitly address the political danger posed by threats to religious 
identity that Locke raises in the Two Tracts and elsewhere, it implicitly 
addresses such threats by transforming public religion into discourse 
and thus weakening passionate attachments to religious identities.88 
Locke also limits those risks by making religious debate in the public 
sphere a Christian virtue:
I would not have this understood, as if I mean thereby to condemn all 
charitable Admonitions, and affectionate Endeavors to reduce Men from 
Errors; which are indeed the greatest Duty of a Christian. Any one may 
employ as many Exhortations and Arguments as he pleases towards the 
promoting of another man’s Salvation.89
Anyone “may” but no one must. Locke’s tolerance opens up the pos-
sibility of intersubjective reasoning but does not require it. Only Chris-
tian charity, for Locke, can motivate public reasoning about religion. 
Just as good humour in Shaftesbury was a theological imperative that 
structured the rationality of the public sphere, Locke’s practice of pub-
lic reasoning about religion is understood as an exemplary Christian 
practice. Locke’s text reforms Christianity publicly and privately in 
ways that advance both the aims of theology and governance. It does 
not downplay the religious in favour of the worldly but moves forward 
on two interrelated fronts: “A Good Life, in which consists not the least 
part of Religion and true Piety, concerns also the Civil Government: 
and in it lies the safety both of Mens Souls, and of the Commonwealth” 
(46).90 Promoted by an appeal to Christian duty, public religious dis-
course is not about subordinating religion to the secular but about man-
aging anxieties related to religious identity.
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Fears for safety relating both to “Mens Souls, and of the Common-
wealth” unify the divided concerns for “Eternal Happiness” and “the 
Defence of … Temporal Goods.” Ingrid Creppell argues that Locke’s 
Letter transforms a Christian identity to a “plural or multiple self.”91 
She sees the separations between mind/body, public/private, state/
church as productive of a “psychological plurality,” a subjectivity more 
amenable to religious difference because its own identity is fractured.92 
Such divisions, however, are premised on a philosophical anthropol-
ogy in which the unity of individuals and of society is founded on the 
passions. Behind the conceptual binaries that structure Locke’s argu-
ments for religious tolerance lies the unifying sensation of fear.
Towards a More Tolerant Tolerance
A Shaftesburian framework for analysing the formation of Enlight-
enment religious tolerance not only wrests Locke free from teleologi-
cal readings that place him on the ineluctable road to Kant, it also 
reminds us that religious autonomy is just one form and legacy of 
Enlightenment tolerance. Characteristics challenges us to tolerate a 
more pluralist history of Enlightenment tolerance. Shaftesbury’s focus 
on the transformation of religious sensibilities, moreover, suggests the 
importance of analysing how conceptions of tolerance are organized 
by background regimes of sensation and passion not only in Locke but 
elsewhere. His work thus contributes to “expos[ing] the intellectualist 
orientation to politics to the plurality embedded in its own history.”93 
Yet because it is reassuring to hold onto tolerance as a sign of political – 
if not epistemological – progress and as a move away from the vio-
lent barbarism of the past, examining the conditions of its justification 
and its moral and political ambiguities can be annoying. Moreover, its 
moral desirability can also make religious tolerance easier to celebrate 
than interrogate. Shaftesbury’s work is useful partly because its fore-
grounding of the interpretation of the passions teaches us how to read 
religious tolerance. It also invites a subtler questioning, a reflection on 
how we continue to inhabit a felt meaning of religion that preserves the 
contours of the secular and tolerance with which we identify.
Overall, reorienting our approach to the formation of religious toler-
ance from Locke to Shaftesbury provides a wedge for a more senso-
rial approach to the formation of Enlightenment religious tolerance, an 
approach that is alert to the politics of the pre-reflective. A Shaftesbu-
rian focus on mood management also invites analysis of how discourses 
98 David Alvarez
of tolerance address the pains related to religious difference and the 
resentments related to tolerating and being tolerated. Significantly, both 
Locke and Shaftesbury locate the resources of resilience and endurance 
outside of intersubjectivity. Finally, because tolerance requires defining 
and managing pains and passions, a conceptual analysis of religious 
tolerance must always be incomplete, as must historical contextualiza-
tions that neglect to engage with the rhetorically productive powers of 
texts.
Shaftesbury’s broadly hermeneutical approach to the pains, plea-
sures, and rationality of religious tolerance also implies that the 
Enlightenment may not offer a definitive, one size fits all solution to 
global religious violence. For we have not arrived through this Shaftes-
burian criticism of an “intellectualist” Locke to some universal cal-
culus of pleasure and pain that applies to all times and places. As the 
contingent religious premises and passions of these two thinkers dem-
onstrate, the meanings of pleasure and pain are not known in advance. 
In both Locke and Shaftesbury, moreover, calculations designed to 
promote tolerance are as rife for the necessity of politics as they are 
for the potential of peace. Alternative formations of religious passions 
and sensibilities, such as might be found outside of Christianity and 
“religion,” could form the basis for equally reasonable, alternative 
forms of religious tolerance. While discourses of tolerance constructed 
in relation to “religion” may make deep sense for us, they may not for 
others.94 An awareness of how deeply regimes of sensation and feel-
ing structure and limit communication appears necessary for a more 
self-reflective secularism and the possibility of Neo-Kantian mutual 
perspective taking. Most optimistically, a postsecular genealogy of 
religious tolerance might open the possibility of thinking past the cat-
egories of religion and the secular, or at least of being open to their 
continued transformation. Such an openness would require the exami-
nation of these categories from within the Western tradition and from 
without. All recent writing about religious tolerance usually ends up 
quoting a passage from Jacques Derrida, and I will not resist a reitera-
tion: “Let us suppose it agreed upon, among ourselves, that all of us 
here are for ‘tolerance,’ even if we have not been assigned the mission 
of promoting it, practising it, or founding it. We would be here to try 
to think what ‘tolerance’ could henceforth be.”95 Reading Locke – and 
Enlightenment discourses of tolerance more generally – after Shaftes-
bury not only expands our ability to rethink what tolerance could be 
but also suggests the importance of reflecting on how we feel our way 
to such a future tolerance.
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 16 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 7–9, 29–38. For useful historical contextualizations 
of Shaftesbury’s claims about wit and truth, see Patrick Müller, “Ridentem 
dicere verum quid vetat: Shaftesbury, Horatian Satire, and the Cultural 
(Ab)Uses of Laughter,” RSÉAA XVII–XVIII 70 (2013): 47–72; and Roger D. 
Lund, Ridicule, Religion and the Politics of Wit in Augustan England (Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 127–54. On wit’s relation to tolerance, see 
Sammy Basu, “‘Woe unto you that laugh now!’: Humor and Toleration in 
Overton and Shaftesbury,” in Religious Toleration: “The Variety of Rites” from 
Cyrus to Defoe, ed. John Christian Laursen (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1999), 147–72.
 17 Lawrence E. Klein, “Introduction,” Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times, xviii. See also Klein’s seminal study, Shaftesbury and the Culture of 
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Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), which describes 
Shaftesbury’s conception of conversation in Habermasian terms as “an 
ideal speech situation.” Culture of Politeness, 98. Cf., 12–14, 96–9, 195–8.
 18 Basu, “Humor and Toleration,” 159. While he notes that humour also 
provides a “dispositional finesse” insofar as it “defuses” and “gives vent” 
to enthusiasm, Basu focuses on the power of humour to distance us from 
epistemologically disruptive passions and to enable sympathy: “humor 
facilitates the dialogic relationships vital to tolerant liberal politics” and 
“inclines one toward sympathy” (159–60, 165, 160).
 19 Shaftesbury, Preface to Select Sermons of Benjamin Whichcot, in Complete 
Works, Selected Letters and Posthumous Writings: in English with Parallel 
German Translation [Sämtliche Werke, ausgewählte Briefe und 
nachgelassene Schriften in englischer Sprache mit paralleler deutscher 
Übersetzung], ed. Gerd Hemmerich and Wolfram Benda (Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1981–), vol. 2, pt. 4, 50.
 20 Basu, “Humor and Toleration,” 159. Mary Astell criticizes the limits of 
Shaftesbury’s conception of dialogic relationships and public reason in 
Bart’lemy Fair: or, an Enquiry after Wit (London, 1709). On the rhetorical 
force of satire, see Fredric V. Bogel’s The Difference Satire Makes: Rhetoric and 
Reading from Jonson to Byron (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
 21 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and 
Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). Cf. David Zaret, 
“Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-
Century England,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 212–35. In response to the continued 
presence of religion in modernity, Habermas has taken a postsecular turn 
that not only pursues a more reflexive understanding of Enlightenment 
rationality through a genealogy of postsecular reason but also calls for 
the translation of the normative content of religious language into secular 
terms as part of an effort to reinvigorate democratic struggles. See most 
recently his “Reply to My Critics,” trans. Ciarin Cronin, in Habermas 
and Religion, ed. Craig Calhoun, Eduardo Mendieta, and Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013), 347–90.
 22 Basu, ”Humor and Toleration,” 161.
 23 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 22. Talal Asad argues similarly in Formations 
of the Secular (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): “‘the secular’ 
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should not be thought of as the space in which real human life gradually 
emancipates itself from the controlling power of ‘religion’ and thus 
achieves the latter’s relocation. It is this assumption that allows us to  
think of religion as ‘infecting’ the secular domain or as replicating  
within it the structure of theological concepts … Secularism doesn’t  
simply insist that religious practice and belief be confined to a space  
where they cannot threaten political stability or the liberties of ‘free-
thinking’ citizens. Secularism builds on a particular conception of the 
world” (191).
 24 Perhaps in response to J.C.D. Clark’s revisionist historiography, Klein 
resists a secular approach: Shaftesbury’s cultural era was “neither secular 
nor secularized but within a regime in which religion has been subjected to 
new political and intellectual disciplines” (Culture of Politeness, 9).
 25 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 10–11.
 26 Shaftesbury first criticizes Hobbes in his Preface to Select Sermons of 
Benjamin Whichcot (1698), which also links Hobbes’s philosophical 
anthropology to the Anglican Church: “It must be confess’d, that it has 
been the Reproach of some Sects of Christians amongst us; that their 
Religion appear’d to be, in a manner, opposite to Good-nature; and 
founded in Moroseness, Selfishness, and Ill-will to Mankind” (52). His 
fullest criticism of Hobbes appears in Characteristics, 42–5. For this effort, 
see Alfred Owen Aldridge, “Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto,” 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 41.2 (1951): 311.
 27 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for 
Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997), 
20–31.
 28 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 11.
 29 Shaftesbury considered religious enthusiasm “natural” and noted “a 
wondrous disposition in mankind towards supernatural objects” (24).
 30 Cf. Shaftesbury’s discussion of Francis Bacon seeing religious fear 
as deriving “from an imperfection in the creation, make or natural 
constitution of man” (368).
 31 For a reading that links this allegory of priestly accumulation (see 
Characteristics, 356–79) as registering the accumulation of capital, see 
Jordana Rosenberg’s Critical Enthusiasm: Capital Accumulation and the 
Transformation of Religious Passion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011): “In pathologizing theocratic accumulation as symbolic of a distant 
past … Shaftesbury periodized the contemporary English state. That 
this periodization unfurls around the allegorical figure of theocratic 
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accumulation reflects England’s grapplings with regulating vast 
accumulations of capital, both at home and in the colonies” (58).
 32 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 342. The passage is both a speculative history 
and an allegory of the practices of the Roman Catholic Church and the 
Anglican Church, figured by Egypt and Israel. See Klein, Culture of 
Politeness, 169–74.
 33 Müller links Shaftesbury’s “good humour” to Whichcote’s “good nature”: 
“The first thing in Religion,” says Whichcote, “is, to refine a Man’s Temper: 
And the second, to govern his Practice” (Select Sermons, 290). Properly 
understood, “Religion produceth a sweet and gracious Temper of Mind; 
calm in its self, and loving to Men. It causeth a Universal Benevolence and 
Kindness to Mankind.” Having listed the several virtues included in his 
notion of “GOOD-NATURE,” Whichcote concludes that religion proper 
“causeth the greatest Serenity and Chearfulness to the Mind; and prevents 
groundless Fears, foolish Imaginations, needless Suspicions, and dastardly 
Thoughts” (Select Sermons, 294). (“Ridentem dicere,” 52).
 34 The priority given to “good humour” and the need for an appropriate 
conception of the universe to justify it also appears in Tønder’s claim, 
for example, that the world’s richness depends on “an attitude of critical 
engagement and presumptive generosity” (Sensorial Orientation, 122).
 35 On the influence of the passions on perception, see Characteristics, 228–9, 
422–3.
 36 I resist designating Shaftesbury’s approach to religious tolerance as 
“secular” or “religious” because I am not trying to unmask the secular 
as religious. Rather, by trying to keep the master terms of “secular” and 
“religious” in abeyance and resisting the need to classify Shaftesbury as 
one or the other, it seems possible to take a step towards a postsecular 
engagement with the Enlightenment. I am inspired here by Saba 
Mahmood’s resistance to “simply posing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer” to the 
query “Is Critique Secular?” at the close of her essay “Religious Reason 
and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?” in Is Critique Secular? 
Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009), 91–2. Cf. Asad, “The Trouble of Thinking: An Interview with Talal 
Asad” in Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, ed. 
David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2006), 284–5; and Amy Allen’s discussion of postsecular genealogy as a 
“problematizing” effort that “aims not at a normative evaluation but in 
Colin Koopman’s words seeks ‘to clarify and intensify the difficulties 
that enable and disable’ the practices it studies.” “Having One’s Cake,” 
134. For an opposed though historically informed approach, see Howard 
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D. Weinbrot, Literature, Religion, and the Evolution of Culture, 1660–1780 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).
 37 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 375.
 38 Basu, “Humor and Toleration,” 171. Cf. Shaftesbury’s claim that “Were 
two travelers agreed to tell their story separate in public, the one being 
a man of sincerity but positive and dogmatical, the other less sincere but 
easy and good-humoured, though it happened that the accounts of this 
latter gentlemen were of the more miraculous sort, they would yet sooner 
gain belief and be more favourably received by mankind, than the strongly 
asserted relations and vehement narratives of the other fierce defender of 
truth” (Characteristics, 384).
 39 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 15–16.
 40 Daniel Carey, “Two Strategies on Toleration: Locke, Shaftesbury, and 
Diversity” in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 2009), 66. For Carey, Shaftesbury “could allow for dispute and 
disunity in religion precisely because he had located an area of stability 
and consensus in morals and taste” via Stoic thought (“Two Strategies,” 
61). I am arguing that this stability is located in religious sentiment.
 41 The subsequent reading draws heavily on Bogel’s analysis of satiric form 
in The Difference Satire Makes, 1–83.
 42 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 10.
 43 Bogel, The Difference Satire Makes, 81.
 44 Basu, “Humor and Toleration,” 161. Basu finds that humour in Shaftesbury 
“breaks the connection between the cognition of another as unlike oneself, 
and the dispositional and political stance that the other is unlikeable,” but 
the puppet show example shows that humour can but does not necessarily 
make it possible to “recognize humanity in the other … to acknowledge 
the other as another” (ibid.). To take a recent example, the Dutch cartoon 
controversy was not especially humanizing in this way. As Bogel explains 
in relation to satiric form, “By aligning our reading selves … with a satirist 
whose ambiguity we refuse to acknowledge and whom we take to be 
normative or ideal … we cast out our own ambiguity of identity and our 
ambiguous relation to both satirist and satiric object” (The Difference Satire 
Makes, 66). This is not to say that satire necessarily works to consolidate 
identity. The form can call attention to its own operation, asking us to 
confront our confusion about whether to stand with the satirist or the satiric 
object, forcing us “to invent our intelligence” (ibid., 66).
 45 Shaftesbury’s appeal to aesthetic force in the service of virtue is another 
example of this kind of jumpstarting: “He seems to assert that there are 
certain moral species or appearances so striking and of such force over 
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our natures that, when they present themselves, they bear down all 
contrary opinion or conceit, all opposite passion, sensation, or mere bodily 
affection” (Characteristics, 353). It is the force and not the truth of such 
images that most interests Shaftesbury.
 46 With some reservations, the “Miscellaneous Reflections” also offer a 
successful and unexpected example of the orchestration of countervailing 
religious passions to achieve political stability, an example that makes no 
claim to intellectual emancipation. The Roman Catholic Church “cannot 
but appear in some respect august and venerable,” Shaftesbury contends, 
because its leaders can control religious passions so effectively: “all these 
seeming contrarieties of human passion they knew how to comprehend in 
their political model” (Characteristics, 378, 377). The church appeals to the 
superstitious through “external proportions, magnificence of structures, 
ceremonies, processions, choirs, and those other harmonies that captivate 
the mind and ear,” while those “of another character and complexion …  
were allowed to proceed … by the inward way of contemplation and 
divine love” (Characteristics, 377, 378). But when enthusiasm goes so far 
as “either expressly or seemingly to dissuade the practice of the vulgar 
and established ceremonial duties,” then “to ingenious writers they afford 
the liberty, on the other side, in a civil manner, to call in question these 
spiritual feats” (Characteristics, 378). Shaftesbury seems to approve of how 
the church balances each religious passion with the other. The passage 
underlines the irrelevance of epistemological concerns to Shaftesbury’s 
promotion of religious tolerance, firmly places his understanding of it in 
the context of religious passions, and emphasizes his understanding of the 
need to regulate the public’s self-regulation. For a less enthusiastic reading 
of this passage, see Klein’s Culture of Politeness, 172–3.
 47 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 33.
 48 Shaftesbury states that wit and raillery should be limited to the “liberty of 
the club,” a claim difficult to square with his publication of Characteristics 
(36). He seems, however, to also hold out good humour as a path for 
the individual from a vulgar, general public to an enlightened elite. 
Good humour is thus a political repositioning of the public through a 
redefinition of religious passion, a mood conducive to epistemological 
success, and a gateway passion to the elite (for this last claim, see 271). 
Müller helpfully contextualizes the politics of Shaftesbury’s theory of 
laughter.
 49 Efforts to consider liberal religious tolerance as something other than an 
unqualified achievement of Western modernity have recently accelerated, 
following a line of thought opened up by Herbert Marcuse’s essay 
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“Repressive Tolerance,” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, ed. Robert Paul 
Wolff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 95–137. See Wendy Brown, Regulating 
Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Stanley Fish, “Mission Impossible: Settling the Just 
Bounds between Church and State,” Columbia Law Review 97.8 (Dec. 1997): 
2255–333; Slavoj Žižek, “Tolerance as an Ideological Category,” Critical 
Inquiry 34.4 (Summer 2008): 660–82. Hans Erich Bödeker, Clorinda Donato, 
and Peter Hanns Reill, eds., Discourses of Tolerance and Intolerance in the 
European Enlightenment (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) shows 
the influence of this revisionist scholarship on Enlightenment studies.
 50 Conceptual analyses of Locke’s arguments still tend to focus on the 
universality of claims about the nature of belief without fully considering 
the limitations implied by Locke’s definition of religion as belief.
 51 See, for example, Tønder’s discussion of UNESCO’s Declaration of 
Principles on Tolerance in Sensorial Orientation, 34.
 52 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. James Tully (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1982), 24, 23.
 53 On Locke’s anticlericalism, see Richard Ashcraft, “Locke and the Problem 
of Toleration” in Discourses of Tolerance and Intolerance in the European 
Enlightenment, ed. Hans Erich Bödeker, Clorinda Donato, and Peter Hanns 
Reill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 60–72; and Scherer’s 
analysis of Locke’s tropes of pretense and zealotry, Beyond Church and State, 
88–92.
 54 Scherer, Beyond Church and State, 82. As Michael Warner notes, Locke’s 
reliance on religious concepts to argue for tolerance has become a 
commonplace in scholarship, as has the observation “that in order to 
manage religious freedom, secular government first regulates what counts 
as religion” (613). “Is Liberalism a Religion?” in Religion: Beyond a Concept, 
ed. Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 610–17.
 55 Locke, Letter, 23. On reform and the secular, see Charles Taylor, A Secular 
Age, 61–88.
 56 Elizabeth A. Pritchard, Religion in Public: Locke’s Political Theology (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2013), 3.
 57 Tønder’s Sensorial Orientation is the groundbreaking exception. An early 
inspiration for this essay comes from Saba Mahmood’s suggestion in an 
online posting at The Immanent Frame: “I think the ‘feeling good’ part 
of the secular story cannot be belittled. It should in fact be studied in 
all seriousness so as to apprehend the visceral force secular discourses 
and practices command in our world today. While it is common to 
ascribe passion to religion, it would behoove us to pay attention to 
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secular worldview … How does secular culture feel?” Saba Mahmood, 
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 58 Locke, Letter, 26.
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Political Theory 18.3 (1990): 380.
 60 Ibid.
 61 Ibid.
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which “mental cruelty and distress” became legal categories and “‘facts’ 
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of one another but as knit together in a complex web of cause and effect” 
(383). For an argument that links religious tolerance to cultural rights, see 
Habermas, “The Pacemaker.”
 63 Ibid., 387.
 64 Veena Das suggestively sums up Asad on this point: “secularism is not 
simply an intellectual argument offered in response to a question of 
enduring social peace and toleration – it is also a way of distributing 
and rearranging forms of suffering so that it becomes legitimate to 
acknowledge some forms of suffering and to practice indifference (or 
worse) towards others.” “Secularism and the Argument from Nature,” in 
Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors, 93.
 65 McClure, “Difference,” 378.
 66 Locke, Letter, 34.
 67 McClure, “Difference,” 370–2.
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 69 Locke, Letter, 47.
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 78 Ibid., 218.
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 86 Pritchard, Religion in Public, 36.
 87 Ibid., 58.
 88 In addition to McClure, “Difference,” 370–2, see Ingrid Creppell’s 
discussion of Locke’s understanding of the political dangers posed by 
religious identity in Toleration and Identity: Foundations in Early Modern 
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In the eighteenth century, several major works on the world’s religious 
ceremonies were published. These encyclopedic projects catalogue, 
describe, and provide visual illustrations of the diversity of worship 
around the globe, including the increasingly baggy category of pagan-
ism. The source material for what they called “idolatry” or “pagan 
superstitions” was recycled, for the most part, from travellers’ and mis-
sionaries’ accounts.1 In this same period, many French, Dutch, and Brit-
ish writers inquired into paganism’s origins, essence, and the history 
of its forms, and they too combed this corpus of travel and mission-
ary accounts for information.2 Comparison was the dominant method 
in both encyclopedias and treatises: the polytheists of the Americas, 
Africa, and Asia were compared to one another, and to the pagan 
cults of antiquity.3 This early foray into comparative religious customs 
has been seen as a watershed in the understanding of religion. Guy 
Stroumsa has argued that eighteenth-century works about rituals con-
tributed to a “genuine revolution in knowledge and attitudes” about 
religion.4 Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob, and Wijnand Mijnhardt have 
made a similar point about the Cérémonies et coûtumes religieuses de tous 
les peuples du monde – a monumental work compiled by Jean-Frédéric 
Bernard and illustrated by Bernard Picart – claiming that it fostered 
secularist toleration in part by “consistently shin[ing] the most favor-
able light possible on idolatrous customs and practices.”5
Most historians agree that a broader transformation from blinkered 
Christian dogmatism to secular relativism regarding the world’s reli-
gions took place in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They attri-
bute this paradigm shift to several factors including this dissemination 
of “factual information” about the “vast and murky area” of indigenous 
4  Rethinking Superstition: Pagan Ritual  
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polytheistic religions, as well as to the emergence of scholarly methods 
of scrutinizing classical, biblical, and doctrinal authorities, and the rise 
of criticism of religious institutions.6   One potential problem with these 
arguments as they pertain to paganism is their proleptic differentia-
tion of the European’s observational mode from pagans’ participatory 
experience. If pagan ritual is seen as a case of the viewer versus the 
viewed, it presumes a certain objectifying distance already associated 
with rational and scientific inquiry. Yet how does a pagan rite become 
observable in the first place? Pagan ceremonies, which are necessarily 
fleeting and yet eminently repeatable performances of subjective and 
communal spirituality, may have visible and audible aspects, but some-
thing remains unobservable in such acts. Before submitting the early 
eighteenth-century’s view of pagan ceremonies to a familiar narrative 
in which rituals become yet another province of modern knowledge 
production, we might look more carefully at the period’s suppositions 
about how pagan ceremonies did – and did not – become objects of 
knowledge.
As Jean-Frédéric Bernard explains in Cérémonies et coûtumes religieuses 
de tous les peuples du monde, rituals were not entirely a function of the 
empirical gaze. His prefatory dissertation on religious cult begins: “La 
plus grande partie des hommes ignoreroit qu’il y a un dieu, si le culte 
qu’on doit lui rendre n’étoit accompagné de quelques marques exté-
rieures. Moins on a connu l’Étre suprême et plus ces marques ont été 
bizarres et extravagantes.” (Most of mankind would have no knowl-
edge of a God, were not that worship that is due him accompanied 
by some external signs. The less the supreme being has been known, 
the more these signs have been whimsical and extravagant.)7 Bernard 
treats religious rituals as visible and audible expressions of our knowl-
edge of the supreme being, though he states it negatively: without such 
external signs, the supreme being would not be known. According to 
this view, which Bernard shared with many of his contemporaries, the 
human mind is innately endowed with the capacity to know the deity, 
and worship is the privileged medium of inherent human religiosity. 
Nonetheless, Bernard derogates the immodesty of pagan ceremonies, 
listing rites such as human sacrifice – “barbare et cruelle” – among 
other obtrusions of rational worship, and asserting that “peu de gens 
ont été capables de s’élever jusqu’à la Divinité” (few have been able 
to raise their minds up to the divinity).8 This statement seems to chal-
lenge the view that Bernard, a Protestant, is a tolerant secularist. Yet the 
relation between the trappings of ritual and the natural knowledge of 
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“the divinity” is significant precisely because he neither judges pagans 
based on Christian beliefs alone, nor does he secularize ritual. Protes-
tants and Catholics alike deprecated the excesses of pagan rites on the 
assumption that all people tend to become dependent on outward signs 
of worship, but Bernard does not equate ceremonial whimsy with a 
denial of divinity in pagan cults. Fetishes and idols, which also attract 
an abundance of attention in this period, appeared to Westerners as 
false embodiments of the deity and were often condemned in theory. 
In practice, material objects deemed to be fetishes or idols were some-
times destroyed to carry out the condemnation, but were also seen as 
curiosities and taken from their original sites by traders and collectors, 
thus undergoing a complex process of desacralization.9 Pagan ceremo-
nies, however, were not dismissed as counterfeits of (the monotheist) 
God, and for many, they were the natural embodiments of the unseen 
divinity.
Thus, rites of all kinds were necessarily available to empirical obser-
vation and ethnographic description as externalized acts, and yet, as 
Bernard reveals, rituals also conveyed imperceptible being. The con-
cept of natural religion, which deemed all humanity capable of knowl-
edge of the supreme deity, appeared to reconcile monotheism with 
paganism, at least for a time, but my emphasis here is not on Euro-
peans’ mediations of religious difference. Rather, the question relates 
to ritual’s suturing of imperceptible being to observable acts, and how 
this bears on knowledge production in the early Enlightenment. To 
pursue this question, I turn to a single-authored work that deals exten-
sively with pagan religious customs from a comparative perspective, 
published just one year after Bernard and Picart’s grand project began 
to appear in print. Joseph-François Lafitau’s Moeurs des sauvages améri-
quains, comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps (Customs of the American 
Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times) deals with several 
aspects of native culture, but the book’s predominant concern is with 
pagan rites in the Americas and in antiquity. The 350-page chapter 
on religion occupies most of the first of its two volumes, whereas a 
more conventional ethnographic chapter on the physical and mental 
qualities of native peoples – “caractère des sauvages” – is only a few 
pages long. Lafitau continually returns to religious rituals in subse-
quent chapters on native customs, including government, medicine, as 
well as death, burial, and mourning. In the introduction he writes: “La 
Religion influait en tout” (Religion played a part in everything), and 
then again at the conclusion of the chapter on religion, he states: “La 
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Religion influait autrefois dans tout ce que faisaient les hommes” (For-
merly, the influence of religion was important in everything men did).10
Lafitau was a French Jesuit missionary who spent five years at a mis-
sion in New France and has long been seen as a forerunner of modern 
anthropology. His firsthand contact with indigenous groups recorded 
in the Moeurs appears to be among the first scientifically based, obser-
vational works of ethnography.11 In his early history of French anthro-
pology, Arnold Van Gennep, author of the classic Rites of Passage, places 
Lafitau in the company of Enlightenment writers such as Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, Rousseau, and d’Alembert, but signals Lafitau’s “connaissance 
étendue et précise” (extensive and precise knowledge) of Native Amer-
icans.12  Ethnography has become the standard framework in which 
to read the Moeurs.  Yet, as Mary Baine Campbell has written, Lafitau 
also seems to yearn for a “less disenchanted world.”13 Campbell does 
not account for this conjunction, nor does Michel de Certeau, whose 
persuasive exegesis of the Moeurs’ frontispiece supposes a division of 
labour between the powerful, emergent discourse of ethnography and 
Lafitau’s “mysterious vision.”14 Other scholars have explored Lafitau’s 
Jesuit background in its historical context, but a more developed dis-
cussion of what William Fenton calls “the troublesome morass of ‘Reli-
gion’” in the Moeurs is lacking.15 In part, the difficulty is that Lafitau’s 
comparative project challenges clear distinctions between the two 
domains of empirical ethnography and religiosity. The Moeurs contains 
descriptions of pagan rites, but the empirical or scientific value of the 
descriptions is undermined by Lafitau’s unrelenting analogies between 
pagans of antiquity and North American indigenous peoples. These 
comparisons between different religious cultures, which are oriented 
entirely to resemblance, were called “conformities” in the early modern 
era, and can be distinguished from the modern comparison in that the 
latter draws out both similarity and difference. I argue that the confor-
mity has a rhetorical and explanatory function, but in the Moeurs it is 
also a model for apprehending the unobservable nature of pagan ritual.
The conformity’s emphasis on resemblances deters ethnographic 
fact-making and its secularizing effects. It is not, however, merely a 
misperception or concealment of differences, attributable to the lens of 
Western, Christian ideology, or as a step towards the Enlightenment’s 
theory of primitive mentality. To demonstrate that the conformity is an 
alternative view of pagan ritual, I contextualize it in early modern com-
parativism, and then analyse the most developed of the Moeurs’ con-
formities: that the ancient rites of Bacchus stand for all pagan cult – in 
antiquity and among all indigenous peoples. The Bacchic rites, which 
are recuperated by Lafitau from their associations with malignant 
enthusiasm, are obscure, formless rituals. At their core is the “frenzy,” 
which is not a set of ritual regulations to perform, but a sensory and 
meta-sensory experience that mingles human and nonhuman being. 
The conformity apprehends ritual by approximating this ontological 
perplexity. Its significance in the early eighteenth century is that rather 
than constitute paganism as a culture or religion, the conformity elicits 
a kind of counter-productive knowing.
Comparing Comparisons
Jacques Revel has argued recently that the comparison had multiple 
purposes rather than a single, stable use in the early eighteenth cen-
tury.16 He notes that despite the scientific aims of projects like Bernard 
and Picart’s, comparisons were often allegorical, or used for argumen-
tative purposes. Revel usefully establishes and contextualizes certain 
aspects of comparison, but his brief study is limited to three examples. 
A survey of the larger spectrum of comparisons in the period reveals a 
correlation between the purpose of comparing and the relative invest-
ment of the comparatist in similarity or difference. Thus, the “con-
formity,” which lies at one end of this comparison spectrum, focused 
exclusively on resemblances and often served a specific argumentative 
purpose. It is found in the works of several French Protestants, includ-
ing Jonas Porée and Pierre Mussard, as well as British Protestants like 
Conyers Middleton, who contended that the ostensible similarities 
between ancient heathen rites and those of the Roman Catholic Church 
were proof of the impurity of the Church’s historical foundations.17 
Noël Alexandre’s Conformité des cérémonies chinoises avec l’idolâtrie 
grecque et romaine (Conformity of Chinese ceremonies with Greek and Roman 
Idolatry) uses the conformity in an East–West comparison, and the goal 
here is also to defend a position in a theological controversy. In this 
case, Alexandre uses conformities to critique Jesuit missionary prac-
tices in China. La Créquinière’s Conformité des coûtumes des Indian ori-
entaux, avec celles des Juifs et autres peuples de l’antiquité (The Agreement 
of the Customs of the East Indians with those of the Jews and Other Ancient 
People), which catalogues conformities between Hindu and Jewish cus-
toms, represents a shift in the aims of the device.18 His stated purpose 
is not polemical, but a kind of reverse illumination of ethnography for 
antiquarianism: “La connaissance des Coûtumes Indiennes prises en 
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elles-mêmes n’étoit d’aucune utilité; que je ne croyois devoir m’en ser-
vir que pour justifier ce que l’on nous rapporte des Anciens, & pour 
l’éclaircir lorsque l’occasion s’en présenteroit; qu’en un mot, l’Antiquité 
était mon unique but” (The knowledge of the customs of the Indians is 
no ways useful in itself, that I thought myself obliged to make use of it, 
only to justify what is told us of the ancients and to explain it whenever 
an occasion offers, and in a word that antiquity was my only aim).19 
The conformity, which was elastic enough to be deployed for theo-
logical debates, antiquarianism, and ethnography, also had a place in 
natural science, where displays of “objects of the most disparate prov-
enances … [were] arranged to maximize resemblance rather than 
diversity.”20 Lorraine Daston has traced a shift from this resemblance 
orientation in seventeenth-century displays to early eighteenth-century 
scientific practices, which “arrange or show the plenitude of nature 
as a continuous series,” underwritten by a new commitment to the 
universalization of nature.21 The conformity was still a predominant 
method of comparison around 1700, and despite the variety of agen-
das it served, it consistently focused on resemblances and continuities 
rather than differences. More important, the conformities are presumed 
by their authors to be indubitable and immediately evident rather than 
a labour of judgment.
The early eighteenth-century comparison was transformed, however, 
by Linnaeus’s use of “collation” in plant morphology, which represents, 
for the purposes of situating the Moeurs’ comparisons, the empirical end 
of the spectrum of comparisons. The collation designates a comparison 
that assesses both similarity and difference, which made it possible to 
identify the general attributes of individuals that inform the species, 
and those of the species that inform the genera.22 Some historians of 
science have remarked that Linnaeus’s use of the type specimen, which 
combines features of particular plants rather than representing a unique 
individual specimen, reveals an idealizing tendency in his otherwise 
scientific pursuit.23 The type specimen was used, however, for purposes 
of illustration, not categorization. In terms of comparisons, the salient 
point is that the collation was a process of induction from observed 
traits of particulars. In this way, the collation is the closest relative of the 
modern scientific comparison, and it is worth noting that the modern 
anthropological study of religious rituals follows the collation in large 
part. The anthropologist often acts as a participant-observer of a rite or 
receives reports given by participants. Detailed descriptions of the rite 
then help classify it according to its function in the culture’s symbolic 
system and as one of its structural mechanisms. Or, the classification 
proceeds by generating a typology of rites across cultures.24
It has been difficult to characterize Lafitau’s comparative project and 
to unpack his conformities because he explicitly subscribes to several 
agendas at once. He states in the introduction that his work is based 
on observations he and his missionary colleagues gathered in the field, 
which suggests proto-scientific aims.25 Lafitau also seems to follow La 
Créquinière’s use of the conformity, explaining that information on 
Native peoples was used to verify ancient sources: “J’avoue que si les 
Auteurs anciens m’ont donné des lumières pour appuyer quelques 
conjectures heureuses touchant les Sauvages, les Coûtumes des Sau-
vages m’ont donné des lumières pour entendre plus facilement, et 
pour expliquer plusieurs choses qui sont dans les Auteurs anciens” 
(I confess that, if the ancient authors have given me information on 
which to base happy conjectures about the Indians, the customs of the 
Indians have given me information on the basis of which I can under-
stand more easily and explain more readily many things in the ancient 
authors).26 More than two hundred sources are cited in the Moeurs, 
and Lafitau often includes a commentary on their documentary value, 
suggesting a rationalist approach. Lafitau also emphasizes that his 
goal is not only to compare indigenous groups and the ancients, but 
to rediscover a distant prehistory. Here, he engages in pure specula-
tion: “J’ai cherché dans ces pratiques et dans ces coûtumes des vestiges 
de l’antiquité la plus reculée” (I have sought in these practices and 
customs vestiges of the most remote antiquity) – the premiers temps of 
his title.27 Lafitau conjectured that “America was peopled a short time 
after the flood” by early Greeks, and this genealogy is visible in the 
conformities of their customs.28 His adherence to historical diffusion-
ism is obliquely related to another conjecture about prehistory – that 
pagan cults retain traces of an originary belief in a supreme being – 
and again relies on conformities to make this point.29 The Moeurs 
appears to vacillate, then, between ethnography, antiquarian pursuits, 
and conjectural history as well as between scientific, rationalist, and 
speculative methods.30
A careful reading of Lafitau’s work reveals an inordinate amount of 
convoluted syntax, which would seem to merely manifest the confu-
sion of the book’s aims as a whole. A closer look at certain rhetorical 
patterns, including the use of perplexing locutions, however, exhibits 
a turn away from the argumentative conformity, as well as from the 
scientific comparison. For example, in one of Lafitau’s earliest claims 
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about pagan ceremony, he asserts that the Americans have a religion 
that has
des rapports d’une si grande conformité avec celle des premiers temps, 
avec ce qu’on appelloit dans l’Antiquité les Orgyes de Bacchus et de la 
Mère des Dieux, les mystères d’Isis et d’Osiris, qu’on sent d’abord à cette 
resemblance que ce sont partout et les mêmes principes et le même fonds
[such great conformity with that of the first times in its manifestations and 
with what were called, in antiquity, the bacchanalian orgies and those of 
the Mother of the Gods and the mysteries of Isis and Osiris that one thinks 
at once by this resemblance that there are everywhere both the same prin-
ciples and the same basic belief].31
The reference to prehistorical “first times” turns the comparative dyad 
of native and ancient into a triangulated affair. Yet Lafitau’s use of the 
conjunction “and” is unclear: indigenous religions manifest a “great 
conformity with religion of the first times and with what were called in 
antiquity, the bacchanalian orgies.” Are there two sets of vestigial reli-
gious practices, the dead (ancients) and the living (indigenous), which 
both emanated from prehistory? Or is native paganism a manifesta-
tion of one ancient model? It is also unclear whether the religion of the 
first times signifies a philosophical fiction like the state of nature, or a 
historical practice that streams into recorded antiquity, or whether the 
first times may be a historical vanishing point, which can be retraced 
through indigenous practices, if only asymptotically.
As William Fenton and Elizabeth Moore explain, Lafitau’s premiers 
temps is probably taken from the French historian Bossuet, for whom 
the term designated the three millennia before Moses and the Flood, 
but Lafitau uses the notion in ways that are less clear and consistent.32 
The comparison here between actual religious customs and an imagi-
nary prehistorical religion is significant nonetheless because it implies 
that resemblances are the focal point, but that such similarities are not 
of observable particulars alone. This abdication of a purely evidentiary 
rationale is reinforced by Lafitau’s reference to orgies and mysteries – 
a particular group of ancient cultic practices in which the initiates were 
sworn to secrecy, and few records of their actual features exist. I will 
return to the bacchanalian orgies in greater detail below, but in the 
context of Lafitau’s rhetoric, the point here is that the interposition of 
prehistory as a tertium comparationis refers to some realm outside of 
historical record and observed fact. The final convolution of the pas-
sage is its illogical segue from the comparison to the conclusion that 
religious principles and beliefs are “everywhere the same.” The work 
of the conformity consists, then, in both presenting comparable partic-
ulars, but then withdrawing from particularity to obscurity and from 
thence to absolute indistinction where all religious principles are “the 
same.”
In a further abandonment of an evidentiary rationale, the conformi-
ties are presumed to be self-evident. The very statement of a similitude 
is, for Lafitau, a sufficient demonstration of it. For example, he writes 
that the Carib ritual of offerings of cassava and ouicou, placed “sur une 
espèce d’autel au fonds de leurs cabanes, où qu’il’s mettent devant cer-
tains pieux qu’ils enfoncent en terre, sont les présents de Bacchus et 
Cérès, leur vin et leur pain qui sont la matière de leurs sacrifices” (on a 
kind of altar in the back of their huts or place[d] before appointed posts 
driven into the earth, are the presents of Bacchus and Ceres, their wine 
and bread which are the substance of their sacrifice).33 The Carib gifts of 
ouicou, a beer made of potato, cassava, and banana, and cassava, a root, 
simply “are” the gifts of Bacchus (wine), and Ceres (bread/grain). This 
conformity elides differences since the appositive “Bacchus and Ceres, 
their wine and bread,” seems to indicate that the gods’ names are not 
metaphors here: the similitude is not attended with the recognition of 
any material difference of wine from ouicou, and bread/grain from cas-
sava. Other discursive symptoms of the conformity include the recur-
rence of such phrasing as “in the same way,” “in the same manner,” or 
“is the same as,” and the rhetorical question “shouldn’t we also say?”34  
Like his predecessors, Lafitau assumed the self-evident status of con-
formities, and he even occasionally abandons his own role in draw-
ing comparisons altogether. At the conclusion of a section on musical 
instruments and dance in ancient rites, he obviates the anticipated com-
parison with the Huron and Iroquois: “Il me semble avoir déjà si bien 
dépeint nos Sauvages dans ce que je viens de décrire des Sacrifices et 
des solemnités des Anciens, que je ne croirais pas avoir besoin d’ajoûter 
rien davantage” (It seems to me that, in the foregoing descriptions of 
the sacrifices and ceremonies of the ancients, I have already described 
so well [those of] the Indians that I believe that there is no need to add 
anything by an additional description).35 Descriptions and comparisons 
are not driven by sectarian conviction, nor do they obey the logic of 
scientific comparison, not least because Lafitau ignores the differences 
that generate categories. Even though he uses concepts like “worship” 
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“offering,” “sacrifice,” and “initiation,” he does not systematically 
derive their general features to construct ritual types.36 
Although Lafitau was reintroduced in the twentieth century as the 
rootstock of the social-scientific method, the Moeurs elicited caustic 
criticism in the decades following its publication.37 Commenting on 
Lafitau’s theses about the diffusion of cultures and the origins of Native 
peoples of the Americas, Voltaire was characteristically sarcastic:
Enfin Lafitau fait venir les Américains des anciens Grecs; et voici ses rai-
sons. Les Grecs avaient des fables, quelques Américains en ont aussi. Les 
premiers Grecs allaient à la chasse, les Américains y vont. Les premiers 
Grecs avaient des oracles, les Américains ont des sorciers. On dansait 
dans les fêtes de la Grèce, on danse en Amérique. Il faut avouer que ces 
raisons sont convaincantes.
[He would derive the Americans from the ancient Greeks and these are his 
reasons: the Greeks have myths, some Americans have them too. The first 
Greeks went hunting, the Americans go too. The first Greeks had oracles, 
the Americans have sorcerers. They danced at the festivals in Greece, they 
dance in America too. It must be avowed these reasons are convincing.]38
By mimicking Lafitau’s conformities in condensed and simplified form, 
Voltaire exposes their fallacy. Any coincidences of material life like 
hunting or those of religious life such as oracles, sorcerers, and ritual 
dances do not originate in historical contact, as Lafitau assumed, but 
can be explained instead by our shared humanity. Corneille de Pauw 
also found Lafitau’s conformities wanting. Unlike Voltaire, he recog-
nized that “les superstitions religieuses des peuples de l’Amérique ont 
eu un rapport sensible avec celles qu’ont pratiqué les nations de l’ancien 
continent” (the religious superstitions of the peoples of America had a 
perceptible relation with those that the nations of the ancient continent 
practised), but he quickly takes a similar stance of rational resistance 
to the ostensible resemblance and proposes, like Voltaire, that similari-
ties can be explained by the human condition: “malgré la diversité des 
climates, l’imbecilité de l’esprit humain a été constante et immuable” 
(despite the diversity of climates, the imbecility of the human mind has 
been constant and unwavering).39 In his History of America, William Rob-
ertson echoes others’ objections to Lafitau’s claim that Native Ameri-
cans originated in the old world, and argues that any similitude comes 
from “situation” and “state of society.” Robertson goes on to critique the 
conformities of religious rites in particular as “destitute of solid founda-
tion,” explaining that “we may ascribe this uniformity, which in many 
instances seems very amazing, to the natural operation of superstitions 
and enthusiasm upon the weakness of the human mind.”40 Again, the 
admission of “amazing” resemblances of customs is followed by an insis-
tence on a simpler explanation: “the natural operation of superstitions.” 
Any conformities can be replaced by the assertion of a single, overarch-
ing cause: mental weakness. These criticisms are posited as correctives 
to the analogical method and its misguided historical speculation.
The idea that mental weakness enables pagan superstition has deep 
roots in Western philosophy and Christian theology. If Pauw’s and 
Robertson’s explanation of similarities between polytheistic cults is not 
entirely novel, they nonetheless replace its conventional terms with a 
universalist premise that allowed Enlightenment writers to hold up the 
mirror to our mental frailties. Although their ridicule is biting and their 
accounts apparently more persuasive than Lafitau’s immoderate com-
parisons, they do not definitively refute his analogical approach. Hav-
ing acknowledged that the resemblances between pagan superstitions 
are indeed perceptible, they sidestep them by imposing, in their place, 
a form of psychological profiling, which separates those who possess 
ratiocinative powers from the unenlightened who remain naturally 
superstitious. Enlightenment primitivism has long been critiqued for 
its covert denial of human equality and for unethical blindness to the 
cultural integrity of non-Western cultures. The cultural politics of com-
parison notwithstanding, I would argue that the stakes of a pagan men-
tality may lie elsewhere. Voltaire, Pauw, and Robertson pretend that 
similarities between religious customs of different groups are irrelevant 
by conjuring the explanatory power of universal mental weakness. This 
anthropocentric theory also sets aside the relation in customary wor-
ship to any being that may not be perceived empirically. That is, if all 
pagan superstitions arise from a mental predisposition to fear or awe, 
ritual’s mediation of the human and nonhuman is nullified. Seen from 
this angle, the conformity – even with its desultory arguments and con-
voluted rhetoric – recasts the high Enlightenment’s confidence in the 
human sciences as incapable of theorizing such mediations.
Bacchic Rites
As we have seen, Lafitau proposes the conformity of indigenous reli-
gious customs “with that of the first times in its manifestations and 
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with what were called, in antiquity, the bacchanalian orgies.”41 This 
hypothesis, which is largely overlooked by scholars of Lafitau, is cen-
tral to the project. It is found in the book’s introduction, and is restated 
early in the chapter on religion: “Tout le fonds de la Religion ancienne 
des Sauvages de l’Amérique est le même que celui des Barbares, qui 
occupèrent en premier lieu la Grèce, et qui se répandirent dans l’Asie, 
le même que celui des Peuples qui suivirent Bacchus dans ses expedi-
tions militaires, le même enfin qui servit ensuite de fondement à toute 
la Mythologie payenne, et aux fables des Grecs.” (The entire basis of 
the former religion of the American Indian as well as that of the barbar-
ians who first occupied Greece, spreading later into Asia, is the same 
as the followers of Bacchus in his military expeditions, and as that 
which served afterward as the basis of all pagan mythology and of the 
Greek myths.)42 In a footnote to this section, he adds that “according to 
Servius, people called orgies all rites that had the name of sacrifice in 
Greece and that of ceremony in Rome.”43 Lafitau’s several statements of 
the conformity of the Bacchic rites to pagan religious cult as a whole, 
he boldly subsumes all paganism into one reputedly licentiousness, 
violent, and irrational cult that gripped a huge portion of the ancient 
world. It is the cult of the god who, according to Euripedes’s Bacchae, 
travelled through Asia and attracted crowds of followers, returning to 
Thebes only to have his rites banned by his cousin, King Pentheus. Bac-
chus then takes his vengeance on the city as his followers, the Bacchae, 
wreak havoc, ripping a herd of cows to pieces with their bare hands 
before performing omophagy on Pentheus.
Bacchus, or as the god is known in Greek, Dionysus, has been 
described by contemporary classicists as “the most complex and mul-
tifaceted of all the Greek gods.”44 In post-Nietzschean interpretations 
of Dionysus, this complexity stems from the god’s polarities and con-
tradictions: life/death, suffering/ecstasy, mortal/immortal. Diony-
sus’s complexity is symbolic, but it also derives from a complicated 
and little-known history of the cult’s cosmopolitan transmission. In 
the myths, Dionysus was a foreign god, the “étrange étranger,” which 
suggests that the cult was taken by the Greeks from elsewhere before 
spreading widely by late antiquity.45 Henk Versnel argues that the Dio-
nysian myths of cultic transit may be the first reflection in antiquity 
on the mobility of religion.46 Seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century 
antiquarians and mythologists were not unaware of the complex nature 
of the god and his cult; they note that Bacchus was called Biformis for 
his appearances as both a youth and elder, Bimater for having two 
mothers (born from the womb of Semele and from the thigh of Zeus), 
or Dithyrambus for being twice born, and also Liber pater because he 
frees his followers from constraint. François Pomey’s popular Pan-
theon includes a lengthy entry on Bacchus with separate sections on his 
birth, names, actions, sacrifices, and historical interpretation of the cult. 
Pomey concludes with a moral allegorization of the god of wine – “the 
cradle of life, but yet the grave of reason.”47 While Bacchus continued 
to represent the passion that deranges one’s reason or the social threat 
of enthusiasm, there was increasing interest in gathering a more com-
plete inventory of the god’s depictions and supplementing the written 
sources with archaeological descriptions of medals and sculptures.48 
And, euhemerist interpretations of the god multiplied: Dionysus was 
assumed to have been a real personage who was later deified. The turn 
to euhemerism from allegorism put additional pressure on the ques-
tion of Bacchus’ actual origins, which were possibly Greek, Egyptian, 
or Judaic, as well as putting pressure on the question of the cult’s his-
tory. There may have been more than one Bacchus, seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century scholars surmised, or only one god whose cult 
spread across occidental–oriental realms. In attempting to answer these 
difficult questions, several eighteenth-century mythologists and anti-
quarians rationalize the stories by explaining the multiple and incon-
sistent histories, like much of ancient religion generally, as intentional 
chicanery. Thus Antoine Banier, the early eighteenth-century Catholic 
author of the influential compendium, La mythologie et les fables expli-
queés par l’histoire (1738–40), dealt with the various stories of Bacchus’s 
origins this way: “Il semble que les anciens aient répandu à dessein ... 
l’obscurité mystérieuse” (It would seem that the Ancients had formed 
a design to throw a veil of obscurity over the true history).49 In The New 
Pantheon (1753), Samuel Boyse dismisses the possibility of a historical 
Bacchus and sees the god as little more than a gross mystification: “no 
real Bacchus ever existed … he was only a masque or figure of some 
concealed truth.”50
Lafitau admits the inconsistencies in Bacchus’ mythology, but rather 
than treating them as obstacles to the production of rational knowledge, 
he deploys them for other purposes. Lafitau concurs that Bacchus is the 
same god as the Egyptian Osiris, and equates him with other pagan 
deities: “la divinité, le soleil, nôtre premier père, et les types du libéra-
teur” (the divinity, the sun, our first father and the types of liberator).51 
Moreover, Lafitau sees a resemblance between the accrual of the names 
and attributes of pagan deities as seen here with Osiris/Bacchus/first 
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father/liberator, etc. and that of the Christian God. Lafitau writes that 
God is known as the Redeemer and as Christ. As Christ he has human 
and divine natures: as human, God is identified under the name Adam, 
the first father and sinner, and as divine, known by symbolic names, 
“Soleil de Justice, la lumière du Monde, le Pain Céleste” (the Sun of Jus-
tice, the Light of the World, Celestial Bread).52 This conformity between 
Christ and Bacchus works on more than one level: both are father fig-
ures, both are liberator figures, and both have multiple names and attri-
butes, but are not a multiplicity of separate deities. Both are (the) one. 
For Lafitau, theistic multiplicity is not a veil, and therefore he does not 
rationalize Bacchus’s cult by attempting to unmask discrepancies as a 
conspiracy of obfuscation. Resemblances, once again, lead to identity, 
and in the special logic of the conformity, the one cult of Bacchus sub-
sumes all pagan rituals.
The true stakes of Lafitau’s conformity of “all former religion” with 
the “followers of Bacchus” lies, however, in those who performed the 
rites more than in the god who leads them. There are two groups of 
Bacchus’s followers according to the mythological traditions: the 
mixed-gender participants in the bacchanal or orgia, a public ritual, 
and second, the bacchantes, a group of female initiates in the mystery 
cult of Bacchus, which is a private and secret rite. Lafitau correlates 
both groups to indigenous Americans, “L’image en est toute naturelle 
dans ce nouveau Monde” (The image [of these followers of Bacchus] 
is quite familiar in the New World).53 The key feature of public rite of 
orgia and the mystery cult of Bacchus is that the participants are vari-
ously described as being out of their minds, often termed “frenzy” in 
eighteenth-century texts. In the Moeurs, Lafitau includes an image of a 
bacchante in frenzy, taken from Jacob Spon’s work on antiquities, which 
helped revive a visual tradition of the bacchante that had largely dis-
appeared from Renaissance mythologies due to its prurience54 (Figure 
4.1). It closely resembles images of the bacchante in other antiquarian 
catalogues such as that of La Chausse’s Le grand cabinet romain ou receuil 
d’antiquitez romaines and Bernard de Montfaucon’s frequently cited 
L’Antiquité expliquée (Figure 4.2). Antoine Banier describes bacchantes 
as running “toutes échevelées avec des grimaces et des contorsions 
affreuses, branlant la tête d’une manière effrayante, et ressemblant 
en tout à des sorcenées” (loose and dishevelled in grimaces and con-
torsions, tossing their heads in a frightful manner, and in every thing 
resembling mad women).55 This image of Bacchic frenzy reinforced its 
reputation as drunken and salacious degeneracy, but Lafitau aims to 
prove that these rites were corrupted only in later antiquity, that is, 
by the time the Romans famously proscribed them.56 In his section on 
the bacchanals of antiquity, Lafitau inserts a passage from the ancient 
Greek geographer, Strabo, which addresses the mystery cult of Bac-
chus and the public bacchanals. Strabo explains that all these rites in 
which frenzy enters are, in fact, in accord with “nature and reason.” He 
explains why:
in the first place, the relaxation draws the mind away from human occupa-
tions and turns the real mind towards that which is divine; and, secondly, 
the religious frenzy seems to afford a kind of divine inspiration and to be 
Figure 4.1. Lafitau, Moeurs des sauvages, Vol. 1, Plate 17, Figure 9. Taken from 
Jacob Spon in Jan Gruter, Miscellaneae Eruditae Antiquitatis, 2 vols. (Lyon, 1685), 
used to illustrate the “Isiac cross.” This item is reproduced by permission of 
The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
124 Mary Helen McMurran
Rethinking Superstition 125
Figure 4.2. Bernard de Montfaucon, Antiquity Explained (London, 1722), vol. I, 
plate 18. The bacchantes are re-engraved from works of Paolo Maffei, Michel 
Ange de La Chausse, and Jacob Spon. This item is reproduced by permission 
of the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
very like that of the soothsayer; and, thirdly, the secrecy with which the 
sacred rites are concealed induces reverence for the divine, which is to 
avoid being perceived by our human senses; and, fourthly, music, which 
includes dancing as well as rhythm and melody, at the same time, by the 
delight it affords and by its artistic beauty, brings us in touch with the 
divine.57
Where Lafitau’s contemporaries had consigned the bacchante to inde-
cipherable madness, this passage from Strabo makes sense of the image 
of the bacchante – her kinetic, skyward-bent pose and her solitary 
religiosity – which is the antithesis of the period’s typical depictions of 
pagans, who appear in the illustrations to works like Lafitau’s or Ber-
nard and Picart’s as prostrate worshippers gravely subjugating them-
selves to their idols, or whose bodies, if animated by dance, remain in 
the circular formation of communal regulation.58 Lafitau adds that he 
takes Strabo’s explanation of Bacchic frenzy “comme un principe” (as a 
principle), suggesting that the quotation is not merely a defence of the 
piety of ancient bacchanals, but the conformity that defines all ancient 
and indigenous pagan cult.
First, the passage reinforces that Bacchic rites and by extension, 
pagan cult, do not consist in formal acts alone, but in something that 
the participant undergoes. In the mystery cults, as Sarah Iles Johnston 
explains: “initiates into mysteries not only did and said things, as part 
of their initiation, but experienced things … those in the cult of Diony-
sus are said to be bebaccheumenoi (they have been ‘bacchiated’).”59 Sec-
ond, Strabo states that the initiate reaches the divinity through the “real 
mind,” which is drawn away from its human occupations, and further, 
that the rite is properly done in secret to avoid being perceived. These 
parts of the passage evoke a dualism of the senses and mind, the for-
mer leading away from divinity and the latter towards it. Yet, Strabo’s 
last point appears to contradict such dualism. The passage ends with 
melody and rhythm inducing the sense-experience of “delight,” which 
brings the bacchante “in touch with the divine.” This pleasure is further 
connected to the aesthetic or “artistic beauty” of dance and music, rein-
forcing the godliness of sensory experience. Perhaps the passage is not 
at odds with itself, however. Frenzy moves into or “enters” the initiate 
by means of several corollary motions of relaxing, receiving, inducing, 
and “being in touch with” in a dialectical move from the senses into 
the mind and then back to the senses. Elsewhere in the religion chapter, 
Lafitau addresses ancient and Native American theurgy, or communi-
cation with the gods, and returns to “des Initiations des Orgies.”60 Spe-
cifically, he notes that in all cases, the soul is cleansed of the “contagion 
of the senses” as a preliminary step. Despite this apparent dualism of 
the contemplative mind and the earthly senses, he quotes cryptic pas-
sages from Pausanius, Dio Chrysostom, Apuleius, and Plato to explain 
that the purification of the senses subsequently brings initiates back to 
their senses in a heightened state of perception and knowledge. Lafitau 
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paraphrases Dio Chrysostom, a Greek orator and philosopher who 
lived during the Roman imperial era: “un homme initié dans cet état 
de vision mystérieuse, aux oreilles de qui plusieurs voix se sont enten-
dre, sous les yeux duquel se présentent en spectacle plusieurs scènes 
différentes” (a man initiated into this state of mystic vision to whose 
ears many voices make themselves heard, under whose eyes many 
different scenes present themselves).61 In his dissertation on religious 
practices quoted above, Jean-Frédéric Bernard explains that the ratio-
nality of proper worship consists in expressionless mental contempla-
tion, and that pagan rituals are fraught with excesses that distract them 
from pure meditation. Lafitau reconsiders this supposedly inferior 
mentality of pagans and its dependence on sensory allure. Pagan cult 
does not mire the participant in sense-perception as a diversion from 
the supreme being, but rather, according to the ancients, disrupts the 
senses and mind to restore them.
Let us return, then, to the significance of this conformity between the 
bacchanalia and all pagan cult. The conformity, first of all, does not pro-
ceed by using descriptors of observed pagan practices for the purposes 
of outlining a formal category, for Bacchic rites are not a particular 
entity, but a historical and translocal adaptation. Lafitau suggests that 
pagan cult is also a transport of the mind from the senses and back into 
the senses, and an ineffable event of “being in touch with” the deity. To 
define Bacchic rites as the essence of pagan cult is, in fact, to upset the 
idea that ritual is reducible to a set of observable external signs or pre-
scriptions for action. Thus, ethnographic descriptions of pagan rites did 
not necessarily change European attitudes about religion from close-
minded belief to tolerant secularization. Rather, such descriptions, 
reinforcing the link between externalized sensory experience and meta-
sensory being, appear to preserve the nonrationality in which the mind, 
the senses, and divinity remain conjugated, as consequent to empirical 
observation.
It would oversimplify the Moeurs to assume that if it is not scientific 
ethnography with secularist effects, then its engagement with religious 
practices is itself religiously motivated. Lafitau’s apparent defence of 
pagan ritual may be allied with natural religion, but to argue that it also 
serves a Counter-Reformation ideology in the wake of Protestant anti-
ritualism, or as a justification of Catholic missions, which were widely 
known for their emphasis on ritual, is insufficient.62 Pagan ceremonies, 
elaborated in the Moeurs through the conformities between ancient and 
native pagans, grapple with a relation to (the one) being as distinct 
from the monotheists’ god – further evinced in the consistent use of 
terms “divinity” or “supreme being.” Is the divine immanent in the 
human mind and then expressed in signs of human worship? Or is rit-
ual frenzy the agent by which a return of the mind to the senses newly 
accommodates the divine each time it is carried out? The Moeurs stops 
short of providing an answer,  but its particular dedication to the con-
formity effectively resists the regime of collecting, accumulating, and 
ordering knowledge.
In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault put analogical thinking and 
its hermeneutic circularity to rest at the end of the Renaissance. He 
explains that the uniform layer of interwoven signs and things breaks 
down, and similitude comes to be seen as deceptive and quixotic.63 
Since the publication of Foucault’s work, the dominant model for inter-
preting many aspects of European thought, and perhaps particularly 
ideas about non-Europeans, has been to analyse representations as 
constructions of a knowledge regime that was made possible by the 
liberation from premodern analogy. A more complete account of pagan 
superstition reveals that it absorbed analogical thinking, exemplified 
here by the conformity.64 If Lafitau’s bewildering analogies are recon-
sidered, they may provide a re-entry to the conjunctions of embodied 
practices, mentalities, and spirit-worlds.
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It is much the same thing whether a Man’s Head be full of Vapours or Procla-
mations: Wind in the Brain makes Men giddy.
 – John Goodman, A Winter-Evening 
Conference between Neighbours (1705)1
In Daniel Defoe’s 1705 lunar voyage narrative, The Consolidator, the 
narrator discovers a number of fanciful instruments on the moon. No 
device is more astounding than the “Cogitator” or “thinking engine.”2 
This “mechanick Chair” has the power to make men’s thoughts “obedi-
ent to mechanick Operation” and, most crucially, to put the wild agita-
tions of “the Memory, the Understanding, the Will, and the thinking 
Faculty … into regular Motions.”3 As I show below, the Consolidator’s 
lunar instrumentation functions as a complex satire of both material-
ist models of the mind/soul and representations of mental activity in 
print.4 We should not, however, mistake Defoe’s satire for a wholesale 
dismissal of the possibility that the motions of thoughts and feelings 
might resemble the movements of material substances. To do so would 
be to ignore Defoe’s persistent tendency to depict the mind/soul as a 
rarefied kinetic substance, a quasi-material vapour or ether that simul-
taneously obeys and defies the laws of physics. For Defoe, the mind/
soul belongs to both the material world and the “angelick” world; it is 
neither wholly physical nor wholly metaphysical, but somewhere vex-
ingly in-between. As Jayne Elizabeth Lewis has recently shown, dur-
ing the eighteenth century “spirits themselves were a notional hybrid 
blending immaterial and material accounts of reality in response to 
the later seventeenth-century demand for discursive compromise.”5 
5  Defoe on Spiritual Communication, 




Defoe’s fraught terminology expresses the philosophical and repre-
sentational difficulties posed by this “hybrid blending” of psyche and 
soma; his narrators self-consciously adopt phrases that are reminiscent 
of John Locke’s “body without body”: “non-entity,” “a middle class of 
spirit,” and “things that are not.”6 Many of his publications approach 
thought as a species of motion itself, a “commotion” or “agitation.” 
Defoe has etymology on his side here; our English word cogitate comes 
from the Latin agitare, meaning to “to turn” or “to agitate.”7 It is easy for 
us in the twenty-first century to forget that the phrase, “I’ll have to turn 
that over in my mind,” has its origins in a time when this “turning” was 
a literal description of mental activity.
This chapter is not a complete history of the many depictions of the 
mind/soul as a quasi-material substance in the Restoration and eigh-
teenth century. Rather, I focus on how Defoe represents the mind/soul 
as an airy substance that is not only moved by stimuli, but also moves 
through various spaces: the upper atmosphere, the printed page, and 
other minds.8 I follow Helen Thompson and Natania Meeker in their 
use of the word “substance” rather than “matter,” because “in the eigh-
teenth century substance could claim the qualifiers material and imma-
terial.”9 I have chosen Defoe’s works in part because his contemporaries 
associated him with the twinned topics of visions and vapours (one 
literary adversary accused Defoe of suffering from “volatile effluvia 
of [the] brain”), but primarily because Defoe both compiled and pro-
duced a mammoth body of work on apparitions, spiritual communica-
tion, and the nature of what he called “vapourous matter.”10 I read the 
blustery minds in The Consolidator and Vision of the Angelick World (1720) 
not merely as meditations on the fine line between ecstatic visions and 
madness, but also as demonstrations of the difficulties of integrating a 
scholastic subject like pneumatology – which for much of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries consisted of the study of angels, demons, 
spirits, and the nature of the soul – into newer empirical Enlightenment 
classifications of knowledge.11 Defoe was not, of course, alone in grap-
pling with these difficulties. Like the Latitudinarian Cambridge Pla-
tonists who developed theories about the soul’s “airy vehicle,” Defoe’s 
narrators are keenly interested in what happens when pneumatics and 
pneumatology collide. Henry More, Joseph Glanvill, Defoe, and many 
others take for granted that the mind/soul moves and perhaps can 
travel as an entity separate from its body. This view raises a number of 
questions: how can we understand motion and its laws when the thing 
that is moving is not a thing, per se? How can we represent the motion 
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of an entity that, although it has extension and therefore tallies with the 
traditional Cartesian definition of material substance, is nevertheless 
invisible or so rarefied as to be almost immaterial?
My focus on vapours, winds, ethers, and other quasi-material sub-
stances is significant for both philosophy and literature, because writ-
ing about the airy qualities of the mind/soul allowed Defoe to reflect 
on the way that the act of reading begets its own mists and ignes fatui, 
its apparitions and evanescent beings. Printed texts, like minds and 
winds, are neither wholly tangible nor intangible. Particularly signifi-
cant are illustrated editions of Defoe’s works, which test theories about 
how the reader’s mind is moved by a text, and how a mind might move 
out and act on the external world. I turn to Jay David Bolter’s and Rich-
ard Grusin’s “double logic” of immediacy and hypermediacy to more 
fully explain how Defoe understood the experience of reading as an 
intermingling of multiple representations, both mental and physical.12 
Media theory provides a framework for thinking through the ways that 
Defoe places both mind/souls and printed works on a continuum of 
quasi-material substances that act as mediums out in the world. Defoe 
was also concerned with how figurative language might address the 
problem of “vapourous” substance. I argue that Defoe challenges the 
modern privileging of “plain” language and suggests that allegory and 
emblems might be better suited to the representation of the mind/soul. 
Furthermore, Defoe takes on the instrumentation of the new philoso-
phy in his insistence that the most accurate optical device would be one 
that reflexively revealed the cloudy and contradictory motions of the 
human perceptive faculties.
I. Mind as “Vapourous Matter”
Recent scholarship has tended to divide The Storm (1704) and The Con-
solidator along modern disciplinary and generic boundaries, separating 
Defoe’s satirical science fiction from his natural-philosophical jour-
nalism.13 By reading The Storm and The Consolidator as two halves of 
the same narrative experiment, we can better understand how Defoe 
approached the challenges of representing the invisible motions of 
the mind/soul. Both texts borrow an experiment that was published 
in Francis Bacon’s 1622 Experimentall History of Winds and reprinted in 
Richard Bohun’s 1671 Discourse Concerning the Origine and Properties of 
Wind, a text that Defoe’s critics accused him of plagiarizing.14 Bacon’s 
three “feather trials” observed the motions of “a Crosse of Feathers” 
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when it was suspended first over a fire, second over a boiling kettle, and 
finally over both a fire and boiling kettle simultaneously.15 During the 
third trial, “the agitation of the Crosse of Feathers was very vehement” 
and it “whirle[d] up and downe, as if it had been a petty Whirlwinde.”16 
From this, Bacon infers that one likely cause of strong winds is the sun 
heating water vapour. In The Storm, Defoe’s narrator doubts whether 
this is “a sufficient Demonstration” that “all the Causes of Wind are 
from the Influence of the Sun upon vaporous Matter” and surmises 
that this is “at best … a probable Conjecture.”17 What is at stake for 
Defoe’s narrator is, in part, a question of first and second causes. If one 
assumes that the cause of the wind is indeed superheated “vaporous 
matter,” this weakens Defoe’s providential account of the Great Storm 
of November, 1703, in which God has expressed his wrath directly – as 
a Prime Mover and first cause – through the tempest. After all, if one 
wants to strike terror into the hearts of sinners, it certainly lessens the 
blow if one cannot say, “the wind is God’s wrath,” but only, “the wind 
is a by-product of a natural system of rarefaction and condensation set 
in place by God four or five millennia ago.” Bacon’s “vaporous mat-
ter” also reduces the mysterious nature of wind – its intangible quasi-
materiality and its apparently self-moving force – to an amalgamation 
of inert particles. Even if Bacon’s hypothesis does not preclude Defoe’s 
argument, that the wind is a medium through which God punishes 
humankind, it thickens and befogs that medium by adding a series of 
second causes (sunlight heating water, water becoming vapour, vapor-
ous particles moving ever faster in a chain reaction) between the Prime 
Mover and the motions of the material world. Divine action at a dis-
tance becomes ever more distant.
Bacon’s feather trials were more useful for Defoe as a metaphor for 
the human mind/soul. The Consolidator, which was published only ten 
months after The Storm, features a feathered spaceship that both satirizes 
pneumatic models of the mind/soul and lampoons volatile members of 
the House of Commons: “The Head of every Feather is … full of a vigor-
ous Substance, which gives Spirit … some are so full of Wind, and puft up 
with the Vapour of the Climate, that there’s not Humid enough to Con-
dence the Stream; and these are so … continually fluttering and trouble-
some, that they greatly serve to disturb and keep the Motion unsteddy ... 
The fluttering hot-headed Feathers are the most dangerous.”18 Defoe 
has shifted the “vapourous matter” of Bacon’s trials from the realm of 
pneumatics (the outer air) to pneumatology (the motions of the mind/
soul). The imagery in this passage playfully samples from humoural 
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medicine, classical descriptions of the soul as pneuma or breath, and iat-
romechanical models in which animal spirits and nervous fluids in the 
brain might behave like the vapours in Bacon’s laboratory.19 This is also, 
in another sense, a metaphor made literal, in that The Consolidator imag-
ines what actual “hot-headed[ness]” might look like. It is this very ten-
dency in English common usage – to refer to mental phenomena as airy 
substances – that Hobbes scorns in Leviathan (1651). While “the com-
mon language of men” equates “idols of the … distempered brain” with 
“wind, or breath,” Hobbes insists that such freaks of fancy are “nothing 
but tumult, proceeding … from the disorderly agitation of the organs of 
our sense.”20 In his Consolidator and elsewhere, Defoe implicitly rejects 
a Hobbesian position in which “substance and body signify the same 
thing; and therefore substance incorporeal are words, which when they 
are joined together, destroy one another.”21 Instead, Defoe explores the 
notion that the mind/soul might exist on a continuum somewhere in 
between materiality and immateriality.
For many eighteenth-century readers, images of an airy mind/soul 
would have alluded directly to Latitudinarian Cambridge Platonists 
such as Henry More, who argued that the immaterial soul was united 
to the material body through an “aerial vehicle,” and that “the place 
of [the disembodied soul’s] abode [was] the Air.”22 James Chandler 
describes More’s vehicular hypothesis as a direct challenge to “the 
mechanistic theses of Descartes, the materialist-mechanist theses of 
Hobbes, and the materialist theses of Spinoza.”23 More and his follow-
ers Ralph Cudworth and Joseph Glanvill insisted that the soul was 
indeed immaterial, but for it to be united with a material human body, 
it followed that it must be encased in a quasi-material substance. This 
gave rise to the central quandary of the vehicular hypothesis: how can 
one imagine an adequate intermediary between matter and spirit? Like 
the air, the soul’s vehicle is like matter but not wholly material, and 
also like spirit but not purely spiritual. This conundrum continued to 
spur debate throughout the century. As late as 1777, Joseph Priestley’s 
Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit derided “modern metaphysi-
cians” who, upon “finding some difficulty in uniting together things so 
discrepant … as a pure immaterial substance and such gross matter …
have imagined that this connection may be better cemented by means 
of some intermediate material substance.”24 Priestley’s concretizing 
verb, “cemented,” expresses the impossibility of fully articulating an 
“intermediate … substance” that is incorporeal and yet capable of join-
ing, with the subtlest of bonds, incompatible substances.25
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For More, the soul’s vehicle resembled the air itself in that it both 
took up space and moved through space but was not, strictly speak-
ing, matter.26 This is nowhere more evident than in More’s discussion 
of the “dangers” that a soul in its vehicle might face when buffeted 
by “tempests” in the upper atmosphere: “And yet Rain, Hail, Snow, 
and Thunder, will incommodate her still less. For they pass as they do 
through other parts of Air, which close again immediately, and leave 
neither wound nor scar behind him. Wherefore all these Meteors … 
may be a pleasure to her and [a] refreshment.”27 Here, the soul in its 
vehicle has qualities of both psyche and soma: on the one hand, even the 
most inclement British weather cannot physically damage it – no more 
than hail can “wound” the air – but, on the other hand, it is moved by 
physical objects in that it experiences “pleasure” and “refreshment” as 
a result of coming in contact with raindrops and snowflakes.
Defoe’s Consolidator explores what happens when analogies between 
the mind/soul and the motions of vapours or gasses are taken to an 
illogical extreme. The lunar civilization boasts “another sort of Machine” 
called an “Elevator,” which allows one to experience “Revelation” “in a 
Mechanick way” “helped by Fire” in which “the more vigorous Particles 
of the Soul” in “the Head” are “by the heat of strong Ideas … fermented to 
a strange height … beyond it self.”28 Here, the mind/soul has “Particles” 
that resemble a rarefied substance like the vapours of Bacon’s feather 
experiment. The “Elevator” engine causes the imaginative faculty of the 
mind/soul to be in a state of ex-stasis that allows it to exit the body and 
act on the external world. Here, the lunar traveller makes an abrupt shift 
in tone and quotes a line from Defoe’s own popular poem, The True-Born 
Englishman (1701): “for Spirits without the helps of Voice converse.”29 
Defoe added this line to later editions of the poem; it appears immedi-
ately after the speaker’s command, “Satire, be silent!,” and insists, in a 
newly sincere manner, that it is possible for humans to communicate with 
“distant worlds of spirits.”30 Defoe’s Elevator makes a jibe at those who 
would puff up the capacity of philosophical instrumentation. Although 
the mind/soul might indeed resemble an airy substance, it is absurd and 
hubristic to imagine that human agency could achieve a divine vision 
through pneumatic experiments or mechanical engines. True visions are 
not subject to, nor caused by, philosophical demonstration. Hence, man-
made instruments will never enable “the Intelligent Soul to have a clear 
Prospect into the World of Spirits, and converse with Visions, Guardian-
Angels, [and] Spirits.”31 Even if the mind/soul is quasi-material, it will 
never be subject to the virtuoso’s air pump.
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As I show below, the notion that the mind/soul might actually 
resemble an airy, rarefied substance is crucial not only to Defoe’s cos-
mology, but also to his generic choices. It is, after all, the mind’s “vigor-
ous” or “hot-headed” tendencies that enable one of Defoe’s favourite 
narrative forms: the visio or dream-vision, in which the narrator’s 
mind ecstatically “travels” or “soars.” Defoe’s narrators often describe 
visions in terms of gasses, vapours, and particulate matter. In describ-
ing his Vision of the Angelick World, Crusoe borrows one of the most 
iconic images in Defoe’s The Storm: “When the soul is more than ordi-
narily agitated … I can liken it to nothing so well as the Wheels of a 
Wind-mill … which if the Wind blow a Storm, run round so fast they 
will set all on Fire.”32 Yet again, cogitation and agitation are one and the 
same, and thus Crusoe can best represent the motions of his mind/soul 
by forming analogies with the movements of pneumatic substances. 
Similarly, in Defoe’s Continuation of Letters Written by a Turkish Spy at 
Paris (1718), Mahmut describes an ecstatic vision-state as “a Ferment” 
that thrusts “the Soul … forcibly out of the Body … as dilated Air bursts 
even the fiercest Mountains, on the fortuitous Meeting of the sulphu-
rous and nitrous Particles in which it is imprisoned.”33 Mahmut admits, 
however, that although the analogy holds when one considers “dilated 
Air” and diaphanous “Particles,” it ceases to function when the quasi-
material is replaced with a vehicle that resembles gross matter. Hence, 
if we imagine the soul as a physical mass, the distance it must travel “is 
so great, that a Velocity of Motion, swift as a Ball from a Cannon, could 
not perform the Labour in a Million of Ages.”34 Crusoe and Mahmut 
agree that, rather than attempt to understand the mind/soul as a body 
that moves through what Isaac Newton called the “aetherial medium” 
or “ambient medium,” it is more apt to envision the mind/soul as the 
in-between medium itself. This corresponds in interesting ways to 
Kevis Goodman’s work on changing seventeenth-century conceptual-
izations of mediums and media. Goodman shows that whereas in the 
older, Aristotelian tradition, “the human faculty … [is] stimulated by 
the in-between” or “conducting bodies” of the intervening medium, 
for Bacon the new, man-made “Organe” of writing “is the in-between” 
medium.35 In one sense, we can view this as a shift from an understand-
ing of a medium as something that impacts upon or happens to human 
beings, to an understanding of a medium as something that humans 
send out into the world. Defoe’s works, as I show below, certainly fol-
low this shift to a conceptualization of the print medium as a human 
faculty that moves out beyond and in between individual minds. For 
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Crusoe and Mahmut, it is both the mind/soul in its vision-state and 
the writings produced as a result of such visions that become “the in-
between” that is “both an activity and a substance.”36
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that pictorial representations of Defoe’s 
vision-narratives tend to depict various mediums: ether, vortices, celes-
tial fluids, angelic spirits. Printed illustrations of Crusoe’s visions bear a 
striking resemblance to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century diagrams 
of the atmosphere, which often employed concentric rings to make dif-
ferent kinds of “vapourous matter” visible (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).37 
Figure 5.1 depicts a series of nesting circles filled with an engraved stip-
pling effect, which indicates a celestial fluid or ether rather than a void. 
This substance fills the space between the orbits of the seven known 
planets, each identified by their astrological symbol. The 1722 engrav-
ing also depicts Jupiter’s four “Galilean moons” and the more recently 
discovered fourth and fifth moons of Saturn.38 This level of accuracy 
urges the reader to associate this illustration with the familiar form 
of the natural philosophical diagram, which in turn lends credibility 
to Defoe’s cosmology. Similarly, in Figure 5.2, the unnamed engraver 
uses concentric bands to illustrate the changing density of the air, with 
cumulonimbus clouds hugging the Earth in “son athmosphere” [sic] to 
the gradually expanding particles in “son tourbillon d’air” (the ether 
or upper atmosphere), and finally to the outermost “matiere celeste de 
notre grand tourbillon,” Cartesian or Leibnizian vortices, an extended 
and quasi-material body of perpetually moving celestial fluid that car-
ries the planets in their orbits.39 The illustrations of Crusoe’s visions 
conform to readers’ expectations that such diagrams represented what 
could not be seen with the naked eye or even through a telescope.
Both engravings also make visible Defoe’s insistence that the mind/
soul and empyrean substance moved in analogous ways. Eighteenth-
century discourse on spiritual communication was one crucial area of 
overlap between the old pneumatology of angels and the soul and a 
renewed late seventeenth-century focus on the quasi-material proper-
ties of the mind.42 As John Durham Peters explains, “If floor space is 
in fact scarce” when angels dance on the head of a pin, then “clearly 
angelic bodies occupy space, however infinitesimal” and hence, “things 
intellectual do indeed have a corporeal correlate – thoughts might have 
weight and extension.”43 This notion that the mind/soul might take up 
space raises crucial questions about its motions, because a substance 
with extension also requires time to move though that space, and could 
potentially be hindered in its motions by contact with other substances.44 
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Figure 5.1. Vision du Monde Angélique, 1721, printed engraving, 16 cm. Image 
courtesy of the Rare Books Collection, Raynor Memorial Libraries, Marquette 
University. From: Reflexions Serieuses et Importantes de Robinson Crusoe … avec 
Sa Vision Du Monde Angelique. Amsterdam: L’Honore et Chatelain, 1721. 
Frontispiece to Volume 3.40
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 Figure 5.2.  Vision du Monde Angélique,  1761, printed engraving, 30 cm. Image 
courtesy of the Lyon Public Library. From: “Vision du Monde Angélique” in 
La vie et les Aventures Surprenantes de Robinson Crusoe , Vol. 3 .  Paris: Cailleau 
Dufour Cuissart, 1761. Frontispiece to Part 5. 41 
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How, then, did souls or thoughts travel? Was physical proximity or 
immediate contact necessary for a mind/soul to “converse” with angels, 
apparitions, or other embodied minds? In his History and Reality of Appa-
ritions (1727), Defoe’s narrator relies on intermediary spirits to explain 
direct communication between the heavens and humans.45 He insists 
that only an arrogant fool would presume that the Prime Mover or even 
the Devil himself might stoop to whisper warnings to the individual 
minds of mere mortals. Instead, we must assume that there is a “middle 
Class of Spirit” that has “the Power of conversing among us … and 
can by Dreams, Impulses, and strong Aversions, move our Thoughts.”46 
To explain how a human mind comes to be moved by a spiritous 
being, Defoe’s narrator must place them both (the mind and spirits) 
on a continuum of corporeal and incorporeal substances. These go-
between beings are neither “Angelick-heavenly [n]or Anglick-Infernal” 
but rather bodies without body that inhabit the “Abyss of Space” in 
countless numbers.47
Hence, the illustration in Figure 5.1 depicts a region that is neither an 
“abyss” nor empty “space.” Instead, the solar system is densely popu-
lated with winged, shadowy spirits. The image of Crusoe’s body is a 
placeholder for his “agitated” soul; he, too, in this context of this vision, 
is a body without body. Like Mahmut’s letters, this engraving prompts 
the reader to understand a vision as an instance of the soul thrust “forc-
ibly out of the body” as if it were in More’s aerial “vehicle.” It is also 
important to note the significance of linear perspective in the image. 
Crusoe’s soul-body appears as the largest object in space, presumably 
because he is closest – as a first-person narrator – to the reader’s imag-
ined point of view. The Earth, as Crusoe’s point of departure, is the 
next-largest body in the solar system. The “middle-class” spirits are, 
in many instances, larger on the page than the planets, and must be 
read as closer to the reader’s field of vision. Hence, the perspective of 
the illustration suggests that souls and angels both have extension and 
move, albeit very swiftly, within the bounds of time and space.
In Figure 5.2, Crusoe’s body is surrounded by a field of diaphanous 
spheres that seem to cling to his outstretched arms and legs, almost 
as if he were enveloped by his own personal atmosphere: a spiritual 
spacesuit. But of course, Crusoe’s narrative does not imply that his 
body is actually swimming through a sea of celestial fluids, rather that 
his “Intelligent Soul is made to converse with its own Species, whether 
embody’d or not.”48 Hence, because the illustration has already estab-
lished itself as a representation of substances that cannot be seen by 
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human eyes (vortices, orbital paths, mediating spirits, souls), we might 
read the atmosphere that surrounds Crusoe’s body as something 
akin to a thought-bubble or thought-balloon, that graphic external-
izer of cogitation found in graphic novels and cartoons.49 The reader 
sees Crusoe’s internal thoughts – what he envisions in his mind’s eye 
during his vision – as beads or particles of an extended substance. For 
Defoe, the genre of the vision narrative requires that thoughts take up 
space. That visions necessitate states of in-between-ness – between 
mind and body, spirit and substance, heaven and earth – also reflects 
Defoe’s theories about a reader’s ideal state of mind. In the preface to 
Apparitions, Defoe’s narrator warns his reader that to comprehend the 
world of spirits, one’s mind must assume “a right Temper between th[e] 
Extreams” of “Imagination and solid Foundation.”50 The reader must 
accustom herself to dwelling in the uncertain realm between fiction and 
fact, metaphysics and physics, pneumatology and pneumatics. This 
“in-between” state of mind is a necessary precondition for contemplat-
ing both the “in-between” genre in which he is writing – the apparition 
narrative – and the “in-between,” quasi-material nature of the “invis-
ible world” itself, which he describes as existing “between Some-where 
and No-where … none of us know where, and yet we are sure must have 
Locality … very near us.”51
Defoe’s quasi-material models of spiritual communication, whether 
satirical, in The Consolidator, or sincere, in Crusoe’s Vision or Mahmut’s 
Letters, demonstrate two of the definitions of communication in John-
son’s Dictionary (1755): first, as a “conversation” or “interchange of 
knowledge,” and second, as a “passage or means … from one place … 
to another” that enables physical motion through space.52 In light of 
this double meaning of communication – both as an interchange of 
knowledge and as the movement of things or people – Defoe’s account 
of moving, vaporous visions resembles nothing so much as printed 
texts, objects that have both a circulating, physical component (words 
on paper) and an imaginative one (what the reader sees in her mind’s 
eye).53 Indeed, Defoe playfully suggests that The Consolidator is both a 
text and a vision. The Baconian feathers function as an allegory for a 
Parliamentarian critique of the Crown (the lunar analogue of Charles I 
is said to have “guided the [Consolidator] with so unsteddy a Hand … 
that the Feathers could not move”) and also stand in for the unreli-
able narrator’s own “unsteddy” and potentially “dangerous” flights 
of fancy.54 It is a figurative device that makes a critique (as a symbol 
for dysfunctional government) and, at the same time, pre-emptively 
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defuses that critique (because, in doing double-duty as a symbol for the 
iatromechanical mind, it draws attention to the fact that this feathered 
spaceship could be nothing more than a delusion caused by the narra-
tor’s own overheated animal spirits). Defoe wrote The Consolidator just 
months after the fallout from the publication of The Shortest Way with the 
Dissenters (1702) landed him in prison. It is not surprising, then, that he 
chose to deliver much of The Consolidator’s political critique from behind 
the mask of a contradictory narrator who is at best “hot-headed” and at 
worst stark raving mad. Defoe’s narrator admits that it is “no uncommon 
thing for [a] Person to be intirely [sic] deceived by himself, not knowing 
the brat of his own Begetting, nor be able to distinguish between Reality 
and Representation.”55 Hence, the subject and object of the narrator’s 
vision is the mind/soul reflexively trying to glimpse its own operations. 
Here, the joke is on the reader: Defoe’s text and the feathered spaceship 
share the same name; both the piece of writing and the gaseous engine 
have the power to drive one, as it were, out of one’s mind.
II. Mind as Apparition
For Defoe, the mind/soul – especially a reader’s mind, which has the 
ability to jump between perspectives and to assume various points of 
view – is a thing that moves. One of the most widely reprinted vignettes 
from Defoe’s Apparitions speaks to the unique ability of print to repre-
sent the mind/soul as a medium that might extend out into the external 
world. The story centres on “a certain Man who was brought to the 
Bar of Justice on Suspicion of Murder” and who is subsequently over-
come by the “agitations” of his guilty conscience.56 Defoe’s narrator 
describes the murderer’s actions as he imagines that he sees his dead 
victim enter the courtroom:
the Man … gave a Start at the Bar, as if he was frighted; but recovering his 
Courage a little, he stretches out his Arm towards the Place where the Wit-
nesses usually stood to give Evidence upon Tryals, and pointing with his 
Hand, My Lord, says he, (aloud) that is not fair, ’tis not according to Law, 
he’s not a legal Witness. The Court is surpris’d, and could not understand 
what the Man meant; but the Judge, a Man of more Penetration, took the 
Hint, and checking some of the Court that offer’d to speak, and which 
would have perhaps brought the Man back again to himself; Hold, says 
the Judge, the Man sees something more than we do, I begin to under-
stand him.57
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The narrator switches back and forth between tenses, using the pres-
ent tense for most actions and speech (“stretches,” “pointing,” “says”) 
and the past tense for mental processes (“could not understand,” “took 
the hint,” “brought … back again to himself”). This emphasizes the 
difference between those activities that are observable and those that 
must be inferred from external signs. Hence, from the outset of the tale, 
the narrator grants the reader a privileged but limited view on events. 
The sequence in which the narrator divulges tantalizing details to the 
reader is also typical of Defoe’s Apparitions. Although the narrator pref-
aces this story with a discussion of the “Force” of “Conscience” that 
“makes a Man view things that are not, as if they were” – and hence, 
presumably, the reader can guess the cause of the man’s “frigh[t]” – 
the narrator withholds crucial information to let the events unfold in 
chronological “real-time” as if from a third-person limited perspec-
tive.58 This perspective places the reader in a curious position; she is 
not, like other observers in the courtroom, “surpris’d” and unable 
to “understand what the Man meant,” but is rather, like the Judge, 
granted “more penetration” through “Hint[s].” And yet, the dialogue 
that follows this passage makes clear that the narrative is focalized nei-
ther through the perspective of the judge nor through that of the guilty 
man. Rather, like a theatregoer in a playhouse, the reader “hears” the 
Judge’s “aside” – his furtive “Hold … ” – when the guilty man and 
other courtroom observers do not. The narrator’s use of the passive 
voice (the guilty man “was observed to be in a great Consternation”) 
seems to suggest that most of the people in the courtroom practice an 
unthinking – or at least less actively “penetrat[ing]” – species of obser-
vation. They, unlike the judge and the reader, are unable to determine 
the cause of the man’s apparent distress. Defoe’s text does not allow the 
reader direct or consistent access to the thoughts of either the judge or 
the murderer, but rather urges her to read external signs (gestures and 
words) and to infer the internal, mental causes thereof.
After the judge exhorts the murderer to confess, the narrator inter-
jects and reveals that the man at the bar had seen “the murder’d Person 
standing upon the Step as a Witness … ready to shew his Throat which 
was cut … and who … stood staring full upon him with a frightful 
Countenance.”59 Defoe’s narrator makes clear that “no body saw any 
thing but the Man at the Bar.”60 This last claim is of double significance: 
first, it insists that the observers in the courtroom saw nothing but the 
guilty man standing before them; and second, it suggests that the man 
at the bar was the only person who “saw any thing” of note (emphasis 
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mine). This is because, as the narrator announces in his conclusion to 
the anecdote,
there was no real Apparition, no Spectre, no Ghost or Appearance, it was 
all figur’d out to him by the Power of his own Guilt, and the Agitations 
of his Soul … the Soul of the Murderer is like the Ocean in a tempest, he 
is in continual Motion, restless and raging, and the Guilt of the Fact, like 
the Winds to the Sea, lies on his Mind like a constant Pressure, and … ’tis 
hurry’d about by its own Weight, rolling to and again, Motion increasing 
Motion, 'till it becomes a mere Mass of Horror and Confusion.61
As with the Baconian feather-minds in The Consolidator, Defoe turns to 
a pneumatic analogy to explain mental activity. The narrator does not 
clearly distinguish between “Soul” and “Mind”; both experience “Agi-
tations,” “Motion,” and “Pressure” that approximate the movements 
of liquids or airs with “Weight” and “Mass.” And yet this is another 
example of mental motion without a thing that moves. Jayne Elizabeth 
Lewis has argued that Defoe approaches apparitions as “pure media: 
pneumatic impersonations of the absent that both validate and objec-
tify the very faculties that perceive them.”62 In this anecdote, what the 
guilty man sees – or thinks he sees – is not only an “impersonation of 
the absent,” but also an externalization of the internal.63 The “thing” 
that the man at the bar sees is his own mental agitation, which, like the 
wind itself, is an invisible causal force that only becomes visible in its 
effects. In short, the mind is the Baconian, in-between medium.
  Defoe’s wind-in-the-mind metaphor is complicated by the illustra-
tion that accompanies the story of the man at the bar (see Figure 5.3).64 
The image depicts the accused murderer, with his ankles shackled, 
starting back from a cloud of vapour that seems to envelop the head 
and neck of the victim. But who sees what is pictured in this engrav-
ing? Certainly not the observers in the courtroom, who – even in the 
case of the more “penetrat[ing]” judge – see only the accused man and 
his “Consternation.” Indeed, not even the guilty man himself sees what 
is pictured here. There is no mention in his confession of a cloud of 
vapour – reminiscent of the damning “Flaming-Sword … coming out of 
a Cloud” that H.F. dismisses in A Journal of the Plague Year (1722) – nor 
of a floating, disembodied head.65 On the contrary, the man at the bar 
views the victim as a decidedly flesh-and-blood personage who can 
“stan[d] on the step as a witness” and “shew his throat.” We cannot, 
then, interpret this cloud as a thought bubble. So what, precisely, does 
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this engraving represent? It is important to note that the illustration 
of the man at the bar is the only “cut” in eighteenth-century editions 
of Apparitions that represents a rarefied vapour or airy substance. The 
other five engravings represent spirits “case[d]” in “Flesh and Blood” 
that on the page appear to be no different than their corporeal counter-
parts.66 This is especially significant when we consider that the picture 
of the man at the bar is the only one that portrays an apparition that is, 
as Defoe’s narrator insists, “no real Apparition” at all. The other illus-
trations show actual mediating spirits who exist outside the confines 
of the percipient’s mind. Hence, Defoe and the engraver, J. Van Der 
Gucht, were tasked with differentiating between illustrations that rep-
resented actual spirits, and one that represented the “tempest[uous]” 
“agitations” of a man’s mind/soul.
What the reader sees in this engraving, then, is a reification of the 
narrator’s analogy between a guilty conscience and the “constant pres-
sure” and pneumatic force of the wind “in a tempest.” The cloud of 
vapour in the picture suggests the quasi-material nature of the mind/
soul: those “pressures” that – like the wind – might also have “Weight” 
and “Mass.” Hence, the disembodied head suspended in cloud func-
tions not as a spectre of the murdered victim, but rather as a mirror 
image of the guilty man’s mind/soul and its motions. We see an illus-
tration not of a ghost, but rather of the agitated animal spirits of a 
murderer’s mind made manifest in the world. This of course does not 
happen in the narrative; Defoe’s text does not suggest that there is a 
cloud of spirits billowing out of the murderer’s brain. Rather, this exter-
nalization is a visual approximation of causality: it allows the viewer 
to see, simultaneously, both the visible effects (the man’s “Consterna-
tion”) and the invisible causes thereof (the agitated “tempest” of spir-
its in his brain). Most strikingly, this engraving represents in pictorial 
form what it is like to be a reader of Defoe’s Apparitions. It is a picture 
not of the events in the courtroom, but rather what happens when the 
narrative is mediated through the reader’s mind’s eye. The illustration 
approximates what the reader visualizes as she reads the words on the 
page: here, a third-person perspective on the courtroom; there, a first-
person glance through the murderer’s eyes; and finally, an omniscient 
glimpse of what the guilty man’s mind/soul might look like were its 
agitations projected out into the world. It captures Defoe’s treatment of 
the story as both an immediate experience, complete with dramatic dia-
logue and descriptions of gestures, and a hypermediated one in which 
an intrusive narrator not only draws attention to the fictionalized status 
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Figure 5.3. J. Van Der Gucht, The Man at the Bar, 1727, printed engraving, 21 
cm. Image courtesy of the Boston Public Library. From: Defoe, An Essay on the 
History and Reality of Apparitions. London: J. Roberts, 1727.67
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of his story (“I have heard a story which I believe to be true”) but also 
insists on its veracity as a particular example of a general truth (“Con-
science … shows us many an Apparition that no other Eyes can see”).68
Defoe’s man at the bar is an example of what Bolter and Grusin call 
the “double logic of immediacy and hypermediacy”: when a medium 
promises us a “more immediate or authentic experience,” it inevitably 
also leads us to become aware of that medium as a medium.69 An audi-
ence thus experiences, simultaneously, a “transparent presentation of 
the real and … the opacity of media themselves.”70 This double logic is 
pertinent not only in the context of remediation and new digital media, 
but also, in past centuries, to an illustrated book’s “integration of text 
and image.”71 Hence, the engraving of the man at the bar both presents 
the reader with a window onto the real events in the courtroom and 
reminds that reader that this exhibition is, in fact, not real, but rather a 
printed representation. On the one hand, if we read the disembodied 
head as the victim as seen by the murderer, the illustration shows us 
the “real Apparition” that the guilty man believes that he sees before 
him (immediacy). On the other hand, if we read the disembodied head 
as a representation of the guilty man’s mental “Agitations,” the vapor-
ous cloud reminds us that the man only imagines that he sees the vic-
tim, and in fact sees a mental representation thereof (hypermediacy). 
This double logic also extends to the reader’s experience. The engrav-
ing gives the reader a sense of immediacy (in that we can glimpse the 
man’s invisible thoughts) and yet also reminds us that we are viewing 
a representation (an engraving) of another representation (the narra-
tor’s written account) of yet another representation (the oral story that 
the narrator “heard”) of what is, finally, a mental representation (the 
apparition that exists only in the guilty man’s mind’s eye). Bolter and 
Grusin explain that hypermediacy “acknowledges multiple acts of rep-
resentation and makes them visible” “particularly when the illusion of 
realistic representation is somehow stretched or altogether ruptured.”72 
Here, one such “rupture” occurs when – although the narrator insists 
that the apparition exists only in the murderer’s thoughts – the illus-
tration suggests quite the contrary: that the agitations of the guilty 
man’s mind are not, in fact, limited to the confines of his brain, but 
have a causal force that extends not only out into the courtroom, but 
also to the minds of readers in distant locales. The hypermediacy of the 
printed page allows Defoe to explore the ways in which mind/souls – 
especially when engaged in the practices of imagining or reading – are 
mobile substances. Print can both represent the fact that mind/souls act 
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as mediums outside the confines of the skull and also cause the mind/
soul to move.
This model of the mind/soul as a moving body without body recalls 
Bacon’s theories about spiritual communication in Sylva Sylvarum 
(1627), what he calls the “operation of the spirits of the mind of man 
upon other spirits.”73 Bacon insists that imagination is the most mobile 
faculty in this regard, because it “hath most force upon things that have 
the lightest and easiest motions. And therefore above all, upon the 
spirits of men.”74 Here, the dynamics of spiritual communication obey 
physical laws. Joseph Glanvill’s Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661) – one of 
Defoe’s many sources of inspiration for Apparitions – followed Bacon’s 
lead with its famous anecdote of the Scholar-Gypsy, who is able to 
both penetrate and move his friends’ minds with the power of thought 
alone: “what he did was by the power of Imagination, his Phancy bind-
ing theirs; and that himself had dictated to them the discourse they 
held together” while he was physically removed in another room.75 
Glanvill explains that the movement of thoughts is analogous to those 
of physical bodies:
I see not why the phancy of one man may not determine the cogitation 
of another rightly qualified, as easily as his bodily motion. This influence 
seems to be no more unreasonable, then that of one string of a Lute upon 
another; when a stroak on it causeth a proportionable motion in the sym-
pathizing consort, which is distant from it and not sensibly touched … so 
then, the agitated parts of Brain begetting a motion in the proxime Aether; 
it is propagated through the liquid medium, as we see the motion is which 
is caus’d by a stone thrown into the water … And thus the motion being 
convey’d from the Brain of one man to the Phancy of another, it is there 
receiv’d from the instrument of conveyance, the subtil matter … 76
The “agitat[ion]” of the “Brain” “beget[s] a motion in the … Aether,” 
which transmits this motion to the “distant” and yet “sympathizing” 
“Phancy of another.” Here, unlike More and his airy vehicle, Glan-
vill’s chain of causality seems to take for granted that the mind/soul 
might immediately act upon and move a quasi-material “medium” 
or “subtil matter.” While Defoe very clearly laid out his argument for 
how angels might move the minds of men, his writings are equivo-
cal on the subject of how minds might move other minds. Rather than 
weigh in definitively on the existence of an airy vehicle or vibrating 
ether, Defoe’s Apparitions suggests that the most effective medium for 
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the transmission of the agitations of the mind/soul is print. Specifically, 
one requires a particular combination of representations – an illustra-
tion that depicts invisible substance and a narrative that is both lim-
ited and partially omniscient – if one hopes to “causeth,” in Glanvill’s 
words, “a proportionable motion” in the “Phancy” of the reader.
III. Mind as Emblem
I have been arguing that there is a connection between Defoe’s ten-
dency to depict the mind/soul as an airy substance and his interest in 
what we in the twenty-first century might call the hypermediacy of the 
printed page. I want now to return to The Consolidator to examine how 
Defoe’s treatment of the mind/soul as a moving substance not only 
tests the efficacy of different methods of representation but also func-
tions as a critique of the movement towards “plainness” in philosophi-
cal writing in the late seventeenth century.77 As I show below, Defoe 
challenges the argument put forth by Thomas Sprat, Robert Hooke, and 
others that plain, non-metaphorical language was the best way to rep-
resent reality. If we take for granted that the mind/soul is like an airy 
substance that – with the aid of printed text and illustrations – moves 
outward, what we see with our eyes is not reality, but rather a projec-
tion of our mind out in the world. This is not to suggest that Defoe is 
embracing a form of Berkeleian idealism in which external objects are 
entirely mind-dependent. Rather, his satire points to how any writer 
hoping to represent the nature of human sensory experience needs alle-
gories and emblems, which can capture the ways in which the agitated 
mind/soul tends to see or jump between multiple things at once.
The Consolidator is another of Defoe’s texts that imagines ways in 
which the mind/soul is not only moved by sensory stimuli, but also 
moves out into and even acts upon the external realm. The narrator 
finds fantastical optical instruments in the lunar realm, including “a 
strange sort of Glass that did not so much bring to the Eye, as by I know 
not what wonderful Operation carried out the Eye to the Object.”78 It is 
not, however, the viewer’s physical eye that travels outward, but rather 
his mind’s eye. These glasses allow Defoe’s narrator to view, externally 
and out in the world, the mental images that, ordinarily, only his imagi-
nation would “see” in the act of reading. What is most germane to my 
discussion here is how the glasses show “allegorical” and “Emblematic 
Representation[s] of the Soul,” in which “the Analogy is remarkable, 
even in the very Simily; for … they represent … the Soul … as a Great 
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Eye, embracing the Man, enveloping, operating, and informing every 
Part.”79 Although one might argue that this symbolism serves primar-
ily to mock the universal language schemes of Restoration writers like 
Bishop Wilkins or John Webster (whose tongue-tripping “Hieroglyphi-
cal, Emblematical, Symbolical” Defoe’s narrator here parrots), Defoe’s 
optical emblems also function as a serious exploration of the advan-
tages of allegory over modern empirical methods. These glasses do the 
work of Defoe’s satire as a whole; when the narrator peers through 
them, he sees not bare reality, but rather a figurative version of real-
ity that is more real than that available to the senses.80 This is because, 
whenever we look at the world, whether through instruments or with 
our naked eye, what we see is in large part an image or projection of 
the agitation of our mind/soul. For Defoe, allegorical or emblematical 
representations – which often present a concrete image that prompts 
the reader’s mind to move onward or outward to other, more abstract 
ideas – can, unlike other forms grounded in empirical description, begin 
to explain the nature of “body without body” and airy substance. Hence, 
when the narrator of The Consolidator looks at a politician through the 
glasses, he sees “a great Eye with Six or Seven pair of Spectacles on … 
[as] they happen to have occasion … to … understand so many contrary 
ways upon one and the same thing.”81 Here, a static emblem of an eye 
wearing “Six or Seven pair of Spectacles” captures the perpetually mov-
ing nature of the human/mind soul in its tendency towards contradic-
tion and changeability.
It is no coincidence that the lunar glasses’ emblematical representa-
tion of the mind/soul is also wearing glasses. Unlike Hooke’s Micro-
graphia (1665), which claimed that optical instrumentation would help 
humankind avoid mistaking “similitudes for definitions” and see 
instead “the true nature of the things themselves,” Defoe’s satire sug-
gests that a more accurate optical instrument would reflexively illus-
trate the contradictory and “contrary” motions of the human mind and 
its perceptions.82 Here, Defoe’s narrator joins the Bear-Men of Margaret 
Cavendish’s Blazing-World (1666), who insist that although their tele-
scopes are indeed “false Informers,” they “take more delight in Arti-
ficial delusions, than in Natural truths.”83 Mistaking what Hooke calls 
“similitudes” for “the things themselves” is the most pleasurable – and 
indeed, most human – way of seeing the world. What Defoe’s lunar 
glasses show the narrator is, primarily, a reflection of his own mind/
soul – with all its “unsteddy” and yet pleasing “agitations” – projected 
outward into his field of vision.
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We can also read the lunar glasses as a defence of allegory in the wake 
of late seventeenth-century attacks on figurative language. Sprat’s His-
tory of the Royal Society (1667) had famously set the “discourse” of the 
New Science above other kinds of writing by claiming that it avoided 
“specious tropes and figures.”84 The “trick of metaphors,” although for-
merly used to clarify abstractions in that it “represent[ed] truth, clothed 
with bodies,” has in modern times, according to Sprat, become a 
“vicious abundance” that “give[s] the mind a motion too changeable.”85 
To counteract the mind/soul’s tendency towards erratic movement, 
Sprat prescribed “a return back to the primitive purity … when men 
delivered so many things, almost in an equal number of words.”86 Such 
a “shortness” and plainness that demands proportionality between 
verba and res naturally precludes the “seeming Mysteries” of allegory, 
where one says a great number of things but means quite another.87 
Allegory’s reputation for changeability and “obscurity” persisted into 
the eighteenth century.88 Johnson’s Dictionary uses as its first example 
of allegory a line from Ben Jonson’s Discoveries (1641) that emphasizes 
the negative connotation of the term: “Neither must we draw out our 
allegory too long, lest either we make ourselves obscure, or fall into 
affectation, which is childish.”89 In The Dyet of Poland (1705), which was 
published in the same year as The Consolidator, Defoe defends the use of 
extended allegorical narrative: “But suppose there are not places call’d 
directly by those Names; if there are places apply’d to the same uses, 
what has any Body to question the Allegories? A poor Author must 
never Write at all, if he is not at Liberty to chuse his Metaphors, and all 
the rest of the necessary Figures of Speech to help out his Expression.”90 
Defoe’s lunar glasses emphasize that although all representation is 
imperfect, one needs these “Figures” – emblems, similes, allegories – to 
understand the nature of in-between substances that are neither wholly 
material nor purely spiritual. More specifically, if one wants to repre-
sent the perpetual motions of the human mind/soul, one can only do 
so by acknowledging that all acts of perception, whether sensory or 
imaginary, are in some sense a reflexive act of seeing our own agitated 
minds projected outward.
Thompson and Meeker have argued that “the problem of substance 
is … one that must be posed in literary, figural, or formal terms because 
substance can only be apprehended as figure.”91 We can apply this 
notion – that airy substances can only be represented through metaphor-
ical language – to The Consolidator’s multiple representational strategies 
for seeing the mind/soul in motion. In this regard, The Consolidator’s 
naive narrator serves as a cautionary figure. He forgets that although 
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allegory is an effective mode for exploring “Immaterial Substance,” 
it does not function in the same way as literal representation. Hence, 
most of the narrator’s “emblematical” depictions do not fulfill their 
promise. Rather than teaching the viewer the vital secrets of matter and 
motion, analogies (e.g., “the memory is like a bee-hive”), when taken 
too literally, tend merely to convert immaterial substances into mate-
rial things. The Lunarians’ most prized artefacts include “anatomical 
dissections of Thought,” including “a Fancy preserv’d a la Mummy,” a 
calcified sample of poetic inspiration, and the “Part of the Head” con-
taining the “Memory” “turn’d in-side outward” to reveal a “Glass Bee-
Hive” full of forgotten thoughts.92 Here, the dynamic faculties of the 
mind have become mere matter. Defoe echoes Locke’s admonition that 
the phrase, “Faculties of the mind,” might “breed … confusion in Mens 
Thoughts, by being supposed … to stand for some real Beings in the 
Soul.”93 The lunar concretions of fancy, poetic inspiration, and memory 
satirize those writers who would take a material model of the mind too 
far. Those vibrancies of the human mind/soul become nothing but life-
less husks: mummified flesh, calcium salts, and an abandoned apiary. 
Hence, the “consolidation” to which the eponymous engine refers is 
not only the fraught, political “combination into … one body” required 
of the House of Commons, but also that petrifaction implied by its Latin 
roots: con + solida-re: “to make firm or solid, to form into a … solid mass, 
to solidify.”94 Strict analogies between immaterial thought and material 
things fail in part because the human mind would seem to possess, 
as a necessary condition, the inability to turn the glasses inward and 
observe the causes of its own motions. The mental faculties, in their 
very potencies and capacities, rely in some unfathomable way on their 
being unfathomable to the mind/soul itself.
Defoe’s lunar glasses underscore the immediacy of the experience of 
reading: that instant when the reader stops seeing the black marks on a 
white page and instead looks through the page, as it were, at a series of 
mental images in her mind’s eye. And yet, the forms of representation 
produced by the glasses – allegory, emblem, analogy, and simile – all 
emphasize, like the engraving of the man at the bar in Apparitions, that 
immediacy paradoxically entails hypermediacy. This is especially true 
when the lunar traveller uses the glasses to flirt with blasphemy and 
to skirt the boundary between human discovery and divine revelation. 
At these doubtful moments, the lunar glasses stop showing allegories 
and emblems – with their proliferation of moving images and abstract 
ideas – and start reproducing printed letters. When Defoe’s narrator, 
much to the horror of his lunar hosts, attempts to look through the 
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glasses to foresee his own death, he sees two lines of verse hovering 
“as it were on the edge of the Horizon”: “The Verge of Life and Death is 
here. / ‘Tis best to know where ’tis, but not how far.”95 Notably, Defoe’s nar-
rator insists that he “plainly saw … these Words” and did not hear 
them, as one might expect in a vision narrative, in the spoken form of 
an angelic voice. When he turns the “Glasses Up … towards the Zenith” 
in order to “pr[y] into the Mysteries of the Great Eye of the World” he 
sees “these Words in the Air, REVELATION, in large Capital Letters.”96 
Here, the emphasis on “these Words … in large Capital Letters” sug-
gests that the narrator sees not handwriting, but rather printed char-
acters [emphasis mine]. At the outer edges of human understanding, 
print, with its reproducibility and predictable sameness, can both halt 
the infinite regress of abstraction and remind us that such regress is, 
indeed, infinite. The act of looking, when mediated through an instru-
ment such as these “second-sight glasses,” produces neither ordinary 
sense data nor airy visions, but rather the printed word, which requires 
the reader to do the work of interpretation. As with the illustration of 
the man at the bar, Defoe calls attention to the hypermediated nature of 
experience. Rather than observing an emblem that represents abstrac-
tions such as Life, Death, or Revelation, the narrator sees printed words 
that denote these concepts. One cannot escape that what seems like a 
representation of reality is in fact a representation of a representation. 
Defoe urges his readers to laugh at his lunar traveller who, in a cari-
cature of Sprat’s directive, conflates verba and res. The narrator claims 
that the lunar glasses grant him the power “to know the separate mean-
ing of Body, Soul, Spirit, Life, Motion … ”97 Of course, knowing the “sepa-
rate meaning” of terms is not the same as understanding how body 
and soul coexist, or how spirit is imbued with motion. Sprat’s “purity” 
and “shortness” of language ultimately fail where more elaborate 
metaphors – whether allegorical hot-headed feathers or similes that 
liken the mind/soul’s agitations to stormy seas – succeed in demon-
strating the reflexive and hypermediated nature of perception.
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—Let it run, therefore; for it will run—
(Letter 37: Miss Howe to Miss Clarissa Harlowe, 173)
At 1,500 pages, Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, still the longest novel 
written in English, does nothing if not persist. His novel’s persistence is 
a subject that, notoriously, caused Richardson anxiety. Ever “diffident 
in relation to this article of length,” Richardson, in the final paragraph 
of the novel’s postscript, defends himself on this count, insisting that 
“length ... must add proportionably to the pleasure that every person 
of taste receives from a well-drawn picture of nature.”1 The novel’s tex-
tual history – multiple revisions, four editions in Richardson’s lifetime, 
companion texts to supplement prior versions, and yet another rewrite 
in the works upon the author’s death – underscores its extraordinary 
tendency to perpetuate itself.2 Through Richardson’s ongoing editorial 
exploits, curtailed only by death, the formidable life of Clarissa endures.
The plot of Clarissa hinges on problems of persistence – problems 
that enable and stretch the novel’s extended length. In brief, Clarissa’s 
family persists in their insistence upon her marriage to Solmes; Solmes 
persists in his suit for her affections; Clarissa persists in her opposition 
to both; Lovelace persists in his attempt at Clarissa’s seduction; Clar-
issa persists in her resistance to it. True, a rape intervenes, yet it barely 
interrupts the pattern. Although Lovelace claims at this juncture that he 
“can go no further” (883), his persistence returns apace: “Have I gone so 
far, and am I afraid to go farther?” he asks Belford (943). Clarissa’s resis-
tance likewise persists: consider Lovelace’s suggestively cryptic com-
ment after the rape that she “lives” (883). Clarissa’s “living” post-rape 
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develops into a persistent waiting for death (almost 500 pages of it), yet 
the point to understand here is, we might say, that persistence persists.3
Richardson also peppers his novel with the term “persistence” and its 
close associate, “perseverance.” On the subject of her family’s dogged 
determination to push Solmes as a lover, Clarissa remarks on “Such a 
strange perseverance in a measure so unreasonable!” (206). Adding that 
“if they will still persevere; if that strange persister against an antipathy 
so strongly avowed, will still persist, say, what can I do?” (231). Her 
solution is to “take example by their perseverance! – Indeed I will!” 
(191). Solmes declares repeatedly that he is “determined to persevere” 
(266). “I must persist,” he avows, “and happy shall I be, if by patience 
and perseverance, ... I may at last overcome the difficulty laid in my 
way ... Pardon me, dear miss, but I must persevere” (160). Lovelace, 
needless to say, is the novel’s persister par excellence. As Anna Howe 
tells Clarissa early on, “in anything he sets his heart upon, or under-
takes, he is the most industrious and persevering mortal under the sun. 
He rests, it seems, not above six hours in the 24” (74). Lovelace fre-
quently brags about his skills in persistence. He self-describes as “an 
intrepid persevering enterpriser” (428), telling Belford that “Impor-
tunity and opportunity no woman is proof against, especially from a 
persevering lover, who knows how to suit temptations to inclination” 
(426). When his efforts to seduce Clarissa become so protracted that they 
arouse skeptical ribbing from the women in Sinclair’s brothel, Lovelace 
returns, “Why then should I be reflected upon ... for my patience and 
perseverance in the most noble of all chases?” (558). “What but dif-
ficulty,” he explains to Belford, “engages me to so much perseverance 
here?” (810). All this persistence, needless to say, consumes many 
pages, deferring resolution and suspending closure. Surely Richardson 
smiles at his readers when, 1,400 pages in, upon Clarissa’s long antici-
pated death, Anna Howe bewails, “And is this all! – is it all of my Cla-
rissa’s story! ... This cannot, surely, be all of my Clarissa’s story!” (1402, 
1403). Richardson would appear to have inaugurated the new novel 
form with the insight memorably articulated by Henry James a century 
later: “really, universally, relations stop nowhere.”4
In this essay, I will ponder the manifold ways in which the prob-
lem of persistence informs Clarissa. In particular, I will examine how 
the novel’s fascination with persistence tracks back to early modern 
materialist philosophy, especially the revival of Epicurean materialism 
and its legacy in Hobbes.5 We’re not inclined to consider Richardson, 
humbly educated and of the eighteenth-century commercial class, to 
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be a philosophical writer and thinker, but I will put this assumption to 
the test.6 While readers have long noted that Lovelace is a materialist 
who takes his cue from Hobbes, critics have ignored the larger implica-
tions of Richardson’s evident familiarity with materialist thinking and 
its significance for the “close, hot, day-dreamy continuity” of his novel 
more generally.7
In his essay, “‘Alien Spirits’: The Unity of Lovelace and Clarissa,” 
John Allen Stevenson points us in a useful direction, proposing that 
we have been too quick to assume that Lovelace and Clarissa represent 
opposite attitudes towards the world, nature, the body, and sex. Claris-
sa’s early readers, he suggests, were thus doing more than just voicing 
a sentimental whim when they “begged Richardson to end his novel 
happily.”8 Readers’ desire for the main protagonists’ ultimate union, 
on this view, reflected their uncomfortable awareness of Lovelace and 
Clarissa’s “shared subversiveness,” particularly their “strange” refusal 
to affirm marriage, a refusal that undermines the Christian ethics that 
Richardson claimed to defend.9 Yet while Stevenson roots the novel’s 
transgression in what he sees to be Lovelace’s and Clarissa’s Gnostic 
repudiation of matter and the flesh, I will argue that our intuition of 
Lovelace’s and Clarissa’s radical strangeness in fact reflects Richard-
son’s deep, if troubled, exploration of materialist theories of life and the 
inclinations that move us.
With Clarissa as my example, I will suggest that the development of 
narrative form in the early novel was driven by the insight, as Hobbes 
puts it, that “Life it selfe is but Motion,” a view that calls for the capa-
cious formal register characteristic of the novel for its fullest expres-
sion.10 Although it is true that Hobbes’s wisdom made its mark in poetic 
forms as well as in drama, I contend that the novel becomes the form 
of choice for contemporaries seeking to explore imaginatively the ways 
that life moves and develops dynamically through time and space. (It 
was Hobbes himself, incidentally, who suggested in his Answer to Dav-
enant that “the ways and motions” of narrative “are so uncertain and 
undistinguished, like the way and motion of a ship in the sea.”)11 In his 
essay “Why the Novel Matters,” D.H. Lawrence described the novel as 
“the one bright book of life.” We learn from the novel, he argues, because 
in it, “the characters can do nothing but live.”12 Himself inspired by 
Lawrence as well as by such naturalist philosophers as Nietzsche and 
Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze argues similarly in his literary criticism for the 
novel’s deep-seated investment in life’s creativity and variability. I’d 
like to suggest that the novel’s primordial concern with what Lawrence 
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calls “man alive,” an embodied being of “flow and change” that con-
tinues through an ongoing defiance of inertia, was integral to the novel 
form from its earliest expressions in texts like Clarissa.13
The fundamentally open-ended nature of the novel so important 
to Lukács’s and Bakhtin’s foundational theories of the novel lends 
itself to a restless persistence that seeks future possibility. In the 
novel, Lukács argues, our goals and our way to them are no longer 
“directly given.” And as Bakhtin puts it, “The novel took shape pre-
cisely at the point when ... the object of artistic representation was being 
degraded to the level of a contemporary reality that was inconclusive 
and fluid.”14 The implication here may be prosaic, but it’s worth mak-
ing all the same: when our subject is a present-day reality whose mean-
ing is understood to be uncertain from the start, our writing about it 
might struggle to come to an end. In addition to emphasizing the nov-
el’s open-endedness, much of the best work on narrative theory since 
the 1980s has underscored the dynamic quality of narrative, the desires 
and forces that propel narrative forward and that find themselves, in 
Peter Brooks’s words, butting up against “man’s time-boundedness, 
his consciousness of existence within the limits of mortality.” (This idea 
takes up Bakhtin’s assertion that “the novel, from the very beginning, 
developed as a genre that had at its core a new way of conceptualizing 
time.”)15
For Brooks and his student, D.A. Miller, psychoanalysis provides an 
especially productive framework for understanding narrative move-
ment. The key concept for their paradigm is desire, which on their 
view is “always there at the start of a narrative, often in a state of initial 
arousal, often having reached a state of intensity such that movement 
must be created, action undertaken, change begun.” Because desire, on 
Freud’s account, is a perpetual want, “never wholly satisfied or indeed 
satisfiable,” it continues to generate the longing to tell.16 This model 
helps us to grasp how desire comes to drive the logic of narration and 
how narrative desire keeps us striving towards narrative ends. Yet to 
the extent that desire, ever insatiable, cannot achieve rest, even upon 
its arrival at these narrative ends, for Miller “the narratable inherently 
lacks finality.” If truth be told, “it can never be properly brought to term. 
The tendency of a narrative,” Miller provocatively concludes, “would 
therefore be to keep going.”17
I will argue below that a long-standing materialist heritage (from 
Lucretian naturalism to its revival in Hobbes) emphasized the prob-
lem of desire’s persistence long before Freud theorized the drives. 
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Materialism has been a neglected source in our understanding of nar-
rative dynamics. What’s more, although both Brooks and Miller men-
tion the eighteenth-century novel in passing, their examples draw from 
the nineteenth-century narrative tradition as the decisive moment, as 
Brooks puts it, “when one no longer can look to a sacred masterplot 
that organized and explains the world.”18 If, on Brooks’s view, secu-
larization informs the novel’s narrative dynamics, all the more reason 
to begin a study of narrative motion in the literature of the Enlighten-
ment when the new form first imagined an account of human experi-
ence that was not providentially informed.19 My interest here, then, is to 
show that the link between narrative and problems of persistence gives 
rise to the novel at its moment of origin in the eighteenth century. The 
novel’s affinity with materialism is crucial to this story.
Before turning to persistence and to its relationship to materialism 
in Clarissa, I’d like to return to Hobbes’s famous dictum that “Life it 
selfe is but Motion” as an entryway into the larger problem of persis-
tence for materialist philosophy. Part of my interest in this essay will 
be to argue that Hobbes’s philosophy of motion, traditionally seen to 
be unambiguously mechanistic, had a more vital, Lucretian tendency 
than has been appreciated.20 Moving off from Galileo, Hobbes’s mate-
rialism grew out of the fundamental insight from physics that motion, 
once started, will continue indefinitely until or unless an external force 
intervenes to stop it. In the history of philosophy, Hobbes’s physics is 
seen to follow from Descartes’s similar formulation of what he calls the 
laws of motion. Yet, given Hobbes’s rejection of God’s role in the work-
ings of the universe, Lucretius, for whom motion’s persistence played 
a key role in the rejection of Aristotle and his view that all motion seeks 
rest in the centre of the universe, was a far more likely intellectual 
influence. “No rest is given,” Lucretius explains, to the bodies mov-
ing through the void. “Always the business of the universe is going 
on with incessant motion in every part.”21 Life itself, in other words, is 
but motion.
Unlike Descartes but like Lucretius, Hobbes emphasizes the magni-
tude of the break from the scholastic emphasis on rest, allowing that 
while we can understand that a thing at rest will remain in rest unless 
something comes to “stirre it,” the flip side of the proposition, “that 
when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless some-
what els stay it, ... is not so easily assented to.”22 What Hobbes implies 
but does not say is that the principle of persistence is perhaps met with 
resistance because it calls to mind the nagging problem of the origin of 
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motion. Here again, Hobbes departs from Descartes’s and mechanism’s 
emphasis on God’s role in beginning motion, suggesting instead that in 
his search back “from cause to cause,” man “will not be able to proceed 
eternally, but wearied will at last give over,” never quite able to arrive 
at “some first eternal movement.” One senses here Hobbes’s covert reli-
ance on the radically naturalist view from Lucretius that “nature is ... 
free ... of proud masters, herself doing all by herself of her own accord, 
without the help of the gods.”23
Yet what does the physics of motion tell us about the behaviour of 
human beings? “After physics,” Hobbes writes in De Corpore, “we must 
come to moral philosophy; in which we are to consider ... appetite, aversion, 
love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, envy, &c; what causes they 
have, and of what they be causes.”24 Here, too, we find that Hobbes’s 
“moral philosophy,” the study of the motions of the mind, fits uneasily 
within a mechanistic conception of material life. Once again, Hobbes-
ian psychology follows logically from Lucretius’s teachings on the rest-
lessness of matter. For Lucretius, just as bodies can never stand still in 
the void, so too is man’s mind and its search for pleasures ever moving 
and seeking: “one unchanging thirst of life fills us and our mouths are 
for ever agape.” While Epicurean philosophy commits itself to provid-
ing a therapy against this unquenchable and thus often destructive lust 
for life, Hobbes takes a darker view.25 Like it or not, for him our minds’ 
processes are inexorably marked by this appetitive tendency – what 
Hobbes often calls conatus or endeavour. Though purportedly absent in 
nonliving things, these appetites follow the same principles of motion 
as all matter.26 That is so because the appetites in Hobbes’s system are 
themselves instances of motion. It’s just that they begin internally and 
thus invisibly: “although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion 
at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is 
moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hin-
der, but that such Motions are.” Even when we cannot see it, appetitive 
motion is the driving force, the sine qua non in any explanatory para-
digm. The “appetite to go, or move” is definitive of organic life, a view 
that takes Hobbes beyond mere physicalism in its identification of an 
origin of motion that is internal to bodies.27
Once we allow that the appetites are invisible life motions that follow 
the physical rules of motion and its persistence, we begin to understand 
from Hobbes that our appetites are endlessly ongoing, and, strictly 
speaking, insatiable.28 The upshot is that our appetites (as well as our 
aversions, as the case may be) are what help keep us alive; they impel 
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us as we strive, like all things in nature, to persevere.29 When Hobbes 
argues that “Life it selfe is but Motion,” he adds for clarification that 
it “can never be without Desire.”30 And when we consider the whole 
system, we understand why. Desire is constitutive of and co-terminus 
with life. Desire determines our activity.31 Emphasizing man’s tendency 
to crave ad infinitum – when we attain what we think we want, we then 
crave something else – Hobbes is explicit about the fact that desire is 
itself a motion that follows nature’s principle of persistence: “for while 
we live, we have desires,” he writes in Human Nature, “and desire pre-
supposeth a further end ... Seeing all delight is appetite, and presup-
poseth a further end, there can be no contentment but in proceeding.” 
Leviathan argues similarly that “the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy 
once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way 
of his future desire.” The important thing to know about appetite and 
desire, then, is that, like all forms of motion, they have a tendency to 
continue.32
Writing Desire’s Persistence
How do materialism’s teachings on the appetites help us understand 
Clarissa? To put it simply, Clarissa is symptomatically long precisely 
because it buys into Hobbes’s and Lucretius’s linking of life with desire 
and its motive persistence.33 Diderot, himself a vital materialist, sug-
gests as much in his Éloge de Richardson, defending Clarissa against 
accusations of excessive length: “the smallest enterprise” in Richard-
son, Diderot insists, “display[s] [the] passions,” recalling us to the truth 
of “what go[es] on daily right under your eyes that you never see.” 
At the broadest level, as Diderot esteemed, bringing out the passions 
requires the spontaneous activity and persistent present-ness of writing 
itself, which in Richardson’s able hands, “shows me the nature of things 
that surround me.”34 To the extent that life is something that goes on, 
so does writing. As Clarissa tells Anna Howe of her “passion for scrib-
bling,” “I know not how to forebear writing ... And I must write on, 
although I were not to send it to anybody” (483, see also 757). Lovelace 
understands the process as similarly endless: “Write ... I can do; and 
as well without a subject, as with one” (142). “I must write on,” he tells 
Belford, “and cannot help it” (721, also 846).
In his preface, Richardson links the “Length” of Clarissa to the for-
mal conceit in novels of letters that he termed writing “to the moment” 
(721, see also 882, 1178). Richardson’s signature technique, in which 
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“the hearts of the writers must be supposed to be wholly engaged in 
their subjects” (35), strives above all to close the gap between writing 
and life. And as the bulk of Clarissa bears testament, such a mandate 
requires infinite textual generativity, productivity, and proliferation, an 
attempt that, as Terry Eagleton observes, leads paradoxically to a break 
from representational realism: how could any group of people actu-
ally write this many letters?35 For Richardson, however, what might 
be called the hyperrealism of writing-to-the-moment gives the reader 
something more important than strict plausibility: its deepest ambition 
is to offer up the epistolary novel as nothing less than the continuous 
pulse of life in its processes of embodied unfolding, for writing-to-the-
moment necessarily assumes writing to the live moment. That is the 
point.36
In the epistolary world of Clarissa, for better and for worse, the 
boundlessness of writing makes it a libertine activity, one that neces-
sarily frustrates the established moral order.37 We learn of Lovelace 
simultaneously that he is “notoriously ... a man of pleasure” as well 
as “a great plotter, and a greater writer” (50), who “rests ... not above 
six hours in the twenty-four,” and “has always, when he retires, a pen 
in his fingers” (74).38 Early in the novel, as Anna Howe is musing on 
Lovelace’s reputation as a writer and particularly on the fact that “all 
his vacant nightly hours are employed in writing,” she wonders, “what 
can be his subjects?” (74). Anna does not have to answer her own rhe-
torical question for us to understand that, however latent, the subject 
of the letter in Clarissa always returns to the unfathomably complex 
motions of desire. Anna contrasts the “twenty innocent subjects” that 
she and Clarissa “scribble upon” (75) to the “secret” and “treasonable” 
content of Lovelace’s “great correspondence by letters” (74). Yet here, 
too, the reader recognizes that Richardsonian letters, leaving traces of 
ink on fingers in their striving to capture life alive, are never, strictly 
speaking, innocent (75, 345).39 Mrs Harlowe likens writing to insubor-
dination and to the “stiffen[ing]” of “will,” preferring her daughter to 
read, an activity seen to teach “duty” (328).
In a letter preceding her escape with Lovelace, Clarissa admits her 
struggle to “govern” (333) her pen and her self-designation as a “scrib-
bler” suggests that a libertine tendency towards lawlessness and license 
underlies her letters as well: “My talent is scribbling,” she reflects to 
Anna, “and I the readier fell into this freedom, as I found delight in 
writing” (408). Delight in writing bespeaks an illicit freedom as well as 
a flux of feeling, an emotional dynamism, and a volatility of desire and 
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intention, all of which Clarissa struggles to regulate. Lovelace relishes 
the complex set of moving interrelations set off by writing, in particular 
what he sees to be the erotic implications of Clarissa’s contradictory 
behaviour, of “every changeable motion of your pen” (392).40 Despite 
herself, Lovelace insinuates, Clarissa’s erratic variability, her unpre-
dictability, shows that “a sweet girl” is also “a rogue” (400). For this 
reason, Clarissa obsessively blames her personal downfall on her con-
sent to correspond clandestinely with Lovelace, a correspondence that, 
as she admits, was not in her “power to discontinue” (408, also 381). 
Once it begins, the libertine motion of writing in this novel appears 
to endure. “Never was there such a pair of scribbling lovers as we,” 
remarks Lovelace to Belford after successfully abducting Clarissa 
from her imprisonment at Harlowe Place (416). Glorying in Clarissa’s 
“blameworthy” correspondence with him, Lovelace recognizes that a 
correspondence begun is one that will go on: “Has she been capable of 
error? – Of persisting in that error?” (427).
Libertinism’s Persistent Aspirations
Lovelace ties his assurance of eventual success with Clarissa to his con-
viction of desire’s persistently seeking quality. It is because desire seeks 
that love, in his view, “is an encroacher. Love never goes backwards. 
Love is always aspiring. Always must aspire” (704).41 Lovelace’s imper-
ative here is theatrical and its sexual politics suspect. Yet let’s pursue 
for a moment its Hobbesian philosophical underpinnings, which are 
rigorous in their own right. When Lovelace claims that love aspires, he 
wants to conjure up something bigger about human experience than 
his libertine attitudes towards women might otherwise suggest. Inso-
far as life is motion, and cannot be without desire, the good life is to 
be found in the accentuation of that motion, its forward trajectory, its 
futurity. According to this logic, if Clarissa appears on the outside to 
be a “frost-piece,” this is merely a culturally imposed artifice that can-
not belie the appetitive force that we know to be constitutive of living 
things.42
We also see Lovelace’s assurance of the truth of Clarissa’s appe-
tite through his tendency to emphasize her bodiliness (and thus her 
inscription in the natural order of things and its tendency to strive). 
With a “constant glow upon her lovely features; eyes so sparkling; ... 
health so florid; youth so blooming: air so animated ... How then can 
she be so impenetrable?” he asks (145). At the moment of the abduction, 
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Lovelace is particularly fired with this materialist conviction about the 
covert desire animating Clarissa’s resistance, waxing ecstatically to 
Belford:
this lady is all alive, all glowing, all charming flesh and blood, yet so 
clear, that every meandering vein is to be seen in all the lovely parts of her 
which custom permits to be visible ... And I saw, all the way we rode, the 
bounding heart; by its throbbing motions I saw it! Dancing beneath the 
charming umbrage. (399–400, also 431, 575, 633)
After the rape, when Lovelace is forced to admit that in fact he has 
“nothing to boast of as to her will,” he meditates again with some con-
fusion on those secret life signs that purportedly cannot lie: “such a 
glowing, such a blooming charmer” (886). “How had I known that a 
but blossoming beauty, who could carry on a private correspondence 
and run such risks with a notorious wild fellow, was not prompted by 
inclination?” (912).
Lovelace’s way out of this seeming contradiction is to assume that 
“had she been sensible, she must have been sensible, so they say” 
(943). His belief in Clarissa’s post-rape pregnancy forwards the same 
kind of case for her inclination. Just as Clarissa’s glow, the coursing 
of her blood, and the bounding of her heart would appear to reveal 
an incontrovertible bodily truth about inclination, so does conception, 
in the views of the period, assume a prior consent to, and thus appe-
tite for, sex.43 Clarissa’s pregnancy would “prove,” Lovelace says, “in 
this charming frost-piece, the triumph of nature over principle” (1147, 
also 916). Once again, Lovelace stresses the body’s latent (and always 
infinite) desire. He here reflects Hobbes’s insistence that appetite is 
precisely that inclination towards an object whose persistent motion 
is unseen (and unseeable) because it is psychological, occurring first 
in the imagination and from there transferring its motive endeavour 
outward to the body’s actions.44 The women in Sinclair’s brothel give 
a salacious spin to this particular insight, assuring Lovelace, as he tells 
Belford, that because appetite begins internally, one cannot know the 
status of a woman’s desire: “and that yet, and yet, and yet, I had not 
tried enough” (971–2). While the reader is positioned against Lovelace 
at these key moments of libertine vaunting, it is, as I will argue, Rich-
ardson’s great accomplishment to show that Lovelace’s faith in the 
force of appetite, of inclination, is confirmed, though not in the way he 
imagines.
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The Endeavour of Aversion
And yet Lovelace must still account for the difficulty of aversion, that 
other striving endeavour that propels us forward and that drives Cla-
rissa’s plot. As Hobbes explains, our general impulse towards contin-
ued self-preservation consists of two forms of motion: 1) endeavours 
towards what assists our persistence, or what Hobbes calls appetite, 
and 2) endeavours away from what we feel impedes it, or what he calls 
aversion.45 The point here is that both appetite and aversion are expres-
sions of endeavour, the broader striving for life’s and thus desire’s 
persistence. Aversion, in other words, is a local means to the furthest 
reaches of desire. This is a fundamental tenet of materialism, originat-
ing with Epicurus’s dictum that “pleasure” is “our first innate good, 
and … our starting point for every choice and avoidance.”46
Lovelace is more than ready to sexualize the materialist heritage, to 
read Clarissa’s extreme aversion to Solmes as a sign of her secret appe-
titive propensity. Yet in a key and unanticipated extension of material-
ism beyond Lovelace, it is the Harlowes, and even Anna Howe, who 
become the most committed followers of this logic.47 James Harlowe 
consistently construes Clarissa’s aversion for Solmes as a mask for her 
rabid concupiscence, as a confirmation, in his terms, that “Virgil’s amor 
omnibus idem [love is the same for all] ... is verified in you [Clarissa], as 
well as in the rest of the animal creation” (218). As Mrs Harlowe puts it, 
“Such extraordinary antipathies to a particular person must be owing 
to extraordinary prepossession in another’s favour” (98). Anna Howe 
reiterates the point: “Nor must you have Solmes, that’s certain: not 
only because of his unworthiness in every respect, but because of the 
aversion you have so openly avowed to him; which everybody knows 
and talks of; as they do of your approbation of the other” (330). “On 
inquiry,” Anna teases Clarissa, “it will come out to be love” (71). Sound-
ing much like Lovelace, Anna seeks to access Clarissa’s “one secret” 
(71), that “unowned inclination” (356) that despite prudence makes 
Clarissa’s face “glow,” her “heart” “go throb, throb, throb, as you read 
just here” (71). Mrs Howe sums up everyone’s shared conviction of 
Clarissa’s desire thus: “Is it such a mighty matter for a young lady to 
give up her own inclinations to oblige her friends? ... Either ... the lady 
must be thought to have very violent inclinations (and what nice young 
creature would have that supposed?) which she could not give up; or 
a very stubborn will, which she would not” (245). A good Hobbesian 
critic herself, Mrs Howe makes clear here that in the final analysis, 
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“inclination” and “will” circle back to the same appetitive place, par-
ticularly in matters involving deliberation. “Will,” explains Hobbes in 
a demystifying gesture, “therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating.”48
Let me pause for a moment. It is no surprise that Lovelace under-
stands life through an appetitive Hobbesian lens. It is perhaps more 
surprising that the Harlowes and the Howes do as well. Yet the real 
question that Richardson prompts is whether this lens illuminates any-
thing apposite to Clarissa and her status as a living body. Is Clarissa 
pressed by inclination? And if so, what does this mean outside the con-
cupiscent readings of others? As we have seen, Clarissa’s various inter-
locutors, via Hobbes, want to insist that aversion signals desire and that 
desire enlivens the body despite itself. Life for them is thus assumed to 
be animate and striving and driven by appetite. Yet on Clarissa’s own 
account, by contrast, aversion is not animate, and life would seem to 
persist as a kind of motive inertia more than as an appetitive inclina-
tion in any particular direction. As Jonathan Kramnick has shown, we 
know Clarissa best by her “posture of inaction,” her “stillness,” her ten-
dency to “stand … apart from life.”49 The novel begins as Anna Howe 
introduces us to Clarissa’s preference for inertia, as Anna commiserates 
with her friend on the familial tumult sparked by Lovelace’s suit: “So 
steady, so uniform in your conduct; so desirous, as you always said, of 
sliding through life to the end of it unnoted” (39–40). Clarissa knows 
that like all bodies, she moves through time and space, yet she wants to 
maintain, via mechanism’s teachings, that her motion has no internal 
dynamism; if she is set going and goes, it is only because of the impact 
(usually unwanted) of other bodies.50
From Inertia to the Swerve
Clarissa is bewildered to find herself drawn from mechanism’s iner-
tia to materialism’s activity, however unwanted, and she struggles to 
understand her passage from one state to the other. “I know not how 
it comes about, but I am, in my own opinion, a poor lost creature,” she 
writes to Anna, “and yet cannot charge myself with one criminal or 
faulty inclination. Do you know, my dear, how this can be?” (565, also 
1261). Despite herself, Clarissa’s question confronts a crucially impor-
tant lesson from materialism about the progress of living things and 
their appetites and aversions through time. Although Descartes’s and 
Newton’s law of inertia considered matter to be constitutionally inert, 
sluggish, and incapable of self-animation, an unintended outcome of 
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the discovery of persistent motion was the repudiation of this supposed 
passivity, the recognition that somewhere along the path of seemingly 
passive motion, the habits of inertia ever so slightly diverge.51
At its most dangerous logical endpoint, persistent motion in its mate-
rialist formulations takes us back before Hobbes to the unpredictable, 
capricious inclinations of Lucretian bodies, inclinations that, like Clar-
issa’s, break out of inertia below the threshold of exact measurement. 
As Lucretius teaches, all bodies “bring with them a nature secret and 
unseen.” This nature is on the one hand “unchangeable,” a stable force 
that explains why a bird remains constant as a bird; a tree always a tree, 
and so forth. On the other hand, however, the “distinct power” in things 
also explains their liveliness, their capacity to evolve, to explore novelty, 
even while preserving, at the same time, their existing form: “but who 
is there who can perceive that [bodies] never swerve ever so little from 
the straight undeviating course?”52 In Lucretius’s famous account, the 
declination of the atoms is what makes life possible in the first place, 
for in declination from motive equilibrium, the atoms connect and form 
the complex structures that comprise live bodies. In swerving to life, 
Lovelace hopes that Clarissa will prove his variety of sexual material-
ism right, and, with him, make more life: as he asks Belford, “But why 
shouldst thou imagine that such a mind as hers, meeting with such a 
one as mine; and, to dwell upon the word, meeting an inclination in 
hers to meet, should not propagate minds like her own?” (558).
Lovelace thus hinges his hopes of success with Clarissa on her hav-
ing already “swerved,” as he concedes, “in lesser points” (430). “A Cla-
rissa (herself her judge) has failed,” so “may she not further fail? Fail in 
the greatest point, to which all the other points in which she has failed, 
have but a natural tendency?” (429). Clarissa’s “swerve,” her “devia-
tion,” her “false step,” thus invokes this essential element of the materi-
alist tradition, the almost undetectable declination of Epicurus’s atoms 
as they fall downward through the void.53 It is difficult to imagine that 
Richardson had no inkling of this tradition (and its libertine implica-
tions) when he imagined Clarissa’s “error” as a departure or step away 
from the straight path, from the inertial status quo: “One devious step 
at setting out! – That must be it: ... for, although but one pace awry at 
first, it has led me hundreds and hundreds of miles out of my path” 
(565–6, also 643, 1036).54
Related to Clarissa’s acknowledgment of the necessary animacy of 
her position vis-à-vis Lovelace is the painful recognition that she has, 
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indeed, put something in motion that she can no longer stop: “My 
faults began early,” she bemoans to Anna, “for I ought not to have cor-
responded with him. I thought I could stop or proceed as I pleased” 
(381). “One evil draws another after it; and how knows she, or anybody, 
where it may stop?” (480). The point becomes a consistent refrain in 
the novel. Colonel Morden takes it up in his resonant summary letter 
ending volume three: “And how do you know,” he asks Clarissa on the 
subject of marrying a rake, “if you once give way, where you shall be 
suffered, where you shall be able to stop?” (563).55 How do we under-
stand the pressure of this refrain? The answer, I want to suggest, points 
us to the novel’s vital materialism and to Richardson’s commitment 
to rendering the continual progress of dynamic passions that make up 
any life’s impulsion to keep going. No living body, strictly speaking, 
can start or stop as it pleases, for as Clarissa learns too well, we never 
proceed as self-contained, isolated actors; there is no individual agency, 
no passive course through life apart from relational entanglement with 
others. All appetites and aversions unfold in reciprocal, multifaceted 
relation with other agents and the result, as Hobbes explains in De Cor-
pore, is both “a certain continual progress” and “a continual mutation 
in the ... agents.”56
Clarissa attempts to determine a single origin point for the causal 
chain she finds herself perpetually moving along – the “one devious 
step at setting out!” – yet this attempt once again assumes that cau-
sation involves singular actors and a sequence of distinct events. The 
protracted length of Clarissa is itself enough to give the lie to Claris-
sa’s causal emphasis on her “first fatal step” (1016), bearing testament 
instead to the unfathomable difficulty of causation, to the impossibility 
of identifying a single act as the “sole” cause because no one occasion 
can be plucked from its embeddedness in an always active antecedent 
world. We see Clarissa’s implicit awareness of this truth when, after she 
escapes to the Widow Moore’s in Hampstead, she repeatedly answers 
the ladies’ queries about her relations with Lovelace with the wearied 
assertion that her story is “too long” (791, 799). Clarissa’s failure to 
master the intricacies of her own story betrays her struggle to capture 
the complexity of material experience, an experience that resists being 
reduced to her clandestine correspondence with Lovelace or to any 
other preliminaries. This irreducible complexity anchors Richardson’s 
theory of the novel, one in which epistolary form saturates us with com-
peting interpretive accounts that no final authority ever adjudicates.57
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Thus, while Lovelace’s and the Harlowes’ libertine reading of Cla-
rissa’s animacy is biased at best, even Clarissa knows that they are 
not wrong to claim that indifference and motive inertia in live things 
is a fallacy. And in a certain sense, she has understood this truth all 
along. Were she truly indifferent, she would not feel such aversion for 
Solmes.58 In an especially revealing letter to Anna a quarter of the way 
through the novel, Clarissa reflects on her recognition that this aver-
sion, “an aversion so very sincere!” (506), is indeed based precisely on 
an active sensitivity, on what she calls “the finer sensibilities,” on the 
impossibility of her “indifference” to sex (507). Had she been capable of 
the indifference to which she aspired (“I wish I had been able in some 
very nice cases to have known what indifference was”), she admits, “my 
duty should have been the conqueror of my inclination” (506). As a liv-
ing being, then, Clarissa is an animate, desiring body, and no living 
thing, even a Clarissa Harlowe, can persist in the real world in a purely 
inertial and static state. Clarissa unwittingly suggests as much in a let-
ter to Anna about her family’s steadfast support of Solmes: “Astonish-
ing persistence! ... I was quite tired with so many attempts, all to the 
same purpose. I am amazed that they are not! So little variation! And no 
concession on either side” (344). As Lovelace later comments, adding 
materialism’s crucial layer of complexity to the principle of persistence, 
“’Tis human to err, but not to persevere – I hope my charmer cannot be 
inhuman!” (731, emphasis in text). The essence of Clarissa’s misfortune 
is captured in this offhand remark, for, as novelist, Richardson wants us 
to understand that as they persist and persevere, all living things neces-
sarily deviate from the straight path. The tragedy of Clarissa, as Chris-
tine Roulston suggests, is that her inclination would appear to have no 
play outside “the terms on which Lovelace offers it.”59
Materialism and the Death of Clarissa
In the end, despite having swerved, Clarissa manifestly fails to act as 
things in nature do (on Lovelace’s reckoning, at least).60 Indeed, after 
the rape, Clarissa appears to behave most unnaturally: far from seek-
ing the perseverance of life and desire, she welcomes death and does 
so with legendary persistence, as suggested by Johnson’s oft-cited 
grumbling of her “unconscionable time a-dying.” Yet it is precisely this 
persistence that alerts us to this novel’s gravest embrace of material-
ism. Such a claim admittedly seems perverse at first glance, for Rich-
ardson is explicit that Clarissa is formed on a “religious plan” (1495) 
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and a “Christian system” (1498) that requires the death of his heroine: 
“And who that are in earnest in their profession of Christianity but 
will rather envy than regret the triumphant death of Clarissa, ... whose 
Christian humility; whose forgiving spirit; whose meekness, whose 
resignation, HEAVEN only could reward?” (1498).61 Yet it is crucial to 
remember that this defence of the unity of art and orthodoxy follows 
from accusations by Richardson’s early readers that Clarissa’s death in 
fact smacked of heterodoxy. For Colley Cibber, her death implied Rich-
ardson’s questioning of Providence despite the author’s protestations 
to the contrary.62
Modern critics have perhaps been too quick to dismiss Cibber’s skep-
tical reading of the “end” of Clarissa. Richardson claims that his design 
in Clarissa was “to inculcate upon the human mind, under the guise 
of an amusement, the great lessons of Christianity” (1495), yet as Cib-
ber’s comment suggests, on another level, the “guise” of Christianity 
also provided cover for the author to explore philosophical thinking 
about death that had little truck with religious consolations. For all of 
Lovelace’s libertine aplomb, in fact he voices the conventional view on 
this matter much as Richardson’s readers do. There is something about 
Clarissa’s attitude towards death, Lovelace insinuates, that’s not quite 
fit or proper. “Tell the dear creature,” he writes to Belford, “she must 
not be wicked in her piety. There is a too much, as well as a too little, 
even in righteousness. Perhaps she does not think of that” (1308). Cla-
rissa may invoke “Honest Job” as a safeguard, yet no actual Christian, 
Lovelace contends, looks at death without fear.
To be sure, as critics have long shown, Clarissa approaches death like a 
Christian: she trusts in the release of her immortal soul from her suffering 
body.63 Yet at the same time, she also looks at life and death with a stark 
frankness worthy of the best of the Epicureans: “What,” she asks Anna, 
“is even the long life which in high health we wish for?” (1318). And 
later she reflects skeptically, “We flutter about here and there, with all 
our vanities about us, like painted butterflies, for a gay but a very short 
season, till at last we lay ourselves down in a quiescent state, and turn 
into vile worms: and who knows in what form, or to what condition, we 
shall rise again?” (1318, 1337). Indeed, in devoting more than a quarter 
of his novel to the excruciatingly protracted death of his heroine, Rich-
ardson seems to challenge his readers to face up to Lucretius’s enduring 
challenge: “And will you hesitate, will you be indignant to die?”64
Through the death of Clarissa, Richardson thus unexpectedly invokes 
Lucretius’s most haunting question: “What is this great and evil lust of 
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life that drives us to be so greatly agitated amidst doubt and peril?”65 
Hobbes argued that our innate impulsion to keep going is, in its most 
fundamental form, the impulsion to avoid death, yet Lucretius empha-
sized that our lust for life is in a certain sense always based on an illu-
sion of our perpetual persistence, at least in this life. Death, he explains, 
merely returns us to the earth from which we came, where our bodies 
disperse and form new combinations, only “in a moment of time [to] 
yield it up again.” To the materially unmystified, then, death is not to 
be feared and perhaps not necessarily to be avoided.66
As we know, Freud later took up the centrality of death to the moment 
in time that is life, arguing in his theory of the death drive for a sort of 
libidinal force in death that is “instinct with life, the very source of life 
and life’s strivings.”67 Yet, beginning with Lucretius, materialism had 
its own prior version of this story, one in which, in the eternal cycles 
of matter, the tireless progress of matter’s perpetual striving takes us 
beyond our individual death by transcending any particular life’s activ-
ity.68 The Epicureans faced death with equanimity for this very reason: 
not only is there no desiring self who continues after death to seek plea-
sure (rewards) and avoid pain (punishment), but matter also endures, 
and, across its endless formations, never stops striving.69 The truest 
materialist, then, is one who is not afraid to die.
Poor Lovelace thus recognizes with horror that it is in fact through 
“woo[ing]” (1098) and “mak[ing] court” (1097) to death that Clarissa 
best shows herself, paradoxically, to be a desiring, aspiring participant 
in the natural world, embedded in its order of things, at last the “for-
ward ... girl” (1098), the “blooming, glowing charmer” he thought he 
wanted her to be, one who, following Lucretius, swerved to life and 
therein started on a course bound inexorably towards decline yet also 
towards infinite futures beyond his grasp. “Strange and perverse,” 
Lovelace complains, relishing the illicit pun despite himself, “that she 
should refuse and sooner choose to die – oh obscene word!” (1107).70 In 
eroticizing Clarissa’s choice to die, Lovelace – and the reader with him – 
intuit Clarissa’s “strange subversiveness,” her “outlaw” attempt to seek 
the futurity of matter beyond the individual as, in Diderot’s words, a 
space of “growth still to come.”71 Richardson turns the screw on us again 
with Lovelace’s mock-prudish reaction to Clarissa’s “encouragement” 
of death as a lover (1096), for we see here what we have long suspected: 
Lovelace is more vulnerable to idealist illusions than Clarissa is.72
As the truest materialist, Clarissa, bound for death, emerges at the 
end of the novel in the full paradoxical light of her libertinism. The 
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“fancy” of “gadding after a rake” here finds its logical endpoint in the 
equally subversive refusal to “get sons and daughters” (970), to “keep 
her own secret” (1149, also 1084), or to “recover” the “overwhelmed 
path for the sake of future passengers” (1044). If Clarissa, as Steven-
son argues, indeed finds “her true identity” in death, what looks to 
be a flight from the body, from desire, in fact asserts her inclination – 
her endeavour – with a vengeance, in a body’s most inevitable natu-
ral act.73 Clarissa is as long as it is in large part because Lovelace [and 
Richardson] notoriously resists fruition – preferring “preparation and 
expectation” – though both know that “nature will not be satisfied 
without it” (163, also 616).74 While Clarissa’s death might be said to 
mark the satisfaction of nature in a way that rape cannot, it actually 
calls our attention to the ghostly persistence of a desire about which we 
still know almost nothing, even after 1,500 pages. To drive home the 
point, Richardson leaves us to brood over the mysterious and sugges-
tive devices on Clarissa’s infamous coffin, devices that, showing “more 
fancy than would perhaps be thought suitable,” demand explanation 
yet keep interpretation at once open-ended and indeterminate (1306).75 
As Terry Castle has shown, everyone strives to decipher the coffin’s 
message, but no one really understands what it means. Its provocative 
ambiguity entices us to puzzle over it again and again. Clarissa’s cof-
fin thus brings us back, in microcosm, to the novel’s vital persistence, 
to the lesson that the story is never finished, the meaning of a life and 
death unlimited.76
This essay has made the case that materialism permeates the world 
of Richardson’s novel more fully than scholarship has tended to grant. 
Clearly Richardson was immersed in materialism’s problems and ten-
sions and was fascinated by its implications for narrative form, where 
persistence would appear to be an informing principle. Critics have not 
fully appreciated the significance of Diderot’s powerful esteem for Cla-
rissa, and particularly for the novel’s treatment of its heroine’s death. Is 
it a coincidence that Diderot’s letters speak to his mistress, Sophie Vol-
land, of the profound poignancy of “Clarissa’s will and funeral” and of 
his materialist belief that “whatever lives has always lived and will live 
for ever”? “Re-read him, my friends,” Diderot urges in his Éloge de Rich-
ardson, “read Richardson; read him without ceasing.”77 It is here that we 
discover Richardson’s voice behind Lovelace’s roguish query: “What is 
the enjoyment of the finest woman in the world to the bustle of a well-
laid plot?” (92).78 Patricia Meyer Spacks argues that Lovelace “conceives 
of plotting as capable of forestalling even death, as a way of fulfilling the 
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desire of the self,” and there is a way in which Spacks’s insight captures 
a truth about Richardson’s novel at its most primal level.79 In directing 
our attention to this narrative that persists through motions that are 
decidedly aesthetic, we find Richardson offering the new novel form as 
an imaginative answer to the ongoing problems of life.
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grew from his ambition to flout “vulgar” prejudice and “attempt what 
I have the Vanity to think was never yet attempted.” Selected Letters of 
Samuel Richardson, ed. John Carroll (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 87. 
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Davies & Eldridge, 1800), 58. To fear death, Drelincourt suggests, is thus to 
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invincible ignorance on which our happiness depends. Whoever thinks in 
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75. As Kramnick demonstrates, this is precisely Clarissa’s attitude at the 
end of the novel. Actions and Objects, 219–29.
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Clarissa’s “refusal” as an alternative, and for Lovelace, deeply threatening, 
version of an open futurity here stands as her “line of flight” from 
the oppressive stagnation of Lovelace’s fantasy future, one in which a 
pregnant Clarissa will assure the rapist’s identity and repetition: “a Twin 
Lovelace at each charming breast” (706). The fact that Lovelace imagines 
his progeny as doubled versions of himself epitomizes his desire to close 
off the future at its supposed moment of opening out. What looks to be a 
futural life orientation, in other words, is merely an inertial perpetuation 
of the same. Looking to death, Clarissa once again breaks out from inertia, 
though this time more on her own terms, following a drive that persists 
beyond the biological rhythms of generation and corruption.
 72 See Lovelace’s (only partially ironic) opening letter to Belford in which he 
blames the poets, “with their celestially-terrene descriptions,” for “fir[ing] 
my imagination and set[ting] me upon a desire to become a goddess-
maker” (142).
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1–6; “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature,” in Tomlinson and 
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lovers’ ardour is storm-tossed, uncertain in its course” (4.1077–8). Nature, 
Lucretius urges, denies us satisfaction, taunting us with “the hope that 
the fire may be extinguished from the same body that was the origin of 
the burning” (4.1086–88). For the view that “pleasure ... interrupts[s] the 
immanent process of desire,” see also Deleuze, “Desire and Pleasure,” in 
Foucault and His Interlocutors, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1997), 189.
 75 See Mrs Smith’s comment to Belford on the devices and inscriptions on 
Clarissa’s coffin: “Lord bless me! Is a coffin a proper subject to display 
fancy upon!” (1305). Ian Watt argues for an erotic impulse in Clarissa’s 
preparations for death as well as in the principle device on the coffin, the 
crowned serpent with its tail in its mouth. The Rise of the Novel: Studies in 
Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1957), 234. On the animacy suggested in Clarissa’s will to die, see also 
Tanner, Adultery in the Novel, 107–8.
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This essay takes a novel approach to the early modern debates about 
“the thinking matter hypothesis,”2 or what we would today call “the 
embodied mind thesis,” the question of whether or not the soul is 
material, whether bodies are sufficient for cognition or whether some 
spiritual substance is required instead, and where the soul or mind 
might be located in the body. Of course, such debates have a long 
history, dating back to the Ancients,3 but they were conducted with 
particular intensity in early modern Europe, notably in France and 
England, following the remarkably successful institutionalization of 
Cartesian metaphysics in the second half of the seventeenth century,4 
with its mechanist body, animal spirits, and pineal gland, as well as its 
reinvigoration of the argument that man could have access to truth by 
means of his reason and by abandoning the dubious evidence of the 
senses. The aim here is not, however, to offer an intellectual history of 
the debates.5 Instead, the approach on offer is literary, and it is so not 
simply on the understanding that any history of ideas is the history 
of material, often textual forms, and thus of genres, discourses, meta-
phors, and images, but also, and more important, because the texts 
that engage with or mobilize the claim that the body is sufficient for 
cognitive activity are particularly dense in imagery.6 To be sure, intel-
lectual historians have not completely overlooked that imagery,7 but 
a literary approach enables us properly to read it, to work out how 
it illuminates and obfuscates, produces satirical and disqualifying 
effects as well as heuristic and enabling ones, and how such imagery 
may elicit consent or dissent in the reader by virtue of its being either 
particularly striking or perfectly banal and predictable, or somewhere 
in between.
7  The Early Modern Embodied Mind and 
the Entomological Imaginary1
kate e. tunstall
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One particular set of images, which appears in discussions of the 
embodied mind, forms the focus of this essay. The set is, loosely speak-
ing, entomological (“loosely speaking,” that is, for the modern reader 
because, in line with early modern taxonomy, the set includes some tiny 
animals that modern entomology would exclude from the category of 
insect).8 There is, of course, a long-standing literary tradition in which 
human behaviours are figured metaphorically as insect activities – we 
might think of the industrious and communitarian bee, the thieving 
and plagiarizing ant, or the proud and self-sufficient spider.9 However, 
while some of the texts in English and French that I will consider here 
draw on those classical tropes, they also mobilize their insects and other 
little creepy-crawlies for rather different ends. In the texts under con-
sideration here, images of bees, spiders, worms, mites, and maggots 
make regular appearances as key elements in accounts of the human 
body and its cognitive and creative capacities (and incapacities).
The boundary between the human and the non-human, as well as 
the ethical and political implications of any such boundary, has recently 
been a focus of attention in the humanities and the social sciences, and 
as a result there is a growing body of work not only on animals, but 
also on bees and worms.10 The question of such a boundary was also 
of interest to early modern writers, especially  following Descartes’s 
claim that animals, unlike humans, who possessed immaterial souls, 
were merely machines. The debate sparked by that claim, known as 
that over “l’âme des bêtes” [the souls of beasts], is bound up with the 
debate over embodied mind insofar as many of those who opposed 
the Cartesian view of animals argued, often by way of Epicurus and 
Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura [On the Nature of the Universe] but also 
by means of Descartes’s own L’Homme [Man] (1662), that the body, that 
which humans share with animals, is sufficient for all cognitive activ-
ity.11 Such is, broadly speaking, the philosophical context – mechanist 
and anti-mechanist, materialist and anti-materialist – in which early 
modern writers mobilized classical literary insect tropes and invented 
novel ones to figure the body and its thoughts, ideas, desires, and imag-
inings as so many swarms and stings, bites, hops, and jumps of various 
kinds of bug. The aim now is to read these figures.
The texts in main (though not exclusive) focus here are two novels 
from the middle of the eighteenth century, Sterne’s Tristram Shandy 
(1759–67) and Diderot’s Le Rêve de d’Alembert [D’Alembert’s Dream] 
(1769). They are, of course, very different, not least formally – one is a 
first-person narrative, the other a triptych of dialogues or conversations 
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between two or more characters. However, each accords significant 
attention to the human body, and, most important for our purposes 
here, each has recourse to some striking insect imagery to figure and 
figure out psycho-physiological events or states.
In the case of the insect imagery accompanying Sterne’s presenta-
tion of the embodied mind, scholarship has produced a paradox: that 
imagery has been at once frequently quoted and consistently over-
looked. Among scholars of early modern representations of the mind 
and its relationship to the body, it is practically a commonplace to quote 
from Sterne’s novel to show that thinkers and writers located the mind 
inside the body, to demonstrate that early modern writers conceived of 
the mind as internal, of mental life as inward.12 In the passage routinely 
quoted, Sterne has his eponymous hero fantasize about being able to 
see inside other people’s minds, but the focus on Tristram’s fantasy of 
transparency has led critics to overlook what it is, precisely, that Sterne 
has Tristram imagine he could see.13 And yet what he envisions is con-
veyed in a strikingly entomological image that is itself, so this essay 
contends, very far from transparent.
It is not, of course, sufficient merely to notice the details of Sterne’s 
image of the embodied mind, however difficult a task noticing those 
details seems to have been. We also need to make sense of the image, 
which this essay argues is best done by setting it in relation to other 
instances of cognate imagery in other early modern works, notably 
those concerned with the brain. This essay will therefore also devote 
some space to such texts and particularly to Swift’s mock-treatise, A 
Discourse upon the Mechanical Operations of the Spirit (1704),14 which 
offers not only a satirical image of modern science, but also an image of 
the brain crawling with insects. Swift’s Discourse does not only satirize 
one of the key images to which Diderot will later have recourse in Le 
Rêve de d’Alembert, however; it also makes a link between cerebral bugs 
and writing, a link further developed by a particular group of writers 
who promoted literary novelty and were associated with Grub Street.15 
This essay, then, intervenes in the debates about the nature of Sterne’s 
inter-textual relations,16 and, more important, it suggests that Sterne’s 
insects figure the conceptions of the embodied mind or, rather, that they 
deliberately and self-satirizingly figure them as the misconceptions of 
the writer’s creative imagination.
While Sterne’s entomological imagery has gone unnoticed by schol-
ars, Diderot’s philosophico-comical dialogue is well-known to be buzz-
ing with various kinds of insect.17 This essay concentrates on one of 
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those images, the swarm of bees, which is also present in a number of 
ancient texts,18 and is used to propose a neo-Lucretian conception of 
the mind as the effect of a particular kind of material organization or 
an “emergent” property of matter, a conception that has recently been 
undergoing something of a revival in some branches of the philosophy 
of mind.19 Two aspects of Diderot’s novel use of the image in Le Rêve 
de d’Alembert will be identified and explored here. First, the essay will 
show that the image is used not only to demonstrate that a body made 
up of different material parts can think, but also to locate that embodied 
thinking throughout the body and in the relationships between bodies, 
thereby figuring thinking as a collective endeavour rather than, as it 
is in Sterne, an activity performed by an individual, private, interior 
mind, material or otherwise. (Or, to speak in the terms of some contem-
porary cognitivist scientists, Diderot uses the image of the swarm of 
bees to figure the mind as “extended” as well as “embodied.”)20 Second, 
the essay will argue that while the insect imagery to which Diderot has 
recourse in Le Rêve is not original to him and is, in fact, commonplace, 
particularly in medical texts of the period,21 it has been chosen with the 
deliberate aim of underscoring the communal, collective dimension of 
thinking – and, crucially, of writing – as it is staged in and by the text.
Comparisons will occasionally be drawn between Sterne and Diderot 
in the course of this essay, but its arguments are not primarily comparat-
ist.22 Its aim is, instead, to reveal a hitherto neglected aspect of what 
might be called the early modern “materialist imaginary,” to demon-
strate that that imaginary did not only contain the Cartesian machines, 
clocks, springs, cogs, and pumps, which have been the subject of so 
much scholarly attention,23 but that it also contained – indeed that it 
was positively buzzing and crawling with – all sorts of tiny beasts and 
bugs. The early modern materialist’s imaginary was also, then, so this 
essay will argue, entomological.
Tristram Shandy: Mind, Matter, and Maggots
In chapter 23 of book 1, Sterne’s eponymous narrator laments that “our 
minds shine not through the body, but are wrapt up here in a dark 
covering of un-crystallized flesh and blood,”24 and imagines what it 
would be like were bodies to be in some way crystalline. Drawing on 
Lucian’s fantastical story in which Momus suggests to Vulcan that he 
should insert a pane of glass into the human body so as to be able to see 
inside,25 Tristram speaks as follows: 
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Had the said glass been there set up, nothing more would have been 
wanting, in order to have taken a man’s character, but to have taken  
a chair and gone softly, as you would to a dioptrical bee-hive, and look’d 
in, – view’d the soul stark naked; — observ’d all her motions, — her 
machinations; — traced all her maggots from their first engendering to 
their crawling forth; — watched her loose in her frisks, her gambols, her 
capricios; and after some notice of her more solemn deportment, conse-
quent upon such frisks, &c. —— then taken your pen and ink and set 
down nothing but what you had seen, and could have sworn to.26 
This is the passage that has frequently been mobilized to support the 
claim that the early modern mind was conceived of as something 
inward and internal, and that the new genre of the novel sought to 
offer its readers imaginary access to that inner space. It is also the pas-
sage the specific details of which, namely a bunch of frisky maggots 
gamboling about inside a dioptrical beehive, have been, quite simply, 
overlooked.27 It is time to restore them to view.
Part of what is remarkable about Tristram’s imagined vision is simply 
the fact that it presents character, the soul, the mind – the terminology 
is shifting – as an object available for empirical inspection,28 but Sterne 
intensifies the strangeness by having Tristram suggest that if the soul 
is, in normal circumstances, invisible, it is not only because the body 
has been masking it from view; it is also because the soul is very tiny, 
invisible to the naked eye, and could in any case only be seen with the 
aid of a “dioptrical” lens or microscope. More remarkably still, Sterne 
suggests that the soul is itself rather unwilling to be seen – the adverb 
“softly” suggests that were it to see or hear us approach, it would hide 
(perhaps because if it saw us through the other end of the microscope, 
we would appear gigantic and scary). Playing, no doubt, on the terms 
“anima” and “animus,” Sterne has Tristram envisage the soul as some 
kind of animal.
Quite what kind of animal the soul might be is later shown by the 
image of the newly revamped body as a “beehive,” which further hints 
that if our approach should be made softly, it is not so much because, 
if disturbed, it might hide as because it might sting. Yet the animals 
inside that hive-body do not turn out to be quite what the metaphor 
had been leading us to expect: when Tristram comes to name the object 
of his imaginary microscopical gaze, it is not of bees that he speaks, but 
of a “soul stark naked.” This takes us away from entomology and back 
to anthropology and, with it, to philosophy and physiology, since the 
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presence of a “stark naked” soul inside the body suggests not only that 
the soul is itself another body, producing a comic mise-en-abîme (will 
this body inside the body also have a window in it?), but also that the 
body with the window in it might be female and, moreover, be preg-
nant. Of course, Tristram Shandy has much to say about sex and obstet-
rics, to which we shall return in due course, but for the moment, there 
is a more urgent set of questions: is there really any evidence that this 
is an image of what critics have suggested, namely the mind? And, in 
any case, what are we to make of the appearance of maggots? If this is 
a womb that Tristram is imagining himself looking into, it could, per-
haps, account for why he imagines seeing not bees in the beehive, but 
maggots, that is to say baby bees or larvæ. But that is not all the mag-
gots are doing there.
Inasmuch as the most obvious connotations of maggots are decay 
and putrefaction, their presence in Tristram’s imagined vision might, of 
course, simply be understood as a satire on human vanity. Momus is, 
after all, the god of mockery, and his optical technology thus exposes 
that man is rotten to the core. Yet in the early modern period, the mer-
est mention of the new-fangled dioptrical technology was often enough 
to trigger an automatic reference to maggots, for, following the suc-
cess of Hooke’s Micrographia (1665), modern science was strongly 
associated with maggots (and other minute animals). One name given 
to the Royal Society in the early eighteenth century was “Maggot- 
Mongers’ Hall.”29 Moreover, the human body, when seen down the lens, 
did indeed appear to be teeming with maggots or worms, the choice 
of term depending on whether the author took their presence to be a 
rebuke to man’s pride, a reminder of human sin and mortality, or a 
sign of the amazing spectacle of nature as created by God; and some-
times both are used in the same work.30 Sterne’s object of satire might 
therefore also be Momus himself; if his dioptrical lens is imagined to 
show the soul crawling with maggots, it is because maggots are the 
only things a microscopist ever sees.31
Yet decay and degeneration are not the maggot’s only associations; 
indeed, in this period, they were almost synonymous with the opposite 
process, that is, with generation, and, in particular, with the theory of 
“equivocal” or “spontaneous” generation.32 Such a theory, which held 
that insects – flies, lice, maggots – came into being out of rotting mat-
ter, was to be found in the Ancients, notably in Lucretius,33 but it was 
much revisited in early modern science. If historians have sometimes 
observed that microscopy ought really to have put an end to the theory, 
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this is to ignore the compelling political ends to which it was put.34 It 
was a key element of Jesuit science, in which the existence in God’s 
creation of what Aristotle had called “imperfect” beings was accounted 
for by spontaneous generation; and if it was indeed dismissed by anti-
Jesuits and by Protestant physico-theologians, for whom the amazing 
“spectacle of nature” revealed God’s hand in even the tiniest and lowli-
est part of nature, the theory was taken up by atheist, materialist think-
ers, such as Diderot, who promoted it as a way of countering the theory 
of final causes, the teleological argument for the existence of God. Athe-
ist materialists and Jesuits thus became strange bedfellows; indeed, 
Voltaire, no fan of either, dubbed the pro-spontaneous-generation sci-
entist, John Turberville Needham, an atheist Jesuit, an accusation that 
seems to have stuck.35 And, of course, microscopes also enabled the 
exploration of human generation, which was revealed, following Leeu-
wenhoek’s observation of semen in 1677, also to involve tiny animals, 
akin to worms, which was indeed Hartsoeker’s term for them.36 If, then, 
we read Tristram’s imaginary vision to be a view inside a womb, per-
haps the maggots are to be understood as wriggling spermatozoa, and, 
moreover, perhaps Sterne is suggesting that there is something “equiv-
ocal” about human generation, that man, like the insects produced by 
spontaneous generation, is an “imperfect” animal.
The more closely we examine the passage, then, the more the con-
notations of its imagery seem to multiply, and though this is no doubt 
a deliberate textual staging of the vertiginous effects of microscopy, we 
seem to be losing sight of the possibility that it stages an embodied 
mind. However, if we turn to other texts of the period and explore the 
meanings and activities of maggots in other works of late seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century writing, the possibility that this is, after all, an 
image of the embodied mind and, in particular, of the brain, comes back 
into view.
Bugs and the Brain: Thinking, Biting, and Writing
The term “maggot” was widely used in early modern English writing 
to refer to an idea conceived in the brain or the imagination. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines it as a “whimsical, eccentric, strange, or per-
verse notion or idea,” a meaning that the OED dates to the first quar-
ter of the seventeenth century, and which Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) 
confirms was still current in the eighteenth century: “Maggot: whimsy, 
caprice, odd fancy.”37 Usage, as given in the OED, makes it clear that the 
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mind that spawns such ideas is embodied – we find, for instance, “Are 
not you mad my friend? … Have not you Maggots in your braines?,” 
and “Ther’s a strange Maggot hath got into their braines”;38 and it is the 
material nature of such a mind, subject to decay and degeneration, that 
accounts for its spawning odd ideas. In the mid-eighteenth century, 
Samuel Butler adapts the image, drawing on contemporary interest in 
the theory of spontaneous generation, and saying of the character of “A 
Quibbler” (1759) that “all his conceptions are produced by equivocal 
generation, which makes them justly esteemed but Maggots.”39
Such imagery may also be drawing on anatomical descriptions of the 
brain, such as that by Thomas Willis, who refers to its “vermiform or worm-
shaped processes,”40 a metaphor that may have enabled an updating 
of an existing comic association between odd ideas, maggots, and the 
brain, giving it a new “scientific” resonance, if it was perhaps not what 
made the association possible in the first place. And other aspects of 
early modern conceptions of the brain seem to have enabled writers 
and, notably, polemicists to make use of animal and insect imagery in 
their writing on the nature of the mind. We find, for instance, in a refu-
tation of the embodied mind thesis entitled Vindiciæ Mentis: An Essay of 
the Being and Nature of Mind (1702), the assertion that the “Little Mass 
of Stuff within the Cranium … can’t be so infinitely Figured, or have 
its little Maggots friggle, at such an Infinite rate, as to cause or produce 
such innumerable variations as are made in Thoughts.”41 The author,42 
probably Thomas Emes, is clearly seeking to emphasize the material-
ity of the brain and therefore to disqualify any claim that it might be 
responsible for thought, but are we also to read the maggots as a meta-
phor for some aspect of early modern brain anatomy?
It is impossible, as well as undesirable, to pin it down, but it should 
be noted that, in addition to the “vermiform processes” observed by 
Willis, there are two other features of early modern brain science that 
may have enabled Emes’s imagery. The first is the association between 
the brain and the animal spirits that were key to the Cartesian account 
of the mechanics of the body. Flowing in the blood, according to pat-
terns determined by the pineal gland in the brain, animal spirits were 
thought to be the means by which physical movement and thinking 
or, rather, perceiving, imagining, and remembering, occurred. While 
Emes is seeking to debunk this conception of thinking by means of the 
maggot-image, it is clear that Sterne’s image functions rather differ-
ently. That he may also associate maggots and animal spirits can be 
established by relating the passage back to the opening of the novel, 
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where another association is made, namely that between animal spir-
its and spermatozoa.43 When Tristram begins his life story at the very 
beginning, at the moment of his conception, he tells (in terms that 
echo Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding)44 of how the ani-
mal spirits in his mother’s brain had come to associate sex and clock- 
winding, of how that had led her to ask his father at a highly inop-
portune moment whether he had wound up the clock, and how that, 
in turn, led his father’s “animal spirits” to be accidentally dispersed, 
resulting in his own (mis)conception.45 Read in this context, the beehive-
body, with a stark naked soul in it, and maggots, presents an image not 
only of a womb, as suggested earlier, but also of a brain, and perhaps 
even Tristram’s own with its “strong propensity to begin … very non-
sensically.”46 In contrast, then, to Emes’s imagery, Sterne’s is lacking in 
polemical charge; instead, the novelist re-imagines the animal spirits as 
spritely animals and thereby suggests that the human mind, embodied 
as it is, is prone to quirky conceptions and capricious movements.
It is not only mechanist models of the body and of the brain that 
are subject to being imagined or re-imagined in entomological terms, 
however. Non-mechanist, materialist accounts of the brain also enable 
entomological images or, rather, they themselves explicitly use insect 
imagery to figure the brain, and it is these that are quoted and satirized, 
along with much else, in Swift’s Discourse. We consider Swift’s satire 
here because it lays the ground for Diderot’s more serious staging of 
the same image in Le Rêve, and because when the satirist also uses the 
image to figure ideas in a particular kind of mind, that of a writer, it 
enables us to grasp a further dimension of the passage in Sterne.
The Discourse is a mock-treatise, satirizing materialism, mechanism, 
and any other modern scientific theories that would “reduce” man to 
the physical,47 as well as the writers whose brains have spawned such 
theories. It contains a description of the brain, which draws not only on 
Willis’s work (though probably only second-hand via William Wotton) 
with its Cartesian mechanism, Galenic humours, and Hippocratic spir-
its,48 but also on Lucretius, combining his theory of equivocal genera-
tion, which microscopy had recently reinvigorated, with his atomism, 
according to which all bodies are made up of tiny particles of different 
shapes that hook onto each other, creating material assemblages, some 
of which can feel and think.49 Swift has his narrator report favourably 
“the Opinion of choice Virtuosi,” according to which the brain, like the 
rest of the body, is “only a Crowd of little Animals, but with Teeth and 
Claws extremely sharp, and therefore cling together in the Contexture 
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we behold, like the Picture of Hobbes’s Leviathan, or like Bees in a per-
pendicular swarm upon a Tree, or like Carrion corrupted into Vermin, 
still preserving the Shape and Figure of the Mother Animal.”50 Here, if 
it is the frontispiece to Hobbes’s Leviathan that is referred to explicitly, 
there can be no doubt that Lucretius’s De Rerum natura or, at least, imag-
ery very strongly associated with it, is also being alluded to: the theory 
of spontaneous generation is present by means of the image of the rot-
ting carcass crawling with maggots, and swarms of bees are a staple of 
both Epicurean and anti-Epicurean works as a means of figuring the 
assemblages of atoms. Richard Bentley, for instance, uses it to argue that 
it was impossible, pace the atheist materialists he was seeking to confute 
in A Confutation of Atheism from the Faculties of the Soul (1692), for a great 
number of atoms to “compose one greater individual animal, with one 
mind and understanding … any more than a swarm of bees ... can be 
conceived to make up one particular living creature.”51 And if the “Teeth 
and Claws extremely sharp” mentioned by Swift are comical versions of 
the hooks that enable Lucretius’s atoms to assemble and form a contex-
ture, they are also that which enables the brain to conceive ideas.
An idea is conceived in the brain, as figured by the materialists sati-
rized by Swift, when its little constituent animals use their teeth to bite. 
Swift’s image of little biting animals may also draw on an early modern 
English expression that was sufficiently common to appear in an early 
eighteenth-century bilingual English-French dictionary, namely “I shall 
do it, when the maggot bites.”52 And biting, according to Swift’s narra-
tor, is what the brain bugs do when they get hot. He reports that “all 
Invention is formed by the Morsure of two or more of these animals 
upon certain capillary nerves, which proceed [from the brain]. … Noth-
ing less than a violent Heat can disentangle these Creatures from their 
hamated Station of Life, or give them Vigor and Humor to imprint the 
Marks of their little Teeth,”53 and he encourages the wearing of “quilted 
caps” to overheat the brain and provoke the most intense bites. The 
effect of such a bite is to cause a person to take up a particular activ-
ity, namely writing: “if the Morsure be Hexagonal, it produced Poetry; 
the Circular gives Eloquence; if the Bite hath been conical, the person, 
whose nerve is so effected, shall be disposed to write upon the poli-
tics; and so of the rest.”54 If it is not surprising to discover at the end 
of the work that the narrator has himself been bitten, Swift may also 
be targeting the self-declared maggot-bite-induced writing of the late 
seventeenth century and early decades of the eighteenth. And though 
Sterne’s maggots do not bite, they do make jerky, quirky movements, 
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“frisks” and “capriccios,” and by mid-century, maggots have come to be 
associated with the embodied (and thus unsound) brain of the writer.55
The association between maggots and the writer’s brain is particu-
larly common in the work of the circle of writers, journalists, booksell-
ers, and literary entrepreneurs known as The Athenian Society, founded 
in 1691. One of them, Samuel Wesley, had published a collection of 
poems entitled Maggots: Or, Poems on Several Subjects, Never Before Han-
dled (1685), which opens: “The Maggot Bites, I must begin:/ Muse! Pray 
be civil! Enter in!/ Ransack my addled pate with Care/ And muster all 
the Maggots there!”56 And another, John Dunton, later expanded on the 
image as a figure for literary novelty in his autobiographical novel, The 
Life and Errors of John Dunton, Late Citizen of London, Written by Himself 
in Solitude (1705), which readers later in the century would compare to 
Tristram Shandy.57 Dunton presents the work as follows: 
As this Idea of a New Life, is an ORIGINAL PROJECT; perhaps some will 
call it one of Dunton’s Maggots: For having printed thirty of W[esley]’s 
writing, it wou’d be strange if I shou’d not by Imitation become one my 
self. But how little I deserve to be so accounted, is sufficiently shewn in 
the following Sheets. … Now this Subject is New and Surprising, but is 
far from being Magotty; for if a Man must be call’d a Magot for starting 
Thoughts that are WHOLLY NEW, than Farewel Invention. In this sense 
the Understanding Lock, and the Metaphysical Noris are greater MAGOTS 
than John Dunton (as they publish Thoughts that are Newer and Better) 
but sure none are so stupid as to call these Gentlemen Magots, for obliging 
the World with their Ideal Discoveries; … But (If after all I can say) my 
IDEAL LIFE must pass for a Magot, I must own it my own pure Magot; 
the Natural Issue of my Brain Pan, bred and born there, and only there.58 
Here Dunton at once defends himself against the charge of being 
“maggoty” and asserts that his maggots are sui generis, and, moreover, 
aligning his work with that of Locke, as well as that of Locke’s oppo-
nent, Norris, he registers the relative novelty in English in the early 
years of the eighteenth century of both the term “idea” and of first-
person writing.59
The literary connotations of the term “maggot,” as well as its appear-
ance in satirical writing on modern philosophy and medicine, make it 
clear, then, that its appearance in Sterne’s novel is significant. When 
Tristram peers inside the “beehive”-body in search of the mind and sees 
the “soul, stark naked,” its “machinations” and its “maggots,” Sterne 
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is not only drawing on an association between maggots and ideas that 
is registered in dictionaries of the period and given a new currency by 
both anti-Cartesian images of the animal spirits, which Sterne locates 
in the womb as well as the brain, and anti-materialist uses of the mate-
rialist image of the brain as a swarm of bees or maggots; he is also 
suggesting that what the embodied mind engenders is the material of 
the modern novel. We understand, then, that what Tristram observes 
through Momus’s glass is a womb spawning a new life and a brain 
spawning not only novel ideas, but also the ideas for a novel, that of 
his life. And so, by means of the maggots, Sterne does not only offer 
a comic image of the mind as embodied; he also ironically locates his 
own novel within the “maggotty” tradition.

We turn now to Le Rêve de d’Alembert, not to compare it with Sterne’s 
novel, though we know Diderot had read Tristram Shandy in 1762,60 but 
to explore another instance of the entomological imaginary in early 
modern materialist writing. We find in Le Rêve references to imagi-
nary microscopes and what might be seen down them, and numer-
ous images designed to explore and give support to the embodied 
mind thesis,61 including harpsichords that play themselves,62 a spider 
in its web,63 and a swarm of bees. This essay concentrates on the lat-
ter image and shows not only how and why the materialist image of 
the swarm of bees, which we have seen satirized by Swift and used 
by Bentley to refute materialism, is presented in the text as a solution 
to the philosophical problem of the unity of the material body, but 
also how the image is itself embodied in the very material form of 
Diderot’s text.
Le Rêve de d’Alembert: Swarm, Form, and Esprit de Corps
Diderot’s text of 1769 is in three parts, the second of which, entitled “Le 
Rêve de d’Alembert,” has given its name to the work as a whole. In the 
first part, entitled, “Suite d’un entretien entre Diderot et d’Alembert” 
[Continuation of a conversation between Diderot and d’Alembert], a 
title that suggests that there was more preceding it that has been omit-
ted, a point to which we shall return, the two characters are engaged 
in a conversation about some of the major philosophical questions of 
the day, notably whether or not an immaterial soul exists, and, if not, 
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where in the body a material soul might be located – the brain, the 
hand, or distributed throughout the body; and how, in the absence of 
an immaterial soul and given that the body is made up of many parts 
that undergo change over time, a continuous sense of self can exist.64 
D’Alembert is skeptical about Diderot’s proposal to abandon the soul, 
conceptually problematic though it might be, and he wonders whether 
it might not leave us with even greater conceptual problems – wouldn’t 
it mean, for example, that a stone has feeling?65 Eventually, tiring rather 
of Diderot’s conversation, d’Alembert makes his excuses and goes 
home to bed, where he has a dream, in which he further continues the 
conversation with Diderot. It is here that the most important image of 
the text, the swarm of bees, appears.
Before exploring it, a little more must be said about the text and, 
notably, about its form. D’Alembert had his dream during the night, 
most of which elapses between parts 1 and 2, but if we read of it in part 
2, it is not because an awake d’Alembert offers a first-person account of 
his nocturnal experience. The reporting of d’Alembert’s dream is given 
to another character, a woman named Mlle de Lespinasse, who has had 
access to his dream, not because she is able, Momus-like, to see into 
his mind, but because the conversation, of which the dream consisted, 
was conducted by d’Alembert out loud in his sleep. She sat by his bed-
side, noting it all down as he sleep-talked both in his own voice and 
in that of his interlocutor, Diderot. In the second part of the text, then, 
with d’Alembert now sleeping silently in the background, she reads 
out her notes to the doctor, Bordeu, whom she had called during the 
night. This extraordinary set-up, in which a dream, the most private 
and inward of experiences, is accessible to other people, and which 
involves a written text in which voices do voices doing other voices, 
has important implications for the way we understand the image of 
the swarm of bees.
The notes that Mlle de Lespinasse reads out to Bordeu make clear 
that the sleep-talker had mentioned the image of the swarm of bees in 
response to the question of how a body, possessing no immaterial soul 
and consisting of many parts, could act as a unified whole. In his sleep, 
d’Alembert replied as follows: 
Avez-vous quelquefois vu un essaim d’abeilles s’échapper de leur  
ruche? […] Le monde, ou la masse générale de la matière est la grande 
ruche […] Les avez-vous vues s’en aller former à l’extrémité de la branche 
d’un arbre, une longue grappe de petits animaux ailés, tous accrochés les 
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uns aux autres par les pattes? … Cette grappe est un être, un individu, 
un animal quelconque […] … [C]elui qui n’aurait jamais vu une pareille 
grappe s’arranger, serait tenté de la prendre pour un animal à cinq ou six 
cents têtes et à mille ou douze cents ailes ….
Have you ever seen a swarm of bees leaving their hive? ... The world, or 
the general mass of matter, is the great hive [...]. Have you seen them fly 
away and form a long cluster of little winged animals, hanging off the end 
of the branch of a tree, all clinging on to each other by their feet? [...] This 
cluster is a being, an individual, some sort of animal [...]. … [S]omeone 
who’d never seen the formation of a cluster like that would be tempted to 
think it was a single animal with five or six hundred heads and a thousand 
or twelve hundred wings [...].66 
So, a material body, made up of parts, has no more difficulty, accord-
ing to the dreaming d’Alembert, in acting as a unified whole than the 
composite body that is the swarm or “cluster” of bees does. And he 
explained the motion of the swarm as a whole in a manner that recalls 
the little animals biting in Swift; d’Alembert’s swarm moves in response 
to one of bees pinching another: 
Si l’une de ces abeilles s’avise de pincer d’une façon quelconque, l’abeille 
à laquelle elle s’est accrochée, que croyez-vous qu’il en arrive? … Celle-ci 
pincera la suivante; … il s’excitera dans toute la grappe autant de sensa-
tions qu’il y a de petits animaux; … le tout s’agitera, se remuera, changera 
de situation et de forme.
If one of these bees decides to pinch somehow the bee it is clinging onto, 
do you know what will happen? … this one will pinch the next one; ... as 
many pinching sensations will arise throughout the cluster as there are 
little animals in it; ... the whole cluster will stir, move and change position 
and shape.67 
Of course, Bentley contended, as we have seen, that even if the 
swarm of bees might appear from the outside to be a single being, it 
is not so, because there is no single consciousness inside it; it has no 
mind. However, Diderot’s aim in putting these words in the mouth of 
a sleep-talking man is, precisely, to unsettle any attachment to the idea 
of consciousness, and to point out that, in fact, we regularly give it up, 
that is to say, every night when we sleep.68
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Yet it is not only an attachment to the idea of consciousness that the 
text seeks to unsettle, it is also an attachment to inwardness and to 
first-personhood. The text’s peculiar set-up means that d’Alembert’s 
private dream happens in public; not only does he have the dream-
conversation out loud and, in addition, describe the things he dreams 
he can see, notably down a microscope, but his ideas and perceptions 
are made visible by his body as he gestures, ejaculates, blushes, and 
sighs.69 Furthermore, d’Alembert’s dream has an effect on other char-
acters’ bodies and voices, which join the dream. The mind in Le Rêve 
is not only embodied, it is also extended, and not simply in the sense 
that it is distributed throughout the body rather than located in one 
place, such as the brain, but also in the sense, akin to that proposed 
by some branches of modern cognitive science, that it shapes and is 
itself shaped by the surrounding material environment.70 In Le Rêve, 
that environment consists of other bodies and other voices, for there 
is something strangely contagious about embodied-mind theory in 
Diderot’s text: it is as though anyone who hears it performs it.71 Diderot 
spoke it to d’Alembert, who then spoke it in his sleep to Mlle de Lespi-
nasse, who then speaks it to Bordeu; indeed, she declares, “Je n’écoute 
que pour le plaisir de redire” [I only listen for the pleasure of repeating 
what I hear].72 And Bordeu then speaks it in his turn; indeed, he is able 
to predict what Mlle de Lespinasse’s notes say without having seen 
them.73 And as the characters repeat, predict, or ventriloquize, they lose 
track of who is who: “Bordeu. – Est-ce vous qui parlez? Mademoiselle 
de Lespinasse. – Non. C’est le rêveur. Bordeu. – Continuez. Mademoi-
selle de Lespinasse. – Je continue […] Il a ajouté, en s’apostrophant 
lui-même. Mon ami, d’Alembert, prenez-y garde …” [Bordeu. – Is 
it you talking? Mademoiselle de Lespinasse. – No, it’s the dreamer. 
Bordeu. – Continue. Mademoiselle de Lespinasse. – I am continuing ... 
He added, addressing himself. D’Alembert, my friend, take a closer 
look ...].74 Voices merge, and identities fuse and become continuous 
with each other to create a verbally performed swarm, in which each 
swarm-member is part of a greater conversational whole.
But what is the status of that performance? Many scholars have 
argued that Le Rêve is Diderot’s most clearly materialist work, one 
in which he offers a philosophical and literary demonstration for 
embodied-mind thesis, a demonstration that he backs up with scien-
tific evidence by means of the interventions of the medical doctor, Bor-
deu.75 Yet the text also explores the nature of scientific truth, and indeed 
the swarm-form enables the suggestion that if the characters all speak 
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embodied-mind theory, it is not so much because it is true as because 
it is the discursive practice of the group to which they belong; it is an 
esprit de corps. Mlle de Lespinasse makes use of this phrase when she 
glosses Bordeu’s explanation of how it is, in the absence of an immate-
rial soul, that a body, which undergoes many changes over time, has 
a continuous identity. Bordeu explains to d’Alembert, who has now 
woken up, that had he gone suddenly from being a young man to an 
old, not only would people not recognize him, but he would have no 
idea who other people were, since: “Vous n’auriez plus été vous ni pour 
les autres ni pour vous, pour les autres qui n’auraient point été eux pour 
vous. Tous les rapports auraient été anéantis. Toute l’histoire de votre 
vie pour moi, toute l’histoire de la mienne pour vous, brouillée” [You 
would no longer have been you either to other people or to yourself, 
and they would not have been them to you. All relations would have 
been destroyed. Your entire life history as I know it, and my entire life 
history as you know it, scrambled].76 This is the claim that Mlle de Les-
pinasse glosses by referring back to the swarm and observing: “Dans la 
grappe d’abeilles, il n’y en aurait pas une qui eût le temps de prendre 
l’esprit du corps” [In the cluster of bees, there wouldn’t be a single one 
that had been there long enough to adopt the esprit de corps].77 It is a 
good joke: in French “l’esprit du corps” literally means “the mind of the 
body,” and the esprit de corps of the conversational swarm of which she 
is a member, is, precisely, the belief that the mind is embodied. Yet the 
pun also allows for the suggestion that materialism is not so much a sci-
entific truth as a corporate ethos; and indeed Mlle de Lespinasse’s sub-
sequent comparison of the swarm of bees and a monastery underlines 
this: “Je dis que l’esprit monastique se conserve, parce que le monastère 
se refait peu à peu, et quand il entre un moine nouveau, il en trouve une 
centaine de vieux qui l’entraînent à penser et à sentir comme eux” [the 
spirit of the monastery is preserved over time because the monastery 
only renews itself gradually, and that when a new monk arrives, he is 
met by a hundred old hands who lead him to think and feel like them].78 
Of course, the idea of an atheist, materialist monastery is another good 
joke, but it also strengthens the suggestion that if embodied-mind the-
ory is to be understood as a scientific truth, it can only be so on the 
condition that scientific truth is itself understood to be the shared dis-
courses and practices, the habitus, of a particular community.79
That community would seem, at first glance, to have a kind of found-
ing member insofar as the character, Diderot, appears to be at the ori-
gin of all the conversations: Mlle de Lespinasse reads out d’Alembert’s 
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dream, which continued an earlier conversation he had had with 
Diderot, who appeared to have initiated it, for, though the first words of 
the text are spoken by d’Alembert, they are clearly in reply to something 
Diderot had just said. Presenting Diderot as the prime mover would 
also seem to be a way for Diderot, the author, to assert himself as such.80 
And yet, on further inspection, a point of origin is hard to find. Not 
only is the first part of the text entitled, we recall, “Suite,” suggesting 
the possibility that Diderot may be repeating to d’Alembert what some-
one else had earlier said to him,81 but the work’s imagery as a whole is 
very far from being original to Diderot, the author; indeed the imagery 
has been thought disappointingly banal.82 It might, of course, be argued 
that it is precisely such banality that lends the images their legitimacy 
and persuasive force,83 but another interpretation is also possible. If the 
images are commonplace, it is also because Diderot’s concept of author-
ship is not invested in originality and is, instead, more concerned with 
participating in a communal literary imaginary.84 Of course, within that 
very imaginary, literary activities are themselves often figured in ento-
mological terms: where the spider is a figure for the writer who will 
acknowledge no predecessors, and the ant a figure for the literary thief 
or plagiarist, the bee is, by contrast, the writer who acknowledges the 
work of his forebears and reworks what he finds in them.85 And it is this 
latter approach that best figures Diderot’s in Le Rêve, and it might in this 
sense also be read as Lucretian for, when it comes to poetry, as it is with 
atoms, so it is with letters: there is only combination and recombina-
tion, and no such thing as creation ex nihilo.86
With Le Rêve, then, Diderot recombines existing entomological images, 
and assembles novel forms and new swarms. The swarm of bees does 
not only figure the body and the embodied mind; it also enables the fig-
uring out of the way in which body parts cooperate and perform actions 
without the need for an immaterial soul. Moreover, the figuring-out 
activity is one in which bodies not only think but also think with other 
bodies, speak in cooperation with each other. What the image offers, 
then, is not so much a claim that the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts, as a performance in which the soul is the hum of its parts.87

“La Cironalité Universelle”?
This essay contends, then, that the early modern materialist imagi-
nary is not only stocked with clocks and machines, but also teeming 
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with bugs. Indeed, the two sets of images, mechanist and organic, 
sometimes go hand in hand – in Sterne’s novel, “maggots” appear just 
after “motions” and “machinations,” and a similar collocation can be 
found in another novel not considered here, namely Fanny Hill (1748).88 
Indeed, we might go so far as to apply to early modern literature the 
memorable phrase coined by Cyrano de Bergerac to describe the uni-
verse, namely “la cironalité universelle” [universal little-critterdom].89
Moreover, it is significant that writers do not only employ entomo-
logical images to figure the embodied mind; they also use them to figure 
the books and texts in which the images appear: Sterne’s brain-child is 
maggoty, and Diderot’s dream-text a bee-swarm. If nothing else, such 
close attention to matters literary on the part of early modern embodied- 
mind theorists (and their critics) means that modern intellectual histo-
rians working on the history of materialism and the idea of “thinking 
matter” must also attend to its particular literary embodiments.
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Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, ed. Peter Sabor (Oxford: Oxford World’s 
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métaphore?,” Dix-huitième siècle 20 (1988): 368–76; Charles T. Wolfe, 
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At the end of his life, the ailing philosopher Denis Diderot was still 
working on a decades-old project that has been called his “second ency-
clopedia.”1 This was the Éléments de physiologie, a work he intended as 
nothing less than a compendium of all existing knowledge on the oper-
ations of the human body and mind. The work was left, apparently 
unfinished, at Diderot’s death in 1784, and its fragmented, partially 
derivative nature has led some commentators to read it more as a col-
lection of notes for an unrealized project than as a consummate final 
expression of Diderot’s philosophy.2 Others have called the Éléments 
de physiologie Diderot’s philosophical testament, but without address-
ing what that might mean for our understanding of this work or of 
Diderot’s philosophy in general.3 I do not mean to suggest here that 
Diderot realized his ambitions for the Éléments de physiologie before he 
died; we don’t know his intentions for the work and we probably never 
will.4 I want to propose, however, that in this seemingly unfinished 
work he gave written form to his vision of the human brain as a vast, 
dynamic repository for encyclopedic knowledge. Through the form of 
the work, he also staged the impending loss of his own brain as a living 
encyclopedia. The Éléments de physiologie is thus indeed “something of 
a swansong,” but not simply because it was, along with the Essai sur 
les règnes de Claude et de Néron, one of Diderot’s two last works.5 We 
should read the Éléments de physiologie as Diderot’s philosophical testa-
ment because in this work he both reflected upon and embodied the 
end of his philosophical life. Diderot’s life as a philosopher was marked 
by his adherence to materialist philosophy – his belief that nature oper-
ated according to a continual recycling and transformation of vital 




project. Indeed, the Éléments de physiologie binds these two aspects of his 
philosophy together, showing us how new minds formed by the recy-
cling of vital matter continually reinvent new forms of knowledge by 
integrating and transforming the work of previous minds. It is clear 
that Diderot wanted to come to some definitive conclusion about phi-
losophy at the end of his life: on the last page of the Éléments de physi-
ologie, he summed up his philosophy in a single sentence. But the work 
as a whole opened a window onto the constantly changing operations 
of his mind, and its eventual dissolution and recuperation by others. 
In my reading, the Éléments de physiologie takes its meaning from the 
elaboration of a form of philosophical writing that functions as a sort of 
extended mind, one that encompasses individual thoughts, memories, 
and projects, but also looks beyond them in acknowledgment of their 
finitude.
The Éléments de physiologie deserves its appellation as Diderot’s sec-
ond encyclopedia in two important respects: first, it synthesized a life-
time of reading in the medical sciences (begun in the 1740s when the 
young Diderot took courses in anatomy and undertook a translation 
of the Englishman Robert James’s Medicinal Dictionary), and second, 
it aimed to achieve a comprehensive natural history of man based in 
physiology, psychology, and philosophy.6 According to Jean Mayer, the 
first scholar to take Diderot’s scientific thought seriously in the 1950s, 
the Éléments de physiologie rivalled and even surpassed the great nat-
uralist Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon’s Histoire naturelle de 
l’homme.7 Unlike Buffon, Diderot was not an experimental scientist, but 
for Mayer the attentiveness and breadth of his readings allowed him to 
constitute “a veritable borrowed experimentation.”8 The range of Dider-
ot’s sources is astonishing, including, in addition to Buffon, Albrecht 
von Haller, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Mau-
pertuis, Théophile de Bordeu, Jean-Paul Marat, Paul-Joseph Barthez, 
Marin Cureau de la Chambre, Antoine Le Camus, Robert Whytt, and 
Charles Bonnet, among many others. In some cases, Diderot used mate-
rial from his sources to combat their conclusions.9 But in other cases, 
notably in the middle section, he borrowed so heavily from his sources 
that the status of the Éléments de physiologie as an original work has been 
questioned. My reading will combine formal and philosophical analy-
sis to connect this middle section to the two more original parts of the 
work, to show how the work as a whole functions as an encyclopedic 
brain even as it contemplates the loss of Diderot’s individual brain.10 I 
will focus on three aspects of the Éléments de physiologie that correspond 
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to its three main sections: first, I will discuss Diderot’s physiological 
theory of death, outlined in his first section on the nature of life and its 
various forms; second, I will address the derivative nature of the mid-
dle section, which was largely borrowed from Haller’s writings on the 
irritability and sensibility of animal tissues and organs; and third, I will 
consider Diderot’s concept of deep memory, which he developed in 
his third section on the self, consciousness, and memory. Here, Diderot 
introduced an image of the human brain as a dynamic, encyclopedic 
repository for a lifetime of sensations and learning. At the same time, 
he posed the question of what the ultimate destruction of this living 
repository meant for the practice of philosophy and the continuing 
advancement of human knowledge.
Death Stops There
In the first part of the Éléments de physiologie, entitled “On Beings,” 
Diderot outlined his view of the various life forms found in nature, 
their organization, and their dissolution in death. Throughout this sec-
tion he emphasized the provisional character of his contemporaries’ 
knowledge of natural beings, observing that “the manner of classify-
ing natural beings with exactitude can only be the fruit of the succes-
sive work of a great number of naturalists: it will be tiresome and very 
slow. Let us wait and not hurry ourselves to make judgments.”11 The 
apparent discontinuities between various life forms might simply be 
the result of as yet undiscovered beings that would allow the naturalist 
to better perceive the continuous chain of nature; hence Diderot paid 
special attention to beings he classed as plant-animals, notably the 
freshwater polyps observed by the Swiss naturalist Abraham Tremb-
ley. In his chapter on animals, Diderot rejected the mechanistic view 
of these animated beings as “hydraulic machines,” again emphasizing 
the extent to which his contemporaries’ knowledge of animal move-
ment was provisional: “the laws of movement governing sensitive, ani-
mated, organized, living bodies have not even been sketched out yet” 
(305). Following Haller, Diderot gave great importance to animal sen-
sibility, which he defined as “the quality proper to the animal, which 
alerts it to the relationship between itself and everything surrounding 
it” (305). But it was above all with reference to the Hallerian concept of 
irritability that he introduced his principal concern in this section: the 
fine line between life and death. As Haller showed in his experiments 
on cadavers, “certain parts of the body conserve after death, for more or 
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less time, their irritability or individual life” (308–9).12 This insight into 
animal physiology paved the way for a fuller discussion of death in 
which Diderot offered an original synthesis of the views of the French 
naturalist Buffon, the Montpellier doctor Théophile de Bordeu, and the 
Scottish physician Robert Whytt.
Diderot’s understanding of death was consistent with the gradual-
ist conception of death popularized by Buffon’s Histoire naturelle de 
l’homme, published in 1749. According to Buffon, death must be under-
stood not as a singular, catastrophic event, but as a gradual process that 
gets played out in the body over time. Buffon grounded this specula-
tive theory in empirical studies of the hardening of tree trunks, positing 
that death was an analogous process of hardening, or ossification, of 
the body.13 Although Buffon did not personally contribute to the Ency-
clopédie, passages from the Histoire naturelle were frequently included 
in the work without attribution, as in the Chevalier de Jaucourt’s 
article “Ossification,” which reproduced Buffon’s theory of death.14 In 
the Éléments de physiologie, Diderot combined Buffon’s theory with a 
view of the human body he took from Bordeu, according to which vari-
ous organs work together as a system while also possessing their own 
individual vitality. As Kurt Ballstadt puts it, “Bordeu viewed the body 
as a more-or-less loose assembly of organs, hierarchically arranged, 
in which each vital organ possessed a certain degree of autonomy. ... 
Human life was, for Bordeu, a multi-layered phenomenon. The life of 
the body as a whole was superimposed over the lives of the organs 
themselves, which could be viewed as semi-independent systems in 
their own right.”15 This view informed Diderot’s understanding of ani-
mal organization, a key concept for eighteenth-century vitalists.16 For 
Diderot, the initially fluid animal has sensibility and life in each of its 
constituent parts, but seems to lack “a sensibility and a life common 
to the mass” (310). As an animal takes on its organized form, “there 
is established a general and common sensibility that the organs share 
diversely” (310). In Le Rêve de d’Alembert, Diderot expressed this distinc-
tion with an image borrowed from Bordeu’s 1751 Recherches anatomiques 
sur la position des glandes et sur leur action, when Dr Bordeu invites Mlle 
de Lespinasse to imagine the difference between a swarm of bees that 
appears to act as a whole but is in fact merely joined by contiguity (the 
animal in its initially fluid state) and a swarm of bees that has been 
fused to form a continuous whole (the animal in its organized state).17 
It is significant that the distinction between the two swarms of bees 
appears extremely slight and is even imperceptible to the human eye.
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The fine line between contiguity and continuity in Bordeu’s bee meta-
phor informed Diderot’s understanding of death as a relative phenom-
enon. In the Éléments de physiologie, he combined the Buffonian view 
of death as a process of gradual hardening with the Bordeu-inspired 
notion that the various parts of the body can harden and lose their sen-
sibility at different times, thereby isolating themselves from the whole: 
“[The sensibility] appears proportional to the progress of hardening; 
the harder an organ gets, the less sensitive it is. The more quickly it 
advances towards hardness, the more quickly it loses its sensibility and 
isolates itself from the system” (310). Thus, for Diderot, death was not 
only a gradual process, as it was for Buffon, but also a discontinuous 
process in which various parts of the body became dissociated from 
the whole each according to its own rhythm.18 Diderot’s conception of 
death was also influenced by Whytt, who, in An Essay on the Vital and 
other Involuntary Motions of Animals, distinguished between “the gen-
eral death of the body as a system” and the “particular death of the 
several parts, which does not happen for some time after.”19 In keeping 
with this view, Diderot posited various levels of life (and death) in any 
living organism:
There are certainly two very distinct lives, even three.
The life of the entire animal:
The life of each of its organs.
The life of the molecule. (310–11)
Animal organization is what allows the various organs and molecules 
of a living being to work in conjunction with each other. But in death, 
the collective life of the animal ceases, even if the life of its various parts 
persists. In fact, Diderot asserted the relativity of death in quite radical 
terms, claiming that it did not reach the level of the molecule: “The 
heart, the lungs, the spleen, the hand, almost all the parts of the animal 
live for some time separated from the whole. Even the head separated 
from the body looks and lives. There is only the life of the molecule or 
its sensibility that does not cease. That is one of its essential qualities. 
Death stops there” (311). The notion that death did not reach the animal 
on the level of the molecule was crucial to Diderot’s materialism, which 
was vitalist, not in the strict sense of positing a vital substance replacing 
the soul as the source of life, but in the broader sense that it attributed 
unending vitality to the primitive elements of nature. This view made it 
possible that after death, the now contiguous (rather than continuous) 
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molecules of an animal’s corpse could be recombined in new forms; as 
Diderot put it, “How many metamorphoses escape us! I see some that 
are rather quick: why wouldn’t there be others for which the period 
would be more distant? Who knows what may become of the insensi-
tive molecules of animals after their deaths?” (296). In a similar vein, 
d’Alembert goes so far as to muse, at the climax of his dream, that to 
die is merely to change forms: “Alive, I act and I react as a whole ... 
dead, I act and I react as molecules. ... So I don’t die at all. No, with-
out a doubt, I don’t die at all in this sense, neither me, nor anything 
at all. ... To be born, to live and to pass, is to change forms.”20 In a let-
ter to his lover Sophie Volland, written in 1759, Diderot himself mused 
about the possibility that the most basic elements of his body might one 
day meld with hers to form a new self centuries after their deaths, in a 
morbid act of procreation. This passage merits being quoted at length 
in the original French because it prefigures two crucial aspects of the 
Éléments de physiologie:
Ceux qui se sont aimés pendant leur vie et qui se font inhumer l’un à côté 
de l’autre ne sont peut-être pas si fous qu’on pense. Peut-être leurs cendres 
se pressent, se mêlent et s’unissent ! que scais-je ? Peut-être n’ont-elles pas 
perdu tout sentiment, toute mémoire de leur premier état. Peut-être ont-
elles un reste de chaleur et de vie dont elles jouissent à leur manière au 
fond de l’urne froide qui les renferme. Nous jugeons de la vie des éléments 
par la vie des masses grossières ! Peut-être sont-ce des choses bien diver-
ses. On croit qu’il n’y a qu’un polype ! Et pourquoi la nature entière ne 
seroit-elle pas du même ordre ? lorsque le polype est divisé en cent mille 
parties, l’animal primitif et générateur n’est plus ; mais tous ses principes 
sont vivants. O ma Sophie ! il me resteroit donc un espoir de vous toucher, 
de vous sentir, de vous aimer, de vous chercher, de m’unir, de me confon-
dre avec vous quand nous ne serons plus, s’il y avoit dans nos principes 
une loi d’affinité, s’il nous étoit réservé de composer un être commun, si je 
devois dans la suite des siècles refaire un tout avec vous, si les molécules 
de votre amant dissous avoient à s’agiter, à s’émouvoir et à rechercher les 
vôtres éparses dans la nature ! Laissez-moi cette chimère, elle m’est douce, 
elle m’assureroit l’éternité en vous et avec vous.21
[Those who loved each other during their lives and are buried next to 
each other may not be as crazy as we think. Perhaps their ashes press up 
against each other, mingle together and are united! who knows? Perhaps 
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they have not lost all feeling, all memory of their initial state. Perhaps they 
have a remnant of warmth and life that they enjoy in their own way at the 
bottom of the cold urn that holds them. We judge the life of elements by 
that of crude masses! Maybe they are very different things. We think there 
is only one polyp! And why wouldn’t all of nature be of the same order? 
when the polyp is divided into one hundred thousand parts, the primitive 
and generative animal is no longer; but all its principles are living. Oh my 
Sophie, I would then still have some hope of touching you, of feeling you, 
of loving you, of searching for you, of uniting myself, of blending myself 
with you, when we are no longer! If only there were a law of affinity for 
our principles, if only our fate were to compose a single being; if only I 
were to form a whole with you in the coming centuries; if only the disper-
sed molecules of your lover were to become agitated, to start moving and 
searching  for yours spread in nature. Leave me this illusion. It is sweet to 
me. It would guarantee me eternity in you and with you.]
This letter sketches out some of the central ideas of the Rêve de 
d’Alembert, which Diderot wrote a decade later in 1769. But it also helps 
us to understand the Éléments de physiologie in two important respects: 
first, we see Diderot using the term elements, along with molecules, to 
refer to the basic building blocks of vital matter (“Nous jugeons de la 
vie des éléments par la vie des masses grossières!”). This suggests that 
we should read the title of the Éléments de physiologie – which has often 
troubled scholars both because it is taken from Haller and because it 
seems to reduce the ambitions of Diderot’s work to a mere textbook 
in physiology – not simply as a Hallerian reference to the fundamen-
tal elements of the science of physiology, but as drawing an analogy 
between the work itself and the elements of vital matter (still alive after 
death). Second, the letter holds out the tantalizing possibility – more 
fully developed in the Éléments de physiologie – that the elements of 
the human body may contain some memory of their former state after 
death. Both of these ideas would be essential to Diderot’s image of the 
brain as a living encyclopedia in the third part of his work, and to his 
reflection on the fate of his own brain after death.
Diderot’s erotic musings about reincarnation in his letter to Sophie 
Volland might seem more in keeping with the speculative, poetic Rêve 
de d’Alembert than with the more empirically grounded, scientific Élé-
ments de physiologie.22 But in fact it was not unusual for Enlightenment 
vitalists to attempt to ground theories of reincarnation in the empirical 
sciences. As Kris Pangburn has shown, the Genevan naturalist Charles 
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Bonnet (another of Diderot’s sources) derived his seemingly mystical 
theory of palingenesis from detailed, anatomical studies seeking to 
locate the elusive organ of the human soul.23 Diderot, however, rejected 
any notion of the soul as the source of life or unity in the animal: “Life 
persists in the organs when they are separated from the body. Where 
then is the soul? What becomes of its unity, its indivisibility? … Why 
not see sensibility, life, movement as so many properties of matter: since 
we find these qualities in each portion, each particle of flesh?” (333). 
Although Diderot did use the term soul in the Éléments de physiologie, 
he understood it not as the immaterial substance of an immortal soul, 
but simply as another word for the unity of the organized animal: “The 
animal is a complete unity, and it is perhaps this unity that constitutes 
the soul, the self, consciousness, with the aid of memory” (335). Instead 
of relying on metaphysical notions, Diderot used social metaphors to 
characterize the organization, or collective life, of the animal. If life was 
constituted by an animal’s various parts working together collectively, 
the death of its various parts could be seen as analogous to their retreat 
from the pleasures and duties of a collective, social life:
Parts united to the body seem to die, at least as a group: in getting older, 
the flesh becomes muscular, the fiber hardens, the muscles become tendon- 
like, the tendon appears to have lost its sensibility, I say appears, because 
it could still have sensation in itself, without the entire animal knowing it. 
Who can assure us that there isn’t an infinity of sensations that excite and 
extinguish themselves here? Little by little the tendon slackens, it dries 
out, it hardens, it ceases to live, at least of the common life of the whole 
system; perhaps it only isolates itself, separates itself from the society 
whose pains and pleasures it no longer shares and to which it no longer 
gives back anything. (311)
What is lost, when a part secedes from the whole, is not necessarily its 
individual sensibility or vitality, but merely its participation in the col-
lective life of the body. Once again, Diderot emphasized his contempo-
raries’ lack of knowledge concerning the hidden processes of life and 
death: just as we may not perceive the difference between a contiguous 
and continuous swarm of bees, we may not perceive the continuing 
sensibility of organs that have separated themselves from the whole. 
And just as there are infinitely fine gradations between the world of 
plants and animals, the fine line between a cadaver and a living animal 
is much more subtle than we may realize. Death is nothing more than 
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the dissolution of a temporary, contingent organization of living mol-
ecules that will enter into new forms in the future.
The social metaphors at work in Diderot’s theory of death are also 
significant in light of his reflections, in the same chapter, on the place 
of the elderly in society. Whereas in the Histoire naturelle Buffon used 
mortality statistics to attack old age as a prejudice to be eradicated by 
the rational philosopher, Diderot presented a disabused vision of the 
illusions of old age and the burden the elderly represent for society:24
The child runs towards death with his eyes closed: the adult man is statio-
nary. The old man gets there with his back turned. The child does not see 
the term of his life span; the adult man feigns to doubt whether one dies 
at all; the old man soothes himself, trembling, with hope that is renewed 
from day to day. It is cruelly impolite to speak of death in the presence of 
an old man: one honors old age, but one does not love it; even if one gains 
only respite from the painful duties one gives to a man when he dies, it 
doesn’t take one long to console oneself for his death. It is already saying 
a lot when one does not secretly rejoice. I was 66 years old when I told 
myself these truths. (313)
In this passage, we hear a rueful note of Diderot’s personal experience 
of aging. But if we link this passage to his reflections on death as a 
process of dissociation of parts from the whole, we see an implicit anal-
ogy between the exclusion of an old man from the pains and pleasures 
of society and that of an organ from the living, sensitive body. With 
respect to the dying body, Diderot insisted on the fact that we cannot 
perceive the sensibility of an organ after it secedes from the whole; 
although it may appear dead to us, it may continue to possess its own 
sensibility and vitality apart from the whole. In keeping with this idea, 
he suggested in a 1774 letter to the Volland family that, contrary to his 
expectations, his heart had not hardened with age; quite the contrary: 
“I may have ten more years at the bottom of my bag. Of these ten years, 
fluxions, rheumatisms, and all the rest of this troublesome family will 
occupy two or three; let’s try to save the seven others for rest and all the 
scraps of happiness one can hope for after sixty. That is my project and 
I hope you will want to second me on it. I thought that the fibers of the 
heart hardened with age. That is not so at all. I might even say that my 
sensibility has increased. Everything touches me, everything affects me, 
I will be the most remarkably weepy old man you have ever known.”25 
In both his personal correspondence and his philosophical testament, 
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Diderot offered his readers a glimpse of how his personal experience 
of aging was infused with his physiological thinking. Beneath the 
apparent decline of his body, he perceived a continuing vitality that 
he expected to survive beyond the grave. He understood his death as 
marking the end of a particular social cooperation among the elements 
of his body, but not the ultimate destruction of the underlying vitality 
that had brought that organization into being.
Bodies of Knowledge
The social metaphors at work in Diderot’s discussion of animal orga-
nization take on an added significance when one considers the ency-
clopedic and collaborative dimension of the Éléments de physiologie. 
Of course, this work was not written by a Société de gens de lettres as 
the Encyclopédie had been. In a certain sense, it was the most deeply 
personal of Diderot’s works, offering his readers a window onto the 
workings of his mind. But its derivative nature, especially in the 
second section, has given it a tenuous status in Diderot’s corpus.26 
Indeed, the fact that the second section consists largely of a collage 
of quotations and paraphrases from Haller’s eight-volume Elementa 
physiologiae corporis humani (and its one-volume digest the Primae lin-
eae physiologiae) has led some scholars to assert that the final state of 
the two extant manuscript copies cannot possibly represent Diderot’s 
final intentions for the work. As Aram Vartanian puts it, “It is highly 
implausible, of course, that Diderot had proposed all along to give, in 
the Eléments de physiologie, what would have been in substance merely 
a compilation – a sort of cours abrégé of Haller, enriched by additions 
from other specialists, plus an informal commentary of his own.”27 Yet 
the premise behind this claim is that originality is the overriding value 
in literary and scientific writing. This premise must be questioned if 
we are to take seriously the characterization of the Éléments de physi-
ologie as Diderot’s second encyclopedia, and if we are to take full stock 
of the social metaphors at work in his theory of death. Perhaps origi-
nality was not Diderot’s primary concern, or perhaps the originality 
of the work lies not so much in the exposition of new scientific knowl-
edge as in the elaboration of a form that reflects both his conception 
of knowledge as a shared, social endeavour and his understanding of 
nature as a constant recycling of vital matter in new forms.
Viewed in this light, the term “elements,” as Diderot used it in his 
1759 letter to Sophie Volland and in the title of the Éléments de physiologie, 
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takes on a special significance, regardless of whether Diderot’s age and 
declining health prevented him from realizing the Éléments de physiolo-
gie as he might have intended.28 The fragmentary, note-like form of the 
work (with numerous intriguing aphorisms followed by “to be medi-
tated upon” or “to be explained”) embodies the motif of elements (or 
vital molecules) that was the basis for Diderot’s understanding of life 
as a continual recycling of vital matter. This form also reflects Diderot’s 
understanding of the quest for encyclopedic knowledge as a collective 
project. Just as Diderot believed that the sentient molecules of his body 
could be recombined after his death to form other selves, he believed 
that the elements of other physiologists’ knowledge that exist in a frag-
mentary form in the Éléments de physiologie could be recombined to cre-
ate new knowledge in the future. This is not to say that Diderot limited 
himself to the role of compiler. As Mayer observes, “He does with his 
sources what Socrates did with his interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues: he 
takes from them their own refutation, borrowing from them the facts 
that are most able to overthrow their theories. Moreover, by confront-
ing opposing doctrines, he manages to achieve a comprehensive view 
thanks to the richness of his documentation.”29 In other words, Diderot 
played in the Éléments de physiologie a similar role to the one he had 
prescribed for himself in the Encyclopédie, that of the Socratic midwife 
who helped others give birth to new knowledge. But he sometimes did 
this by breaking knowledge down into its most basic elements, present-
ing it in a fragmentary form that could be picked up and incorporated 
into new forms by other writers in the future. Through its form and 
its content, the Éléments de physiologie reminds its readers that Dider-
ot’s knowledge of nature is provisional, that it depends on a collective 
body of empirical observations that is constantly being expanded and 
revised, and that comprehensive theories of natural processes always 
exist in creative tension with the labyrinth of empirical evidence.
Thus the derivative quality of Diderot’s middle section, entitled “Ele-
ments and Parts of the Human Body,” is thematically and formally con-
sistent with his project as a whole. The presence of multiple passages 
from Haller is not a reason to exclude the Éléments de physiologie from 
Diderot’s corpus or to argue that it is less original than his other works. 
On the contrary, in borrowing so liberally from Haller – but departing 
from him at significant moments – Diderot underlined his reliance on 
the body of empirical evidence that was available to him in his time. In 
keeping with Mayer’s notion of a “borrowed experimentation,” Diderot 
exposed in his middle section the results of Haller’s experiments on the 
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sensibility and irritability of organs, presenting his readers with a series 
of brief chapters covering topics ranging from muscle fibres to the brain 
to nerves to glands. He concluded this Hallerian survey of body parts 
with the organs of generation, paving the way for his own discussion 
of various competing theories of reproduction, and concluding with a 
chapter on the human fetus. If he was content to borrow from Haller 
in presenting the “elements” of the human body – the building blocks 
for his own evolving knowledge of physiology – he chose to arrange 
the chapters in such a way as to move from the dissected, isolated parts 
(taken from Haller) to the generation of a living, organized fetus. This 
progression should be interpreted in terms of Diderot’s preoccupa-
tion with animal organization and its dissolution in death, and more 
broadly in the context of contemporary debates among naturalists such 
as Buffon and Maupertuis concerning the mysteries of generation. 
Unlike the more derivative chapters on body parts, Diderot’s discus-
sion of generation was not lifted directly from Haller; rather, it offered 
a dynamic exposition of four competing “systems” of generation, in 
which he engaged with contemporary theories ranging from Buffon’s 
concept of the interior mould to Maupertuis’s claim that particles of 
organic matter were imbued with qualities such as desire, aversion, and 
even memory in a way that propelled the process of generation.30 Thus, 
the middle section allowed Diderot’s readers to witness the constitu-
tion of knowledge in parallel with the constitution of a living fetus: we 
begin with the most basic, unorganized elements of empirical knowl-
edge borrowed from Haller, and move to a more synthetic, organized 
discussion of generation drawn from a variety of sources. Knowledge 
comes to appear as something that is itself generated through the con-
tact between various minds. Reading, thinking, and writing are likened 
to physiological processes involved in the creation of life. The Éléments 
de physiologie thus appears as Diderot’s brainchild, a familiar metaphor 
for works of literature but one that takes on a new resonance in the 
context of his physiologically informed philosophy.
The Encyclopedic Brain
The third section of the Éléments de physiologie, entitled “Phenomena of 
the Brain,” explores the workings of the brain and, by extension, the 
contours of the self, consciousness, and memory. For François Laplas-
sotte, Diderot’s treatment of the brain is symptomatic of the “anticere-
bralism” of eighteenth-century materialism and the surprising lack of 
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progress in the scientific understanding of the brain from the Renais-
sance to the early nineteenth century. Laplassotte characterizes Dider-
ot’s discussion of the brain as “a long and systematic contestation of 
the prejudices that accord to this organ an importance that, according 
to Diderot, it does not deserve in the slightest.”31 It is true that Diderot 
sometimes downplayed the importance of the brain, calling it “an organ 
like any other” and “only a secondary organ that would never func-
tion without the intervention of other organs” (467). Yet, as Paolo Quin-
tili has observed, Diderot’s characterization of the brain as “merely an 
organ of secretion” in the middle section of Éléments de physiologie did 
not reflect his own views but was simply a transcription of Buffon’s 
conclusions.32 In his more developed discussion of the brain in his chap-
ter on memory, Diderot went on to contest this view, giving a much 
more powerful role to this organ as a dynamic site of consciousness 
and encyclopedic memory. As in the Encyclopédie, the reader must com-
pare various parts of the work against each other to perceive Diderot’s 
engagement with different theories of the brain and the genesis of his 
own theory. By including undigested passages from Haller and Buffon, 
he presented his readers with the scaffolding of his knowledge, and 
showed his mind at work as he surveyed various theories and com-
pared them with his own insights.
The third part of the Éléments de physiologie is undoubtedly the most 
original part of the work, and the one in which Diderot took on what 
one critic has called “the ‘big issues’ of life in general, and of human 
life in particular.”33 Central among these was his reflection on the con-
stitution and limits of the self as a part of nature. Diderot gave great 
importance to memory in the constitution of a unified self, asserting 
that “memory constitutes the self” (471). But he was especially inter-
ested in the various ways the brain filters sensory information to create 
a unified sense of experience. Like Buffon, who characterized life as a 
seemingly continuous thread that is broken every time we go to sleep, 
Diderot suggested that even a single day’s experience is punctuated by 
multiple little nights every time we blink: “It seems that we spend our 
days in little days and little nights. First of all, night falls every time 
we close our eyelids. And when doesn’t this happen to us? If we don’t 
perceive all these little nights, it is just because we don’t pay attention 
to them” (456). Diderot insisted on the gap between the illusion of con-
tinuous perception that our brain creates and the reality of intermit-
tent perceptions. In another striking analogy, he compared the soul (to 
be understood as another term for the self in the context of Diderot’s 
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monist materialism) to a person at a noisy dinner table, who only hears 
the person next to him: “The soul is amid its sensations like a guest at 
a tumultuous table, who talks with the person next to him, and does 
not hear the others” (467). Diderot emphasized the extent to which our 
brains filter out a unified, continuous sense of experience (a single con-
versation) amid a cacophony of competing sensations (the tumultuous 
table). Yet, just as the “little nights” are in fact part of our experience, 
whether consciously or not, so are the other conversations at the dinner 
table part of the soul’s experience (“The soul is amid its sensations”).
Diderot’s interest in the role played by unnoticed sensations – the con-
versations not attended to at the dinner table – was especially apparent 
in his chapter on memory, where he developed a concept of something 
we might call deep memory, by analogy to what scientists today call 
deep time. This concept of memory was extraordinarily expansive, con-
sisting of an immense memory bank of all the sensations – significantly, 
even unnoticed sensations – we have absorbed over the course of our 
lives. In a remarkable sentence that merits being quoted in the original 
French, Diderot represented the brain as a kind of living encyclopedia:
Je suis porté à croire, que tout ce que nous avons vu, connu, entendu 
aperçu, jusqu’aux arbres d’une longue forêt, que dis-je, jusqu’à la disposi-
tion des branches, à la forme des feuilles, et à la variété des couleurs, des 
verts et des lumières ; jusqu’à l’aspect des grains de sable du rivage de la 
mer, aux inégalités de la surface des flots soit agités par un souffle léger, 
soit écumeux et soulevés par les vents de la tempête, jusqu’à la multitude 
des voix humaines, des cris des animaux, et des bruits physiques, à la 
mélodie et à l’harmonie de tous les airs, de toutes les pièces de musique, 
de tous les concerts que nous avons entendus, tout cela existe en nous à 
notre insu. (468–9)
[I am inclined to believe that everything we have seen, known, heard, 
noticed, all the way down to the trees of a long forest, which is to say, even 
to the arrangement of branches, to the form of the leaves and the variety 
of colors, of greens and lights; down to the aspect of grains of sand on the 
banks of the sea, to the unevenness of the surface of the waves, whether 
stirred up by a light breeze, or foaming and whipped up by the winds of 
a storm, down to the multitude of human voices, of animal cries and of 
physical noises, to the melody and to the harmony of all the airs, of all the 
pieces of music, of all the concerts we have heard, all of this exists in us 
unbeknownst to us.]
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What is striking about this sentence, in addition to its expansive, 
breathing syntax, is how deep into nature and into the self Diderot’s 
conception of deep memory reaches. The human brain appears as 
an immensely powerful tool for recording and preserving the tiniest 
details of nature absorbed over an entire lifetime of experience. The 
encyclopedic reach of memory makes the boundaries between the self 
and nature appear extremely porous; and by extension, it suggests that 
the boundaries between individuals may be porous too, since each 
individual brain reaches so deeply into nature. We find a similar idea at 
work in Le Rêve de d’Alembert, where the philosophical dream is some-
how shared by d’Alembert (who dreams it), Mlle de Lespinasse (who 
writes it down), and Bordeu (who knows its content without having 
spoken to d’Alembert or seen Mlle de Lespinasse’s text). As individ-
ual parts, or elements, of nature, the characters in Le Rêve de d’Alembert 
appear to share some sort of collective consciousness or memory. And 
although Diderot never formulated this idea explicitly, the Éléments de 
physiologie begs the tantalizing question – already raised in his 1759 let-
ter to Sophie Volland – of whether the most basic elements of an ani-
mal might not hold some traces of its deep memory after death. This 
idea might well have been suggested to Diderot by Maupertuis’s fanci-
ful theory of generation, in which he speculated that particles of mat-
ter “preserve the memory of their former situation that they tend to 
take up again.”34 This theory allowed for the possibility that the most 
basic elements of nature – the building blocks of future selves – might 
contain memories of the former selves they had constituted, and that 
these memories might play a role in the generation of new selves in 
the future. In this way, the collective memory that the characters of Le 
Rêve de d’Alembert seem to share might even extend across generations, 
forming a macro memory for the species as a whole over time.35
Diderot even suggested that our deep memory, understood as the 
unification of a lifetime of sensorial experience, could be recalled to our 
conscious perception by certain actions: “immense memory is the con-
nection between everything one has been in an instant to everything 
one has been in the following moment, states that, linked by an action, 
will recall to a man everything he has sensed during his life. I think 
every man has this memory. The conclusions are easy to draw” (471). 
The Proustian dimension of this and other passages in the Éléments de 
physiologie has not escaped Diderot’s readers, but the implications of 
deep memory for Diderot’s conception of the self, and especially for 
his view of aging and death, have not been explored.36 For Diderot, the 
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true unity of the self lay not in the illusory sense of unity created by the 
brain’s filtering of sensations and memories, but rather in “immense or 
total memory, [which] is a state of complete unity. Partial memory, state 
of incomplete unity” (472). Diderot was less interested in conscious 
memory as the locus of a continuous sense of self than in unconscious 
memory as a receptacle for the multiple sensations that crowd into our 
brains and are constantly being filtered to create a continuous sense of 
perception. This idea takes on a special significance at the end of our 
lives because, as Diderot put it, “old men remember the past in forget-
ting the present” (473). Just as he insisted on the possible vitality of 
an apparently deadened organ, Diderot alluded here to the old man’s 
renewed contact with the deep memory that had previously been inac-
cessible to him.
Diderot’s belief that deep memory preserves some record of all of 
our sensorial perceptions also led him to posit a deep logic underlying 
seemingly discontinuous intellectual operations. In the allusive style 
typical of the Éléments de physiologie, he wrote: “Intellectual actions 
interrupted and picked up again after a long interval; phenomenon to 
be explained” (465). The specific context in which this remark appears 
has to do with thoughts or intentions that are interrupted by a medi-
cal accident and then resumed at a later date. But Diderot’s interest in 
this kind of mental phenomenon speaks more broadly to the long and 
discontinuous composition of the Éléments de physiologie and, more gen-
erally, to the way intellectual projects take shape over time. If our deep 
memory indeed records everything we have ever seen, heard, learned, 
noticed (or, presumably, read), this might explain why our thought 
processes are both more discontinuous than we might expect (ideas 
and projects can be apparently dropped or stalled for long periods of 
time) and more continuous (unfinished ideas and projects are picked 
up later in life; forgotten facts or readings can play an unconscious role 
in the constitution of knowledge) than we might realize. This idea was 
reflected in the fragmented, collage-like form of the Éléments de physi-
ologie: it is as if Diderot were attempting to reproduce the intermittent 
form of his perceptions of a lifetime of reading in the physiological 
and medical sciences. Just as Buffon claimed at the end of his life to 
have attained a broad, sweeping view of nature in its entirety, Diderot 
sought to represent, through the form of his last encyclopedic project, 
his mind as an encyclopedic repository for a lifetime of learning about 
the body. Given his understanding of knowledge as a collective enter-
prise, the continuity of intellectual operations over time ultimately 
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reached beyond the limits of his own brain, to enter into conversation 
with other brains in what we today call an extended mind.
The analogy I am drawing between Diderot’s image of the brain and 
the form of the Éléments de physiologie as a literary work finds support in 
Diderot’s own analogy of the brain as a dynamic, living book that con-
tains its own reader within it. I will quote this passage in the original 
French because its allusive quality makes it difficult to decipher:
Pour expliquer le mécanisme de la mémoire il faut regarder la substance 
molle du cerveau comme une masse de cire sensible et vivante, mais 
susceptible de toutes sortes de formes, n’en perdant aucune de celles 
qu’elle a reçues et en recevant, sans cesse, de nouvelles qu’elle garde. Voilà 
le livre. Mais où est le lecteur? Le lecteur c’est le livre même. Car ce livre 
est sentant, vivant, parlant, ou communiquant par des sons, par des traits, 
l’ordre des sensations; et comment se lit lui-même? En sentant ce qu’il est 
et en le manifestant par des sons. (470)
[To explain the mechanism of memory one must see the soft substance of 
the brain as a mass of sensitive and living wax, but susceptible to all kinds 
of forms, never losing any of the forms it has taken and endlessly taking 
new ones that it preserves. Here is the book. But where is the reader? The 
reader is the book itself. For this book is sensitive, living, speaking, or 
communicating through sounds, through features, the order of sensations; 
and how does it read itself? By feeling what it is and by demonstrating it 
through sounds.]
Contrary to Laplassotte’s claim that Diderot sought to downplay the 
importance of the brain, this passage highlights his insight into the 
brain’s remarkable combination of dynamic plasticity and perma-
nent record-keeping. Far from denigrating the brain as a minor organ, 
Diderot seemed to marvel at its capacity to be at once a sensitive, liv-
ing mass of wax that continually changed shape to record new impres-
sions, and a permanent repository for an entire lifetime of sensations 
and experiences. As such, the brain is a living book, an ideal encyclope-
dia that records knowledge even as it changes shape to make room for 
new forms of knowledge. By containing its reader within it, the book 
gains the capacity to receive impressions while also reflecting on them 
to develop self-reflexive consciousness. One might then ask, what cor-
responds to the internal reader within the encyclopedic brain that is the 
Éléments de physiologie? Is it Diderot himself, who left so many traces of 
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his active mind in the work? Or is it the reader, who must grapple with 
the discontinuous, fragmentary form of the work, and who is thereby 
invited to enter into conversation with Diderot’s mind even long after 
his death?
If we take a step back to consider the form of the Éléments de physi-
ologie as a whole, a clear parallel emerges between the first and third 
parts, both of which address in different ways the dissolution of the 
human body and mind. In the first part, Diderot was concerned with 
what happens to the elements of the body when they isolate them-
selves from the whole and are restored to their original place in the 
broader universe of vital matter. In the third part, he was concerned 
with the relationship between the unified self (which is constituted by 
the brain’s sensorial filtering) and deep memory (which is constituted 
by the undifferentiated mass of the sensations). In the first part of the 
Éléments de physiologie, we get a fairly clear sense of what happens to 
the elements of the body after death: as Diderot had already suggested 
in the Rêve de d’Alembert, sentient molecules will be recycled to create 
new beings. In the third part, in contrast, we get much less of a sense of 
how Diderot envisioned what happens to the self (and especially to the 
mind) upon death. Yet the third part begs the question, since it begins 
with chapters on sensations, understanding, and memory (which are 
constitutive of the self) and ends with chapters on organs and illnesses 
(which contribute to the dissolution of the self in death). In his Discours 
sur la poésie dramatique, written in 1758, Diderot observed that memory 
alone guaranteed the continuity of the self, given the perpetual renewal 
of vital matter in the body: “It is only by memory that we are one and 
the same individual for others and for ourselves. At my age, there may 
not be remaining to me a single molecule of the body that I brought 
with me at birth. I do not know the term prescribed for my life span; 
but when the time comes to give this body back to the earth, it may 
well not contain a single one of the molecules it now has.”37 But in the 
Éléments de physiologie, Diderot complicated this apparent disjuncture 
between unified memory and vital matter, proposing that vital matter 
might itself possess some kind of memory. He did so in part through 
the form of the work, inventing a visceral form of writing that sought to 
capture the workings of his mind, even as it signalled the ultimate loss 
of that mind to the processes of nature.
After the penultimate chapter on illnesses, Diderot concluded the 
Éléments de physiologie with a chapter that departs from strictly physi-
ological matters to take up the classical understanding of philosophy 
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as a means of preparing for death. Here, Diderot proposed two differ-
ent spiritual exercises in preparation for death. The first relies on the 
faculty of the imagination, which occupies one of the main chapters 
of the third part: “A rather common fantasy among living people is to 
imagine themselves dead, standing next to their corpses and follow-
ing their funeral convoy. It is a swimmer who sees his clothing hung 
up on the shore. You men who inspire fear no longer, what will you 
hear then?” (516). This is a classic Stoic meditation, but it also reflects 
Diderot’s growing uncertainty, in the last years of his life, about the 
posthumous glory he had imagined for himself in his earlier exchange 
with the sculptor Étienne Maurice Falconet.38 Diderot’s violent attack 
on Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron, 
the other major work he wrote in his last years, was inspired in part by 
his fear that his former friend’s autobiographical writings might con-
tain personal revelations that would tarnish his public reputation. Yet 
in the second spiritual exercise described in the Éléments de physiologie, 
Diderot explicitly rejected any preoccupation with posterity, represent-
ing philosophy instead as a means of removing oneself from the con-
cerns of everyday life and the fear of death: “Another apprenticeship of 
death is philosophy, a habitual and profound meditation that removes 
us from everything surrounding us and annihilates us. The fear of 
death, says the Stoic, is a handle by which the strong man grabs us and 
takes us where he pleases. Break the handle and trick the hand of the 
strong man” (516). In keeping with the tradition of spiritual exercises, 
Diderot emphasized the habitual dimension of philosophy as a means 
of preparing for death. Indeed, this Stoic sentence about the fear of 
death was one Diderot recycled at least twice in the last years of his life, 
once in his contributions to the abbé de Raynal’s Histoire des Deux Indes 
and once in his Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron.39 Such recycling 
across works that are so different in tone and content suggests that just 
as living matter is recycled with the death of each individual, the same 
sentences must be continually recycled as the philosopher faces death. 
Thus, Diderot concluded the Éléments de physiologie, a work generally 
seen as unfinished, by condensing his entire philosophy into a single 
sentence: “There is only one virtue, justice; only one duty, to make one-
self happy; only one corollary, not to overestimate life for oneself and 
not to fear death” (516).
In fact, Diderot’s Stoic meditation on the annihilation of the self con-
tains the reverse image of his conception of deep memory. Whereas 
deep memory unifies a lifetime of sensorial experience and blurs the 
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boundaries between the self and nature, and between the self and oth-
ers, the Stoic meditation removes us from nature and obliterates the self 
to better understand its place in nature. For Diderot, the philosophi-
cal life was one that tracked deep memory through its encyclopedic 
attempts to understand nature; but it was also one that saw its own 
efforts as subject to the eventual annihilation of the self, whereby a 
lifetime of memories and intellectual pursuits will be restored to their 
elemental nature, only to be recombined by new selves at some point 
in the future. In this sense, his philosophical testament offered both his 
last word on philosophy and his acknowledgment that his writings 
were only one combinatory possibility in the infinite and ever shifting 
body of human knowledge.

In his preface to the eighth volume of the Encyclopédie, published in 
1765 as the project was drawing to a close, Diderot reflected bitterly on 
the many years of his life the work had consumed: “If you add to the 
years of our life that had already passed when we took on this Work, 
the years we have given to its execution, you will easily see that we 
have been alive for more years than are now remaining to us. But we 
will have earned the reward we expected from our Contemporaries 
and our descendants, if we cause them to say some day that we have 
not lived in vain.”40 As Diderot looked back on the struggles he faced 
as the editor of the Encyclopédie, the spectre of a wasted philosophical 
life loomed large. Nonetheless, he insisted that even if his own days 
were numbered, the Encyclopédie would serve as a bulwark against the 
eventual destruction of human knowledge: “If a revolution of which 
the germ is perhaps forming in some unknown region of the earth, or is 
brewing secretly in the very center of civilized countries, breaks out in 
due course, overthrows cities, disperses peoples once again and brings 
back ignorance and shadows; if a single complete copy of this Work is 
preserved, all will not be lost.”41 In the face of various losses – from the 
death of the philosopher to the return of the dark ages – the Encyclopédie 
promised a permanent record of the progress of human knowledge. As 
we have seen, Diderot betrayed a similar preoccupation with the con-
solidation and preservation of knowledge in his second encyclopedia, 
the Éléments de physiologie. But in this work, it was the brain itself that 
appeared to defy the passage of time through its remarkable capacity 
to record an entire lifetime of sensations, including the tiniest details of 
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nature, language, and artistic expression. The vast ambitions of the Élé-
ments de physiologie make the work appear as a figuration of Diderot’s 
brain, as an enduring record of an entire lifetime of learning about the 
body. But the work also stages, through the ordering of its chapters, the 
eventual dissolution of the individual life of the mind. The final chap-
ters on illness and death, and Diderot’s Stoic reflections on the meaning 
of death for the philosopher, remind us that no matter how powerful the 
brain is in its capacity to record a lifetime of sensations, it will eventually 
secede from the whole to be broken down into its most basic elements. 
The question Diderot left us with, at the end of his life, was whether the 
traces of his deep memory might not be preserved in the vital molecules 
of his corpse, and what new forms they might take on in the future. He 
also left us with a form of philosophical writing that embodied both his 
highest aspirations for the human brain as a living encyclopedia, and 
his inscription of his own mortal brain into an extended conversation 
with other brains that he hoped would continue far into the future.
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One of the most striking developments on the intellectual landscape 
of the eighteenth century is the emergence of aesthetic theory as an 
autonomous realm of inquiry. To be sure, reflection on the arts and their 
social function, and even on beauty itself, is almost as old as philosophy. 
But prior to the eighteenth century, the perception of the beautiful was 
not thought to constitute a distinctive mode of cognition, irreducible to 
logic, epistemology, or ethics. Of course, the idea that the brave thought-
adventurers of the eighteenth century discovered a terra incognita of 
the mind is implausible.1 Rather, we must ask ourselves what was there 
before, and what happened when a particular set of cognitive opera-
tions was annexed as properly “aesthetic.” Most important, why, at this 
particular juncture in Western intellectual history, did it come to seem 
imperative to rescue a distinct realm of the aesthetic from the mass of 
phenomena? When framed in this way, the problem of the emergence 
of aesthetics is genuinely puzzling. One way to understand the need for 
aesthetic theory at this moment is as a response (inadequate at best) to 
the nascent discourse of empiricism and its radical delegitimization of 
forms of thinking that are ends-oriented: the kind of thinking Aristotle 
calls phro-ne-sis (practical wisdom) and I will call judgment.2
Before I explain more fully what I mean by this last claim, it is worth 
remembering that we already have an answer to the question about 
why the aesthetic emerges at this moment, in the form of the so-called 
critique of instrumental reason, a critique that remains not just service-
able but necessary and powerful today as we endure the encroachment 
of marketized forms of thinking into every realm of human endeavour.3 
On this account, the Enlightenment witnesses the emergence and con-
solidation of a distinctive form of thinking that has come to dominate 
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our modernity, a kind of thinking called “instrumental reason” and 
associated with the new science. The objections to this form of thinking 
are manifold: that it is mathematizing and even utilitarian in its orienta-
tion, treating all phenomena as quantifiable; that it renders everything 
equivalent and without distinction; that it is reductive, attempting 
to explain phenomena from as simplified a set of postulates as pos-
sible; that it disenchants the world, voiding it of meaning and human 
purpose; that it is crassly focused on coordinating means to ends, and 
allows no room for digression and errancy; and finally, that it seeks to 
explain all human behaviour, starting from the premise of desire and 
self-interest, making it impossible to imagine actions that might not 
be self-interested.4 If we grant that this nexus of features characterizes 
instrumental reason, then the aesthetic could be viewed as a supple-
mentary discourse that remedies some if not all of these problems.5 
Perhaps most memorably, the experience of the aesthetic is supposed 
to attest to our capacity for disinterested contemplation, not governed 
by the dictates of desire or self-interest. Immanuel Kant describes the 
experience of the beautiful as that which pleases “without interest,”6 
but as Jerome Stolnitz argued long ago, the concern with disinterested 
contemplation is already evident in Shaftesbury.7 In his essay, “Sen-
sus Communis,” a text Kant appears to have in mind when he writes 
about the sensus communis or universal voice that we hear in aesthetic 
perception, Shaftesbury argues against Hobbes’s claim that all motiva-
tion is reducible to self-interest. He observes that we have a herding 
instinct that operates alongside our desire for self-preservation, and 
adduces everyday aesthetic experiences as proof that not everything 
that pleases is for the sake of self-interest. In other words, aesthetic 
contemplation appears to foil reductive explanations of behaviour as 
self-interested by offering evidence of a realm of phenomena in which 
we take pleasure even when we derive no benefit whatsoever from the 
encounter.8
The aesthetic is also a way of re-enchanting the world. We cannot 
gaze impassively at a beautiful object; it fills us with a feeling of plea-
sure as we contemplate it. For Baumgarten, who coined the term “aes-
thetics,” what distinguishes aesthetic representations is that they are 
“clear and confused,”9 by which he means the object of the representa-
tion can be distinguished from others (clear) but its qualities cannot 
be specified (confused).10 The confused character of aesthetic represen-
tations means precisely that they resist epistemological clarification, 
analysis, or quantification, functioning as qualitative experiences of 
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the meaningfulness of the world that cannot be explained further – 
the famous “je ne sais quoi” that defined aesthetic experiences. In 
fact, in some early accounts, the aesthetic is tasked precisely with re- 
animating the world with meaning and purposiveness, with a set of 
ends or final causes that had been stripped from it when phenomena 
were explained purely in terms of efficient causation. Thus, in Spectator 
413, part of the sequence on the “pleasures of the imagination,” Addi-
son and Steele explicitly frame their aesthetic arguments as a reflec-
tion on final causes,11 which had been bracketed from consideration in 
the discourses of empiricism.12 They explain that beauty generates the 
purposiveness of sexual desire; greatness (sublimity) motivates us to 
respect and worship god; and our fascination with novelty is the impe-
tus that drives us to seek knowledge.13 Hutcheson also finds a tripar-
tite purposiveness to the aesthetic. The epistemological and theological 
functions of the aesthetic are similar to those found in Addison and 
Steele, but the sexual impetus of beauty is repurposed as that which 
spurs us to accumulate wealth.14 The purposes of sexual reproduction, 
worshipping god, seeking knowledge, and wanting wealth cannot be 
made by ourselves, but must be given by naturally conditioned modes 
of aesthetic perception. The function of aesthetic categories, in these 
cases, is to restore purposiveness, but to do so as if purpose were sim-
ply a given and observable fact within the empiricist framework, rather 
than acknowledging it as the work of free judgment.
But as soon as we express the function of the aesthetic in this way, we 
begin to glimpse a problem both with the critique of instrumental rea-
son and with the aesthetic response to it. After all, if the aesthetic works 
to restore our sense of the purposiveness of the world and our lives in 
it, to give us goals and ends to pursue, then has it not re-established 
a kind of instrumentality in our lives? Sexual reproduction serves to 
propagate the species, reverence for god guarantees our morality or 
secures our fate in the afterlife, the pursuit of knowledge improves our 
lot, and the accumulation of wealth is perhaps the most instrumental 
of all ends. How is the pursuit of ends, however lofty these are, to be 
distinguished from the crassest forms of instrumentality? Furthermore, 
if purposiveness and instrumentality had to be re-established by the 
discourse of the aesthetic, does that not imply that instrumental rea-
son had stripped us of these in the first place, making “instrumental 
reason” a misnomer? Of course, the most important development in 
aesthetic theory in the century, Kant’s Critique of Judgment, which by all 
accounts establishes aesthetics as an autonomous discipline, radically 
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de-instrumentalizes the aesthetic, responding directly to the concern 
that an aesthetic that gives us purpose is open to the charge of serv-
ing merely instrumental ends. For Kant, what we experience, when 
we judge an object to be beautiful, is a purposiveness without purpose: 
“Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is 
perceived in it without representation of an end” (CJ, 5:236). The beau-
tiful object gives us an inkling of a world filled with meaning, but if we 
try to specify what that meaning is, we fail. Indeed, we must fail, or we 
would destroy the distinctively aesthetic dimension of the experience 
by judging that a particular purpose was given by our encounter with 
the object (5:229–30).
Kant’s account of beauty certainly rescues the beautiful object from 
any charge of instrumentality. But this solution is not one that can 
satisfy us. Rather, it points to a profound problem with the critique 
of instrumental reason and the aesthetic solution to it, which is still 
widely in evidence today. I suggested earlier that one of the functions 
of the aesthetic was to restore purposiveness or ends-orientation to a 
world that had been stripped of it by instrumental reason. Accounts 
of the world according to the logic of efficient causation – the entire 
realm of scientific inquiry is encompassed by this – are written in the 
language of mathematics. But mathematics has no language for pur-
pose and meaning; it can only express quantitative or logical relation-
ality. Thus, the critique of disenchantment is a very real one, but if we 
accept that to be true, a twofold puzzle remains. First, in what sense is 
instrumental reason “instrumental” at all, if it eradicates goals, mean-
ings, purposes, ends, from the world? Second, in what sense is the 
aesthetic an adequate response to “instrumental reason”? It appears to 
be caught in a double bind. If it restores purposiveness (Addison and 
Steele, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson), it re-enchants the world, but opens 
itself up to the charge that aesthetic objects have been instrumental-
ized. If it refuses to restore purpose (Kant’s “purposiveness without 
purpose”), it shelters itself from the charge of instrumentality, but 
appears to collude with the disenchantment of the world – the strip-
ping of ends and purposes from the world – enacted by instrumental 
reason itself. The problem I am describing here is not just an abstract 
logical dilemma. It is one aspect of what I call the “crisis of judgment” 
in the eighteenth century, because part of the work of judgment is 
to specify, indeed to fiction, purposes. Now, to specify a purpose is 
to articulate some goal or end that we judge worthy or important to 
attain, and thereafter to discern the means to attain that end. But the 
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very act of specifying ends and the means of attaining them requires 
us to participate in an instrumental logic, and if we refuse instrumen-
tality because of the problems described above, as aesthetic theory 
since Kant has often sought to do, we risk complete paralysis, inac-
tion, and the refusal of all commitment. Neither alternative is satisfy-
ing, but there does not appear to be another on the horizon. Either 
we judge according to some instrumental logic that we are forced to 
follow in lockstep, and whose conclusions are dictated in advance by 
the premises, or we refuse judgment altogether as the only way of 
resisting the encroachments of instrumentality. The dialectical dance 
of instrumentality and aesthetics, as it has played itself out since the 
late eighteenth century, is but one face of the aporia of judgment that 
we have inherited from the period.15
The problem, it should now be apparent, lies with the very notion 
that “instrumentality” is to be avoided at all costs. If that were the case, 
then any and all ends are automatically suspect, and we end up with 
a radical hermeneutics of suspicion that has dominated contemporary 
discourses of critical theory. But surely we want to be able to specify 
defensible ends and purposes that will not fall prey to a critique of 
instrumental reason? How are we to go about doing this? Are there 
ends and purposes that are not instrumental, and if so, what distin-
guishes them from instrumental ends? Or is there a good and bad ver-
sion of instrumentality, and how would we know the difference? As I 
have been suggesting, this set of questions, problems, and confusions 
is internal to the Enlightenment constellation of aesthetic discourse in 
the eighteenth century because, from Shaftesbury to Kant, one of the 
ways that aesthetic theory develops is precisely as a critique of “instru-
mental reason” of the kind proposed by Hobbes, Locke, or Mandev-
ille.16 But the same set of questions, problems, and confusions can also 
be found in the “critique of instrumental reason” proposed by Hork-
heimer. In the rest of this essay, I want to turn first to Horkheimer’s 
critique of instrumental reason. A fresh study of this critique is instruc-
tive because it will show that, although Horkheimer reproduces 
the incoherences of eighteenth-century aesthetics around the ends- 
orientation described above, he nevertheless accurately diagnoses 
many of the costs entailed in the shift to “subjective reason” (another 
name for instrumental reason). Perhaps most surprisingly, we will 
discover that his response to instrumental or subjective reason is not 
to purge all ends from reason, but to try and preserve (unsuccess-
fully) a certain orientation towards ends. I will then turn to Bernard 
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Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees to offer a new analysis of what is wrong 
with “instrumental reason,” and to suggest how these problems might 
be remedied, not through a repudiation of instrumentality but rather 
through a defence of judgment. Mandeville’s Fable articulates the most 
extreme version of a market logic in the period, the very epitome of 
what Horkheimer wants to critique under the name of “instrumental 
reason.” Yet we will find that there is nothing instrumental about this 
“instrumental reason.” On the contrary, it aims to abolish ends-oriented 
thinking entirely. If there is a problem with Mandeville’s market logic, 
I want to argue, it does not lie in instrumentality at all, but in the elision 
of the practice of judgment that would allow us to posit and commit 
to a different set of ends than those assumed in Mandeville’s account. 
Mandeville’s Fable is especially valuable because it stages for us this 
elision of judgment as very few exemplars of “instrumental reason” 
do. To complete my own analysis, it would be necessary to give a fuller 
account of the practice of judgment itself, as Shaftesbury, Fielding, and 
Austen, among others, do. But, for reasons of space, that will have to 
be undertaken elsewhere.

Horkheimer is one of the architects of the critique of instrumental rea-
son, and while he is certainly prone to the danger I have described of 
eliding the distinction between ends-oriented reason and instrumental 
reason, he still manages to preserve something of the distinction in his 
impressive study, The Eclipse of Reason. The first chapter of Eclipse of 
Reason ought to be read in its entirety here, for the exemplary diagnosis 
it offers, but I will offer a brief synopsis. Horkheimer begins by explain-
ing how a premodern conception of objective reason differs from the 
subjective reason that comes to displace it in modernity:
The degree of reasonableness of a man’s life could be determined accor-
ding to its harmony with this totality. Its objective structure, and not 
just man and his purposes, was to be the measuring rod for individual 
thoughts and actions. … The emphasis was on ends rather than means. The 
supreme endeavor of this kind of thinking was to reconcile the objec-
tive order of the “reasonable,” as philosophy conceived it, with human 
existence, including self-interest and self-preservation. … The theory of 
objective reason did not focus on the co-ordination of behavior and aim, 
but on concepts – however mythological they sound to us today – on the idea 
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of the greatest good, on the problem of human destiny, and on the way of 
realization of ultimate goals.17
The account might as well be Shaftesbury’s from his “Soliloquy” 
essay, with the reference to “harmony” that is such an important fea-
ture of Shaftesbury’s analysis, the focus on ends, and the uncomfort-
able recognition of the fictive ground on which judgments are based 
(“concepts – however mythological they sound to us today”). The effort 
to distinguish instrumental reason (“the co-ordination of behavior and 
aim”) from ends-oriented reason (“the idea of the greatest good,” etc.) 
is also in evidence here, but the grounds for this distinction remain 
opaque. How are the aims towards which behaviour is coordinated in 
any way different from ends, such as the greatest good? Once we have 
an end such as the latter, don’t we coordinate our actions in such a 
way as to achieve it? It is precisely the ability to distinguish between 
these two kinds of ends-oriented action that the critique of instrumen-
tal reason promises to deliver without being able to do so. All the same, 
Horkheimer lucidly diagnoses the problems that arise when “objective 
reason” is displaced by “subjective reason”:
In the subjectivist view, when “reason” is used to connote a thing or an 
idea rather than an act, it refers exclusively to the relation of such an object 
or concept to a purpose, not to the object or concept itself. It means that 
the thing or idea is good for something else. There is no reasonable aim as 
such, and to discuss the superiority of one aim over another in terms of 
reason becomes meaningless. (ER, 6)
Although Horkheimer recognizes the effects of the transformation that 
are underway – the inability of reason or judgment to arbitrate between 
ends – his description of the subjectivist view risks giving up too much, 
especially when he attributes the instrumentality of such a view to the 
linking of object with “purpose.” Once again, we must ask how such 
instrumental purposes differ from concepts of objective reason like 
“the greatest good” described a page earlier? Horkheimer attributes 
it to the purposiveness itself, but that will not help us separate instru-
mental from ends-oriented reason. The ultimate effect of the transition 
from objective to subjective reason may be summarized as follows:
In the end, no particular reality can seem reasonable per se; all the basic 
concepts, emptied of their content, have come to be only formal shells. As 
reason is subjectivized, it also becomes formalized. … If the subjectivist 
view holds true, thinking cannot be of any help in determining the desi-
rability of any goal in itself. (ER, 7; see also 92; Horkheimer and Adorno, 
DE, 88–9)
The problem Horkheimer describes here – the problem of how rea-
son can deliberate about substantive ends rather than being simply a 
formal, calculative, and algorithmic ratiocination – plagues the mod-
ern conception of reason disjoined from any ethical vocation.18 It is, 
as Horkheimer sees, a problem of judgment: “Reason has never really 
directed social reality, but now reason has been so thoroughly purged 
of any specific trend or preference that it has finally renounced even 
the task of passing judgment on man’s actions and way of life” (ER, 
9).19 But the terms in which Horkheimer articulates the problem, that 
of instrumentality and objective versus subjective reasons, obscures the 
way to a solution. After all, if thinking were to “help in determining 
the desirability of any goal in itself,” then surely a subject will have 
articulated some goal, purpose, or aim, and we would be hard-pressed 
to know how these were any different from the instrumental ends and 
subjective reason that Horkheimer wants to critique. By blocking the 
way to an account of ends-oriented reason that differs from instrumen-
tal reason, Horkheimer’s only recourse will be to the formal and empty 
notion of reason he impugns, as we will see in a moment.
Despite the proximity of my diagnosis to Horkheimer’s (and Ador-
no’s), the critique of instrumental reason does not offer us a helpful 
way to distinguish between a degraded instrumentality and a valu-
able, indeed indispensable, orientation towards ends. The reasons are 
manifold.20 To begin with, the foundation of the distinction, for Hork-
heimer, lies in the distinction between objective and subjective reason. 
Objective reason had the ability to ground substantive ends, whereas 
subjective reason accepts purposes as arbitrarily given and functions 
only as a means to those ends. However, Horkheimer recognizes that, 
under the conditions of modernity, it becomes impossible to return to 
or credit any conception of objective reason: “Today there is a general 
tendency to revive past theories of objective reason in order to give 
some philosophical foundation to the rapidly disintegrating hierar-
chy of generally accepted values. … But the transition from objective 
to subjective reason was not an accident, and the process of develop-
ment of ideas cannot arbitrarily at any given moment be reversed” (ER, 
61–2). Thus, when Horkheimer himself has recourse to the notion of 
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instrumentality, which relies on being able to distinguish objective from 
subjective reason, his indictments can only seem arbitrary, vague, sub-
jective, and ungrounded, as they often do in Eclipse of Reason. The dis-
tinction between defensible ends and a mere instrumentality becomes 
elusive, and all forms of ends-orientation begin to seem suspect. It is in 
this way that critical theory turns into a merely negative hermeneutics 
of suspicion, all too adept at offering a critique of the regnant order but 
without being able to offer a robust or viable alternative to that order, 
in spite of its proclaimed allegiance to the empty idea of the utopian. 
Speaking of the practice of critical theory, Horkheimer says: “On the 
contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appro-
priate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the pres-
ent order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific presuppositions 
about which one can do nothing” (“Traditional and Critical Theory,” 
207). The qualification “as these are understood in the present order” 
makes clear that some version of these ends is desirable and necessary, 
though they must be transformed in some way. But what is wrong with 
the ends themselves? Is it simply the fact of existing within the present 
order, in which case the problem does not lie with the ends or instru-
mentality but with the social order itself? How are the problems with 
that social order to be judged if not instrumentally, by way of some set 
of purposes or ends? And how can the ends be transformed to make 
them more appropriate or defensible? Without any ability to distin-
guish between instrumental and non-instrumental versions of “better,” 
“productive,” and “valuable,” the critique threatens to consume any 
account of ends-orientation as merely instrumental. An example of this 
excessive critique can be found in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, when 
Adorno and Horkheimer compare the man of science to the dictator: 
“The man of science knows things in so far as he can make them. In 
this way their potentiality is turned to his own ends” (9). One wonders 
what, in the abstract, can be wrong with making and shaping things 
for our own ends, and how it is even possible to live without doing 
so. Surely any utopian political project will require precisely this turn-
ing of potentialities to our own ends, this remaking of the world to be 
hospitable to our ends. The anti-utopian tendency of radical critique is 
clearly visible here. The effect of a critique that will concede no orienta-
tion according to ends, a critique that cannot offer a defence of certain 
ends as preferable to others, is that only formal, abstract, and non- 
substantive uses of reason can be endorsed: “In a historical period like 
the present true theory is more critical than affirmative, just as the society 
that corresponds to it cannot be called ‘productive’” (“Traditional and 
Critical Theory,” 242). For such a negative dialectics, freedom has to be 
understood as liberation from purposiveness;21 a non-instrumentalized 
thinking becomes an endless reflection on itself;22 and, concrete sugges-
tions for action become taboo.23
The only way beyond these impasses of the critique of instrumen-
tal reason is through a robust account of the practice of judgment, of 
the kind we find in Shaftesbury’s remarkable “Soliloquy” essay or the 
novels of Jane Austen, a task that cannot be undertaken here.24 Such 
an account of finite judgment will have to satisfy several conditions. It 
must allow us to specify substantive ends without recourse to notions 
such as “objective reason” that are no longer available to us. It must 
embrace the fictions on which any judgment is founded. (We have seen 
Horkheimer’s discomfort with this.) And yet, the process of judgment, 
and even the construction of appropriate fictions, must not be con-
strued as arbitrary; it has to be grounded, not in Reason, but in the giv-
ing of reasons. The conditions that an account of judgment must satisfy 
are easy to state, but it is difficult to find a working account that satis-
fies them. Adorno and Horkheimer often gesture towards the necessity 
for such an account, although they never articulate one themselves, as 
the problems with the critique of instrumental reason show. For exam-
ple, in the Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer speaks of the need to define 
“the objective goals of society” (175); and in “Traditional and Critical 
Theory,” the practice of critical theory is described as “the unfolding 
of a single existential judgment” (227; see also 234, 239). The Dialectic 
of Enlightenment offers a more extended discussion of judgment (194–
201), and even alludes to Hamlet’s hesitation as a sign of thinking in 
very much the way that Shaftesbury’s transformation of Lockean hesi-
tation into soliloquy does: “The person who doubts is already outlawed 
as a deserter. Since Hamlet, hesitation has been a sign of thinking and 
humanity for modern thinkers” (205). But beyond these gestures, criti-
cal theory offers us no resources for distinguishing an ends-oriented 
reason from instrumental reason.25

If Horkheimer’s theory gives up too much in its efforts to indict instru-
mental reason, then we must return to the representatives of instrumen-
tal reason with fresh eyes, to discern what is problematic about such 
reasoning and how we might remedy it. Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of 
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the Bees is perhaps the most glaring instance of an unchecked market 
logic and precisely the kind of account we might want to critique under 
the rubric of “instrumental reason.”26 A close examination of the Fable 
can help us understand why a “critique of instrumental reason” will 
always miss its mark, compelling us to develop a different diagnosis 
to explain what is so problematic about a theory like Mandeville’s. My 
own explanation, rather than drawing on any concept of instrumental-
ity, will focus on the elision or evasion of judgment in Mandeville’s 
text, the concerted strategy by which it conceals its own judgments to 
legitimate market-reasoning.
But even with all the problems mentioned above, why avoid the 
critique of instrumentality, rather than revising or updating it? The 
answer quite simply is because, if instrumental reason refers to 
the kind of rationality that is always oriented towards some goal, that 
is always seeking to maximize efficiencies and optimize outcomes, that 
always focuses on coordinating means and ends, that allows no room 
for errancy and the aleatory in its calculations, that is doggedly “tele-
ological” in its orientation (to use a word that has become anathema 
in contemporary critical discourse), then Mandeville’s theory cannot 
properly be said to be “instrumental.” Like Locke (Essay Chapter 2.21), 
Mandeville wants to understand motivation and action in a way that 
makes no reference to orientation by ends and judgments about ends.27 
In the second edition of the Essay, Locke tells us that he has revised 
his account significantly, because in the first edition he had mistakenly 
thought that some notion of the “greater good” served as a motiva-
tor for action. Now he has come to realize that desire (or what he calls 
“uneasiness”), not some idea of the “greater good,” motivates us to act. 
In other words, we act because we are uncomfortable with our present, 
not because we are enticed by a better future that we can imagine.28 
Mandeville’s theory, even more strenuously than Locke’s, is designed 
to put an end to high-minded speculation about the ends appropriate 
for human action. Desire, or in Mandeville’s case “passion,” is in effect 
being liberated to follow its wayward path in the present, as any market 
must, unshackled from the need to orient itself according to what might 
be considered “good.” As Mandeville explains in the introduction to his 
remarks: “I believe Man … to be a compound of various Passions, that 
all of them, as they are provoked and come uppermost, govern him by 
turns, whether he will or no” (Fable, 39). We act as the strongest passion 
in the psyche dictates, overwhelmed by its force, and not according to 
some rational calculus of maximization.29 There is hardly any space for 
reasoned deliberation or reflection on a course of action here, so from 
this perspective, there is nothing “reasonable” about instrumental rea-
son, just as there is nothing “instrumental” about it, since action has no 
end in view. If it is nevertheless appropriate to speak of a certain kind 
of “rationality” at work here, it is because the passions constitute the 
psyche as a machine whose motions obey a clear logic of efficient cau-
sation. We might describe this by saying that the system is rational but 
without reason. (When the term “Enlightenment rationality” is being 
used in a pejorative sense, it is usually some version of this “rationality 
without reason” that is being impugned.) In this context, Mandeville’s 
qualification that a person is governed by whichever passion is upper-
most “whether he will or no” is a surprising one, because it suggests 
that we might have the possibility to will otherwise than passion dic-
tates, that there is some space in which a deliberative reason might go to 
work, but elsewhere Mandeville denies this possibility, making the will 
itself indistinguishable from desire. Mandeville’s equivocation can be 
clearly heard in the following argument: “It is impossible that … mere 
fallen Man, should act with any other View but to please himself while 
he has the Use of his organs … There is no difference between Will and 
Pleasure in one sense, and every Motion made in spite of them must be 
unnatural and convulsive” (348–9). If there is no distinction between 
will and pleasure, it is unclear how any “Motion made in spite of them” 
is even possible, but Mandeville allows the possibility nevertheless. This 
equivocation opens onto a question that haunts the theory throughout, 
about whether the account of motivation and action is descriptive (we 
cannot but act in interested and impassioned ways) or normative (we 
should act in these ways and not through reasoned deliberation about 
ends, or we will face deleterious consequences). Indeed, the slippage 
from one to the other is precisely what enables the theory to make its 
claims without acknowledging its own acts of judgment.
The “economic” account of motivation offered in the introduction 
is consistent with Mandeville’s analyses in the body of the text. The 
strong motivating force of any passion can only be overcome by a more 
powerful force, not through any capacity to hesitate and reflect, a capac-
ity that even Locke had conceded (Mandeville, Fable, 75, 202, 207; see 
also Locke, Essay, 242, 254). Thus, for example, courage does not arise 
from some Stoic process of deliberation about our passions that gains 
command over fear; it is rather the effect of another passion, anger, that 
overcomes fear. Nevertheless, Mandeville appears to grant that there is 
some capacity to reason that is distinct from the passions, even though 
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its status may be precarious because it threatens to unhinge the smooth 
functioning of the system of the passions. Thus, he characterizes reason 
as both weaker than the passions even when it is operative, and always 
in the service of the passions even when it pretends not to be:30 “For 
we are ever pushing our Reason which way soever we feel Passion to 
draw it, and Self-love pleads to all human Creatures for their different 
Views, still furnishing every individual with Arguments to justify their 
Inclinations. … His strong Habits and Inclinations can only be subdued 
by Passions of greater Violence” (333). If the only logic of the psyche 
is the quantitative one of greater and lesser force, it is unclear why the 
pleadings of reason should be necessary, so the only function of reason 
must be a disruptive one in the logic of this system. That is precisely 
why it must be yoked back into the service of the passions. It is not that 
the passions need a reasoned accounting to give them more force. They 
operate just fine on their own. Rather, reason itself must be made to 
play a useful role in their service if it is not to be an unsettling force in 
the psychic mechanism. Reason, not passion, is the anarchic wildcard in the 
system, the one that threatens to derail the very systematicity of the system by 
its own unaccountable logic. There are crucial moments when Mandeville 
acknowledges that reason empowers us to judge otherwise than the 
system dictates, but it is precisely this capacity that he must rein in with 
the claim that reason is weak and invariably risks leading us astray. His 
strategy is to discredit the prudence of using our judgment to ques-
tion or second-guess the smooth operation of economic rationality. 
In the example below, Mandeville, by a clever reversal, himself takes 
up the position of the one posing ethical objections to the malt liquor 
trade, only to have his judgment exposed as short-sighted by the “good 
humour’d” proponent of economic reason: “He would answer, that of 
this I could be no Judge, because I don’t know what vast Benefit they 
might afterwards be of to the Commonwealth” (93). “Of this I could 
be no Judge”: I should simply follow my self-interest, allow others to 
follow their self-interest, and not speculate about ends that my reason 
is too weak to calculate.31 As long as I refuse to think about the bigger 
picture – indeed, as long as I do not think at all and am content with 
computation and calculation – unexpected good effects will follow, in 
this case through the untold employment opportunities provided by 
the liquor trade.32
It will seem strange to claim that judgment, or reasoned deliberation 
about ends, is the greatest threat to “instrumental reason,” but such is 
clearly the case in Mandeville. However, it will seem stranger yet to 
accuse Mandeville of bracketing purposes and ends, since his account 
is undoubtedly one of the most powerfully teleological justifications 
of the functioning of the market that we possess. Although the sub-
title of the text, “Private Vices, Public Benefits,” coyly avoids specifying 
the causal link between the two, contenting itself with a jarring jux-
taposition, the argument of the text is that the pursuit of one’s self- 
interest, even when it is clearly vicious, has unintended consequences 
that redound to the public benefit.33 In spite of disclaimers to the con-
trary, the text makes the argument for the unfettering not just of the 
market but of individuals from any moral strictures (thus making this a 
Fable to end all fables, a fable whose intention is to end the moralizing 
genre of the fable itself).34 And it makes this case precisely by appealing 
to the ends it promises will be attained if we follow its prescriptions, 
namely the public benefits that will result if everyone acts out of self-love 
rather than attempting to be good citizens. But we must proceed care-
fully here. We are so accustomed to a reflexive dismissal of teleological 
thinking and the ends it posits for history that the nature of the problem 
becomes obscured. The problem with teleological thinking cannot lie 
in the fact of positing ends by which to orient our action, because then 
Mandeville’s bracketing of ends to guide action would be precisely the 
solution we are in search of. Rather, the problem with the teleology of 
the market (which will become the teleology that guides philosophies 
of history later in the century, such as Hegel’s and Kant’s) is at least 
threefold. First, there can be no deliberation about the end itself, which 
is assumed to be given and self-evident. This becomes apparent when 
Mandeville narrows down the capacious meaning of “Benefits” to the 
narrowly economic one of profit and financial advantage. Second, it is 
assumed that the end naturally and inevitably emerges from the pro-
cesses of history or the market, whether we work towards its attain-
ment or not. Third, and most important for our purposes here, there is 
undoubtedly an end being posited for the system (“Public Benefits”), 
but the end cannot be said to motivate the actions of the individuals within the 
system.35 Individuals act for their own local ends (“Private Vices”) or, 
more properly, for no ends at all, simply following the overwhelming 
logic of their passions and interests. In fact, it is often suggested that the 
surest way to disrupt the attainment of the end is to work concertedly 
and consciously towards it. The end must be allowed to emerge, and 
it will emerge as long as we do not meddle by trying to bring it about, 
or trying to attain some other end. Actions, on this model, work best 
to attain the ends of the system when they are oblivious to those ends; 
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they must, to use a Kantian formulation, be purposive without pur-
pose. To call this reason instrumental, then, when it refuses to consider 
ends, misses the mark, and makes the aesthetic response to it a replica-
tion of the same problem, just as to call this reason “reasonable,” misses 
the mark because instrumental reason disavows the use of deliberative 
judgment, which threatens to disrupt the well-greased “rationality” of 
the economy of passions.

Let us return now to the problem with which I opened this essay, 
namely the aesthetic as an inadequate response to both the threat 
of the elision of ends and the threat of instrumentalization within 
empiricism. Neither the response outlined earlier in the century by 
Hutcheson or Addison and Steele, to find purpose already given in 
the phenomenal texture of the natural world with the beautiful, the 
sublime, and the new, nor the Kantian response later in the century, to 
denude the aesthetic object of purpose to avoid the charge of instru-
mentality, can satisfy us. If the problem with both empiricism and 
aesthetic discourse in the eighteenth century is that they are, in their 
different ways, uncomfortable with the work of making ends, then the 
adequate “aesthetic” response must be to embrace the labour of judg-
ment by which we fashion or fiction ends for ourselves. If judgment 
always has an aesthetic component to it, that is not because it has an 
immediate capacity to discern beauty in objects, but rather because it 
strives to make ends beautiful, so that they can serve as guides for 
our actions. This judgment will have to craft or fiction ends for action, 
and deliberate about alternative ends providing some kind of (provi-
sional) justification for them.36 The work of judgment, at once delib-
erative and fictioning, cannot be erased. It occurs every time we act, 
in the fullest sense of the word. But its place can be concealed. This 
is precisely what Mandeville seeks to do to ensure the smooth func-
tioning of the system, when he downplays the capacity of reason to 
intervene in the psychic mechanism, for example, or when he narrows 
the meaning of “Benefit” without admitting that he is making an eval-
uative judgment about what counts as a benefit, or when he makes 
alternatives invisible so they cannot enter into the process of delibera-
tion. But before the machine of the market or the Mandevillian psyche 
can be set in motion, a judgment has to be made about the ends they 
will serve. Although most of the Fable of the Bees is designed to conceal 
this work – to make the space of judgment invisible or unavailable to 
us – Mandeville nevertheless puts the work of judgment on display in 
the margins of the text, in the poetic fable of “The Grumbling Hive” that 
opens his discourse. It is here that we must be convinced, by a work of 
fictioning and deliberative judgment, that the market societies of today 
are preferable to the anti-consumerist republican societies of yore. It is 
in this prefatory and seemingly marginal discourse, to which the rest 
of the text is then quite literally an appendix or a set of extended foot-
notes, that Mandeville makes his own judgment. Let us now examine 
the process by which this judgment takes place.
Rarely do we think of the work of judgment as relying on fictions. 
But Aristotle tells us that judgment is about the things that can be other-
wise, and to be able to conceive of things as being potentially otherwise 
than they are requires imagination.37 It is only appropriate, then, that 
the judgment that authorizes Mandeville’s market system as the pref-
erable choice takes place in the course of a fable. But what is striking is 
how clear-sighted the fable is about its nearly impossible task: it must 
convince us to prefer life in a restless, corrupt, pointless, consumerist 
market society to life in a nearly idyllic republican utopia. To do this, 
the fable begins with a society of bees who live in a modern commercial 
economy that is kept functioning by a constitutional monarchy, much 
like Mandeville’s England (Fable, 6, 17; see also 116–17). But, dismayed 
by the fraud and mismanagement necessary to keep their society 
operational, the bees complain endlessly and wish that they lived in a 
utopia of honesty and frugality. Finally, the gods, fed up with all their 
complaining, punish them by making them feel shame, which results in 
the transformation of their modern commercial economy into a utopia. 
Perversely, the advent of shame and the resultant transition to a utopian 
social order is portrayed as a biblical Fall: “The very moment [Fraud] 
departs,/ And Honesty fills all their Hearts;/ There shews ’em, like th’ 
Instructive Tree,/ Those Crimes which they’re asham’d to see” (27, my 
emphasis). It may sound implausible to describe the Fall as a fall into 
utopia, since the fable is trying to convince us of the undesirability of the 
alternative, but the representation of the bees’ post-lapsarian society 
draws explicitly on stock tropes of the utopian tradition. In the new 
utopian order, lawyers and even laws themselves become obsolete (28); 
prisons and punishments become unnecessary (28); the quality of med-
icine improves (29–30); the imperial ambitions of the nation evaporate 
(32); the only wars undertaken are for the sake of justice and liberty (32); 
Christian charity comes to dominate social relations (30); and although 
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the economy still uses money, everything has become so cheap that 
the affordability of goods is simply not an issue (28, 32, 34). Indeed, 
nature itself appears to be miraculously liberated from its shackles by 
this transformation: “Still Peace and Plenty reign,/ And every Thing is 
cheap, tho’ plain:/ Kind Nature, free from Gard’ners Force,/ Allows all 
Fruits in her own Course” (34). Perhaps most important, people seem 
to live well, rather than pursuing an endless and pointless round of 
consumption: “Those, that remain’d, grown temp’rate, strive,/ Not 
how to spend; but how to live” (33). It is this idyllic portrait of utopian 
life, not some caricature of a starving and straitened premodern life, 
that Mandeville is calling upon us to reject, in favour of a modern com-
mercial economy:38
Then leave Complaints: Fools only strive
To make a Great an Honest Hive.
T’enjoy the World’s Conveniences,
Be fam’d in War, yet live in Ease,
Without great Vices, is a vain
Eutopia seated in the Brain. (36)
This is the judgment we must make, the “moral” we must draw enabled 
by the fable itself, and it can only take place in the aesthetic terms of 
the narrative we are given, not according to some set of empirical cri-
teria. I have said that the work of judgment is at once fictioning and 
deliberative. It is fictioning because it requires the imagination of this 
utopian alternative against which we might gauge the advantages and 
disadvantages of commercial society. It is deliberative because Man-
deville, in the course of his fiction, gives us reasons to prefer modern 
consumer society to the utopia, as inadequate as these reasons are. The 
arguments range from the frivolous to the gravely earnest, but none of 
them can have the knock-down force of a syllogism, which makes the 
utopia inconceivable as an alternative, since the choice between the two 
will always be a judgment we make and a judgment that we can always 
make differently. Indeed, examining the fable’s reasons, it is still diffi-
cult to know what dictates the preference for consumer society over the 
utopia of the fable. Among the silliest of reasons for the preference is the 
worry that the utopian economy will only produce plain goods, unable 
to entertain the taste for rarity, luxury, and novelty (“Rarities cannot be 
had”). The aestheticizing character of the objection is all too apparent 
here, implicitly appealing to the contemporary aesthetic category of the 
new. Other concerns centre on the collapse of the commercial economy, 
from the rise of unemployment within the formal economy of the divi-
sion of labour (32) to the worry that satisfaction with their lot will pre-
vent people from working (34–5). But as weighty as these objections 
are, they cannot be sustained on their own terms, since they depend on 
us accepting the value of the commercial economy itself, which is pre-
cisely what the fable is supposed to convince us of. Perhaps the most 
serious objection is the Schmittian one: the worry that such a utopia 
would constantly face an existential threat, beset on all sides by foes 
that would want to eliminate or incorporate it (35). But even the spectre 
of this existential threat is not sufficient since we can always judge that 
our continued political life is not worth having if it is denuded of all its 
value, a judgment unavailable to a Schmittian politics but one that we 
must preserve nevertheless. As the extreme example of the existential 
threat shows, the judgment between these two political systems, and 
indeed these two forms of life, cannot lie in any empirically adduced 
advantage, whose value can always be called into question. It must 
lie, rather, in the aesthetic dimension, by which I mean not the unac-
countable and dogmatic assertion of value but instead the ends that we 
fashion and fiction for ourselves and convince others to love. For the 
utopia, this end is the kind of “living” or “living well” that we can call 
by its old-fashioned name of happiness (“Not how to spend; but how to 
live”). But what is the end for which consumer society is instituted? Its 
end, if we are to judge by the fable’s immoral “Moral,” is simply itself, 
not something substantive beyond it: “Then leave Complaints: Fools 
only strive/ To make a Great an honest Hive/ … / Bare Virtue can’t 
make Nations live/ In Splendor” (36–7, my emphasis).39 Thus, not only 
are the desiring or passionate agents within this economy motivated by 
a kind of purposiveness without purpose, but the economy itself, like 
a work of art, has become its own non-instrumental end, acquiring an 
autonomy that severs it from the human ends one might have thought 
it was instituted to subserve.40 This is why the fable has recourse to the 
aesthetic language of “greatness” and “splendour” at this point, as a 
way of convincing us of the economy’s autonomous value. Only on 
these aesthetic terms, only by valuing greatness and splendour over 
honesty and living well, would we choose the commercial economy 
over the bees’ post-lapsarian utopia. Clearly, then, the opposition of 
instrumentality and aesthetic autonomy cannot assist us in grasping 
what is problematic about this situation. The problem is rather taking 
something to be an end (the economy) over against the kinds of beings 
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that have the ability to make their own ends. The only redress we have 
in this situation is to insist on our capacity to judge that things might be 
better otherwise, in other words to fashion different ends for ourselves. 
It is precisely this capacity that most of the text, with its economistic 
account of mental functioning, seeks to conceal from us but that glim-
mers before us here briefly in the opening poem.
So, confronted with the choice between commercial society and the 
post-lapsarian utopia of the bees, how will we decide? Ultimately, I will 
have to leave it to your best judgment, but not without first quoting 
these wise words that preface Mandeville’s prefatory fable:
If laying aside all worldly Greatness and Vain-Glory, I should be ask’d 
where I thought it was most probable that Men might enjoy true Hap-
piness, I would prefer a small peaceable Society, in which Men neither 
envy’d nor esteem’d by Neighbours, should be contented to live upon the 
Natural Product of the Spot they inhabit, to a vast Multitude abounding in 
Wealth and Power, that should always be conquering others by their Arms 
Abroad, and debauching themselves by Foreign Luxury at Home. (12–13)
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